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J.S. Mill
Mill’s writings occupied a pre-eminent position in the
economic thought of the period 1£40 to 1870. He did not deviate
greatly from the basic tenets of the Ricardian system* However,
he showed that the tendency for profits to fall in the long run
as capital increased was subject to certain counteracting
influences such as speculation, Wakefield’s ’’fields of
employment” and an improvement in the terms of trade. It
should he mentioned that such qualifications were designed to
strengthen orthodox theory and not to provide a substitute for it.
Mill said that the rate of interest depends,
’’essentially and permanently, on the comparative amount of real
capital offered and demanded in the way of loan; but is subject
to temporary causes of various sorts, from increase and
(1 )diminution of the circulating medium”.v J Although Mill nowhere 
presents an integrated theory of the trade cycle, these so-called 
’’temporary causes” illustrate the discontinuity of economic 
progress.
One of these disturbances is speculation which is
characterized by credit expansion and low interest rates. When
the speculative boom collapsed there was an increased desire for
(2 ^liquidity and the rate of interest rose.v ' But for most of the
 ^ Principles of Political Economy (London, 1888), p.392.
Cf. J.S. Mill : ’’The Influence of Consumption upon 
Production”. Some Unsettled Questions of Political 
Economy. (London, 1948) T . . N.B. these essays 
were written in 1829 and 1830.
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tim e in t e r e s t  r a te s  ten d ed  to  f a l l  "from th e gradual p r o c e ss  o f
accu m u lation " . M ill  a ls o  ob served  how th ere  was g r a d u a lly  a
movement in to  e q u i t i e s  du rin g  th e  boom b ecau se  p eop le  were
d is p o se d  to  take g r e a te r  r is k s  and a movement back to  cash  as the
p a n ic  s e t  in  and l a t e r  in to  bonds when c o n d it io n s  became more
(1 )n o r m a l.' '
The sudden opening o f  any new and g e n e r a lly  a ttra c tiv e
mode o f  permanent in vestm en t w i l l  l ik e w is e  r a is e  the r a te  o f
in t e r e s t  as does a war w ith  i t s  u n u su a lly  la r g e  demands on the
( 2 )lo a n  m a r k e t .' J An in c r e a se  in  the volume o f  money low ers the
( 3)
r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t .
In  h i s  E s s a y Mi l l  r e fu te d  the d o c tr in e  o f  "The 
I m p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  G eneral O verproduction" and p o s tu la te d  c o n d it io n s  
in  w hich p r ic e s  m ight f a l l  b ecau se  o f  a d e f ic ie n c y  o f  demand.
H is remedy was to  in c r e a se  th e  money su pp ly  and low er i n t e r e s t .  
However, t h i s  was a s p e c ia l  ca se  and was n o t very  im portant in  
h is  \¥ork as a w hole.
A lfr e d  M arshall
A ccord ing to  M a rsh a ll, the r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t  was 
determ ined  by supply and demand ju s t  l ik e  any commodity. I n t e r ­
e s t  was p a id  to  induce p eo p le  to  fo rg o  p r e se n t  fo r  fu tu re
( 5 )g r a t i f i c a t i o n s . T h u s  we have an upward s lo p in g  supply curve  
and a downward s lo p in g  demand cu r v e , because i t  was a ls o  assumed 
th a t  a low er r a te  o f  in t e r e s t  in c r e a se d  the demand fo r  c a p i t a l .
^ ^ C f . P r in c ip le s  I b i d . ,  p p .386-8  and p p .43 9 -4 4 8 .
(2 4 b l d . . p . 389 ^  I b id . . p.391 ^ op. c i t . . p p .69-70
(^ )P r in c ip le s  o f  Econom ics (M acm illan , 19U7) .  pp.81 and 232.
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In the long run the supjjly and demand for capital were
in equilibrium, although in the short run an increase in the
demand for capital was met by a rise in the rate of interest
rather than by an increase in supply* Correspondence, however,
was eventually achieved because of the operation of the
"Principle of Substitution". When the rate of interest rose,
capital would be withdrawn partially from those uses where its
marginal utility was lowest. Conversely when it fell, it would
be found profitable to employ extra-marginal units of capital.
Thus Marshall distinguished between the market rate and the normal
rate of interest. These are only equal when sufficient time has
elapsed for supply and demand to be fully adapted to each other.
The emphasis on the "passage of time" is not without
significance. While there were certain "fundamental truths",
it was the true work of economic analysis to demonstrate "how much
more numerous are the exceptions to this general preference
(i.e., for present as against deferred gratification) than would
(1 )appear at first sight".v ' It is in this context that Marshall 
carries us to the very brink of general equilibrium analysis.
He criticised Bohm-Bawerk’s exclusion of everything that is not 
strictly speaking an intermediate good from his definition of 
capital. The true doctrine he thought was that, because 
interest has to be paid for and can be gained by the use of
capital, those long and roundabout methods are avoided unless
(2)they are more productive than others.v '
(1 ^ Ibid. . p.582 1-bid.. . p.583n.
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What are the exceptions? One is that saving is
governed by a number of factors besides the rate of interest - by
custom, habit of self-control and ... the power of family
affection. But while many people seemed to take little notice
of the rate of interest, "a strong balance of evidence seems to
rest with the opinion that a rise in the rate of interest ...
(1 )tends to increase the volume of saving".v 1
The Direction of Neo-Classical Thought
The view handed down by Hume and Smith was that the 
rate of interest tended to fall in the course of economic pro­
gress, as the volume of savings increased. As the State could 
do nothing to augment capital, it could not interfere with the
"natural" rate of interest. The rate of interest was an effect,
(2 )not a cause, of economic progress.v ' Ricardo concluded that 
the rate of interest was determined by the rate of profit to be 
obtained by the employment of capital. The rate of profit could 
not depend upon the rate of interest.w/
Mill showed that the market rate might diverge from the 
equilibrium rate because of temporary disturbances but in the 
main body of his work there was nothing to suggest that the rate 
of interest was anything more than a passive variable. Sooner or
(T)
(2)
(3)
Ibid.t p.533.
This doctrine, however, had been opposed by a number of 
seventeenth-century writers. Witness, for example, the 
views of Josiah Child.
The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
(Everyman, 1949), p.198.
- 7-
later it would find its ‘'natural" level and it was generally 
unwise for the State to tamper with it. The direction of neo­
classical thought, however, was towards establishing a causal 
connection between the level of interest and the volume of 
investment. This was accomplished by shifting attention somewhat 
to the demand for capital. When Marshall said that the demand 
for capital was guided by the principle of substitution he was 
merely recognizing that in the short run the rate of interest 
was one of the costs which the entrepreneur had to take account 
of in deciding how far, and in what directions, to push his 
investments. fhe margin of profitability of each entrepeneur 
was closely related to the rate of interest. If the rate fell 
without any change in other elements of costs, more machinery 
could profitably be employed. His analysis was applied to the 
whole economy: "The margin of profitability moves irregularly
outwards in all directions whenever there is a fall in the rate 
(1 )of i n t e r e s t , ' and further ... "the demand for the loan of 
capital is the aggregation of the demands of all individuals in 
all trades; and it obeys a law similar to that which holds for 
the sale of commodities". Marshall admitted that government 
borrowing was in a rather special category but said that even in 
that sphere the rate of interest "exercises a perceptible 
influence".
^  ^ op. cit. , pp. 520-1 (2 ^Ibid. , P.521
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Kowever, even though Marshallian theory accorded more 
or less equal weight to both short and long term factors in its 
analytical framework, it was conceived essentially in real and 
not in monetary terms. Mill had come close to a monetary 
explanation of the trade cycle and in doing so was greatly 
influenced by writers such as Tooke, Ellis, Chalmers, Lauderdale 
and Wakefield as well as by the severity of the 1824-25 financial 
crisis. But these disturbances were exceptions to the general 
rule that money was a medium of exchange having no special 
significance in itself.
It was Wicksell who was responsible for showing that
the level of interest rates had a direct connection v/ith prices
and the state of trade. It v/as one of Wicksell* s aims to arrive
(a )at and justify a principle of monetary policy.v ' A fall in the
rate of interest had a tendency to raise prices and to further
production; in the case of very long-term investments only a
small fall in the rate of interest was required to produce a
given increase in price while at the other extreme of raw
materials, the fall would need to be a good deal larger to bring
(2 )the same price response.v 1 Wicksell dispelled the neo­
classical inference that an easy money policy could result only
(1 )v 'Cf. T.W. Hutchison : A Review of Economic Doctrines 
(Clarendon, 1953),  p .236.
(2)v 'Knut Wicksell : Interest and Prices : A Study of the
causes regulating the volume of money (Macmillan, 1936), 
PP.91-2. (N.B. - Wicksell wrote in 1898).
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in  in f l a t io n ;  i t  was n o t the q u a n tity  o f  money but the r e l a t io n ­
sh ip  betw een  the n a tu r a l and m arket r a te s  o f  i n t e r e s t  th a t  
determ ined  the l e v e l  o f  p r ic e s .  The q u a n tity  o f  money had no 
c a u sa l s ig n i f ic a n c e  w h atever.
U n fo rtu n a te ly  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  a t t e n t io n  was p a id  to  
W ic k s e l l ’ s works u n t i l  com p ara tive ly  r e c e n t ly .  The co n v e rs io n  
by which i n t e r e s t  r a te s  were d is c u sse d  w ith in  the framework o f  
changes in  m onetary r a th er  than r e a l phenomena was on ly  p a r t i a l l y  
r e a l iz e d  by o th e r  e a r ly  tw e n t ie th  cen tu ry  w r it e r s .  However, 
F ish e r  and C a sse l had much in  common w ith  W ic k se ll and a ls o  
e x e r te d  an in f lu e n c e  on the tren d  o f  thought on monetary 
q u e s t io n s  p r io r  to  the r i s e  to  prominence o f  the K eynes-H aw trey- 
R obertson t r i o .
I t  i s  c e r ta in ly  q u ite  wrong to  th in k  th a t the v iew s o f  
w r ite r s  p r io r  to  1930 were so a l ik e  th a t  we can d e sc r ib e  them 
as c l a s s i c a l  or by some o th er  la b e l  in d ic a t in g  hom ogeneity .
P igou  probably c a r r ie d  on the " c la s s ic a l"  t r a d i t io n  in  the sen se  
th a t  he brought M arshall up to  d a te  w h ile  s t i l l  p r e se r v in g  h i s  
b a s ic  p rem ises and c o n c lu s io n s . P ig o u , how ever, was n o t a 
m onetary t h e o r i s t ;  he d id  n o t th in k  th a t  f lu c t u a t io n s  in  
econom ic a c t i v i t y  o r ig in a te d  to  any a p p re c ia b le  e x te n t  from  
m onetary d is tu r b a n c e s , and h e ld  th a t  i t  fo llo w e d  from the  
p o s t u la t e s  o f  " c la s s ic a l"  econom ics th a t  th ere  cou ld  be no id le
sa v in g s
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Knut Wickseil
Wicksell was the economist who threw out the strongest 
challenge to the adequacy of the self-adjusting normal equilibrium 
models. He considered that the main problem of monetary theory 
lay in the question of why prices rose or fell and was impressed 
with Tooke’s observation that the rate of interest was generally 
low during times of falling prices and high during times of 
rising prices.
He asserted that changes in prices owed their origin to 
divergences between the "natural" and market rates of interest.
The natural rate was said to be governed by the marginal 
productivity of capital which Wicksell, following Bbhm-Bawerk 
regarded as arising from the roundabout methods of production 
such as would exist if money were not used. This has been inter­
preted by contemporary writers as the rate which equates savings 
and investment. Thus Wicksell integrated the theory of money 
with the theory of interest and showed that money could not be 
"neutral" when a divergence occurred between the natural rate and 
the market rate because this gave rise to price movements which 
tended to be cumulative in character. Furthermore, as the 
natural rate was changing almost continuously, it would be a very 
exceptional set of circumstances that v/ould render money 
innocuous.
Wicksell regarded this analysis as a mere amplific­
ation of the Quantity Theory and not an explanation of the trade-
- 1 1 -
(1 }cycle, which he attributed to real causes.v ' He objected
strongly to the idea that rising prices were due simply to an
excess of money and falling prices to a scarcity. The volume
of money was merely a consequence of changes in the demand for
instruments of exchange brought about by price movements. The
cause of price movements was to be found not in absolute changes
in market rates of interest but in changes relative to changes
(2 )in the natural rate.x '
There is some resemblance here to Keynesian analysis.
Keynes also held (in his General Theory) that absolute changes
in the rate of interest commanded less importance than their
position relative to the marginal efficiency of capital schedule
which is somewhat akin to the "natural" rate of interest as used
by Wicksell. However, with Wicksell the emphasis was on price
and not income effects and his system was an inherently unstable
one. He argued that if a lower rate were imposed on a hitherto
stable system and maintained at that lower level the increase in
prices which resulted would give rise to further increases ad
infinitum. Hence a cheap money policy was likely to cause an
(3)uncontrollable rise in prices. K J Keynes stressed the inherent
^^Cf. Lectures on Political Economy (London, 1 9 3 4 ) ,  Vol. 
II, p p . 209-11 .
K 'interest and Prices, op. cit., pp.166-7*
^ h b i d .  , p .1 0 0 .
(2 )
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instability of the Investment Demand Schedule itself hut such
instability did not give rise to a cumulative departure of the
whole system from an equilibrium position. At least two further
factors distinguish the Keynesian system; one is the difficulty
of keeping interest rates low because of liquidity preference
and the other is the belief that in the long run the marginal
efficiency of capital schedule would fall to zero.
Another point of similarity, however, is that Wicksell
did much to shift the traditional emphasis on bank rate. He
said that the benefits of a cheap money policy were not fully
felt until long term interest rates had moved in sympathy with
(1 )short term rates.v y It was a change in bond rate - not the
discount rate - that was the operative factor in price changes.
The discount rate, however, was important in relation to
(2 )international capital movements. v '
While no statistics of the natural rate were available, 
the banks were not powerless to influence the level of economic 
activity; the practical guide was the level of prices. If 
prices were tending to rise the rate of interest must be raised 
and if tending to fall, it must be lowered. The goal was the 
stability of the price l e v e l . T h e  main cause of instability
^rbid. , p.192.
'^Wicksell became increasingly sceptical as to the efficacy of purely monetary measures to arrest pronounced price 
movements.
(3)lbid. , p.89
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was found in the failure of the banks to promptly adjust their 
market rates of interest whenever there occurred a general change 
in the price level,
Gustav Cassel
Cassel was more confident than Wicksell in the ability
of the banks to mitigate business cycles by appropriately
manipulating interest rates. In fact he went as far as to say
that if the banks always acted promptly to ensure equality
between the true equilibrium rates and their money rates, the
trade cycle would be a ’’thing of the past". Observed cycles
were explained in terms of unavoidable changes in the production
(1 )of real capital.v ' The expansion of real capital was hampered 
by a relatively high rate of interest.
As for interest theory, Cassel was essentially 
Marshallian and not Bbhm-Bawerkian. The rate of interest simply 
accommodated itself to the demand and supply of capital. As 
for interest policy, the rate of interest was a most pov/erful 
instrument for stimulating investment. The true comparison, 
howrever, was bet ween the Bank Rate (not bond rate), and the 
"equilibrium rate".
Cf. The Theory of Social Economy (London, 1923)*
Cf. The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1927-28),
pp.511-29. Reprinted in Readings in Monetary Theory 
(Blakiston, 1951), p p»319-333«
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The ’’true equilibrium rate” was apparently the rate
which maintained a constant price level. A reduction in Bank
Rate was assumed to lead to a fall in bank lending rates, thence
to an increased demand for loans and rising prices. If the
banks failed to prevent a departure of Bank Rate from the true
equilibrium rate, wide price fluctuations and serious economic
disturbance would ensue.
Cassel, like Marshall, thought that the rate of
interest was only one of the factors which affected saving.
However, while savings did not vary much with usual fluctuations
in the rate of interest, the latter was nan essential factor
(1 )keeping up the supply of net savings to its actual height."' J 
Irving Fisher
Fisher’s Appreciation and Interest (1896) is comparable
in many respects with Wicksell’s Interest and Prices. Both
grappled with what may be called the Ricardo-Tooke Conundrum of
why the rate of interest had often been low during times of
(2 )falling prices and high during times of rising prices. v '
Fisher made no formal distinction between natural and 
market rates of interest but spoke instead of nominal and real 
rates. The real rate was the nominal rate corrected for changes 
in the value of money. He said that theorists in the past had 
mistaken nominal rates for real rates. v / The inherent
I IMd.
*<Cf. T.W. Hutchison, op. cit.. pp.274-5»
^Appreciation and Interest, pp.67-9.
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instability of the system was due to a failure of the market rate 
to adjust itself sufficiently to a change in prices.
Any price rise tended to he cumulative because the 
market rate of interest was not raised to an extent sufficient to 
neutralize the future fall in the value of money. When prices 
were rising profits would also rise and borrowers could afford 
to pay a higher "money" interest. The movement tended to be 
cumulative because it was some time before people realized that 
borrowers were, in fact, better off than before the price rise.
The interest rate would not therefore be fully adjusted to the 
level of prices - i.e. , to the fall in the value of money. This 
situation, however, would soon lead to an increased demand for 
loans and to an investment boom. The boom ends because "in 
self-protection" the banks must eventually raise the rate of 
interest. A financial crisis and a downturn in economic 
activity followed.
Both Fisher and Wicksell played up the importance of 
money and their conclusions did not vary greatly. Thus Fisher 
said : "the monetary causes are the most important when taken in 
conjunction with the maladjustment in the rate of interest."
There v/ere differences, however, in methods. Most important 
perhaps was Fisher’s use of the crude Quantity Theory to explain 
changes in the value of money. Wicksell regarded this as an 
unsatisfactory tool of analysis and, as mentioned earlier, did
- 1 6 -
not even consider it as an operative factor in the situation.
On the other hand it may he objected that he was able to maintain 
this position only because of his particular regard to the 
natural rate of interest, which was a non-monetary phenomenon, 
and its position relative to the long-term market rate in the 
determination of prices. It has been claimed that this smacks 
of circular reasoning, and that by definition he had tended to 
assume the problem away.
R.G. Hawtrey
The increasing importance of monetary phenomena was
carried a stage further by Hawtrey who v/rote at a time when
interest in trade cycle problems was mounting and when central
banking techniques were developing rapidly.
('[ )In one of his early publicationsv ' Hawtrey said this:
"whereas the influences arising out of the banking system are very
important, those which arise from conditions of production and
consumption have but little bearing upon the state of trade as a
(2 )whole." In a later publicationv~y he said that the principal 
instrument for regulating credit was the rate of interest which 
was determined by the demand and supply of loans. Against the 
view that variations in interest rates were not of much signif­
icance when compared with prospects of profit, Hawtrey held that 
profits were high because prices were rising and it was under
^ ' Good and Bad Trade (London), 1913» p.130.
( 2 )
K J Currency and Credit (London), 1927.
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these conditions that it "becomes exceptionally profitable to buy 
and hold stocks. If the rate of interest was raised sufficient­
ly high to offset the extra profit, there was every reason to 
expect an immediate reaction on the demand for new credits.
Hav/trey admitted that a change in the rate of interest 
may be of small moment to the manufacturer but thought it was a 
very important consideration for the wholesaler. In fact the 
trade cycle was set in motion because of the high degree of 
sensitivity of commerical borrowing to a change in credit terms. 
It was the market rate that actually checked or stimulated 
borrowing but it was Central Bank action in making Bank rate
"effective" that secured the attainment of a particular market
(1 )rate.x ' The rate of interest on short-term borrowings was the
primary weapon of credit contraction but could be reinforced by
other methods "open to bankers to discourage their customers
(2)from borrowing."v 1
In 1930 Hav/trey was confident that the timely action
of central banks could serve to maintain a stable price level.
He altered his position somewhat as a result of the Depression,
for he admitted that the course of events had disclosed a weak-
(*)ness in the power of central banks.v /  He no longer insisted 
that a reduction in Bank rate was sufficient in itself to promote
(1^Ibid. , pp.55-6. Ibid., p.133
^^Cf. Trade Depression and the Way Out (London, 1934), 
p.133.
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recovery, The latent tendency to revival however, could be 
reinforced by the central bank purchasing securities in the open 
market. People do not have an unlimited desire to hold cash 
balances.
Hawtrey undoubtedly went further than any other 
economist in elevating the role of monetary policy,
J.M, Keynes : A Treatise on Money
In 1930 Keynes was confident that the rate of invest­
ment could be controlled through appropriate adjustments of 
market rates of interest and that the level of saving would also 
respond to a change in interest rates.
For the most part, the Treatise did not break new 
ground in the realm of economic theory, and certainly not in 
interest theory. In a sense we have something of a super­
structure built on a variety of hitherto loosely knit ideas. 
Problems were posed in a different way - in a more challenging
way: we feel that the author is searching for something big.
(1 )According to Dillard' ' the Treatise marked the turning point 
from a monetary theory of prices to a monetary theory of output. 
The central proposition, however, was that the cause of much 
instability was to be found in a divergence betv/een the natural 
and market rates of interest - and there was nothing novel in 
that idea. Greater attention would seem to have been focused 
on changes in the level of saving and investment; the
(A )' JPost Keynesian Economics - Edited by K.K. Kurihara
(Rutgers, 1954), P*4
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importance of the Treatise however, consists not so much in the 
particular theoretical structure employed as in the nature of 
the conclusions reached and the direction of thought in what 
subsequently proved to he a critical turning point in history.
Keynes maintained that there was a direct relationship 
between the long-term rate of interest and the level of invest­
ment. A dear money policy deterred new investment because it 
lowered the value of capital goods. However, it increased the 
rate of saving. When the price level of new investment goods 
fell, it not only upset the balance between investment and saving, 
but decreased the profits of those engaged in the production of 
consumption goods. By the same token a fall in the rate of 
interest increased investment relative to saving and raised the 
profits of those engaged in the production of consumption goods. 
Both effects led to an increase in the volume of employment
which entrepreneurs were prepared to offer at existing wage 
(1 )rates.' 1
Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry
The increased attention given to monetary aspects of 
crises and cycles after World War I reached its high watermark 
with the Macmillan Committee’s Report of 1931*
The Committee thought that there were some limitations 
to the usefulness of a Bank rate policy but that in conjunction
A Treatise on Money (Macmillan, 1930), Vol.I, p.209.
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with other monetary weapons, it offered the "best means of evening
out fluctuations in economic activity.
It was recognized, however, that the particular
situation which confronted Britain in 1930 was of an exceptional
nature and. that it might not therefore respond to the treatment
prescribed for a more "normal" situation. The pressing problem
was to increase exports, an objective which might be jeopardized
through too much credit expansion.
Of the Bank rate, the Committee said that "it exercises
a pressure in the right direction" whatever the extent of the
(1 )disequilibrium may be.v ' It was sometimes difficult to know
whether a rise in Bank rate was intended to correct a temporary
maladjustment or was the prelude to a more general and widespread
contraction. However, the confusion which this creates in the
minds of businessmen can be averted if the Bank of England
(2 )states the position clearly on each occasion.v J
Bank rate was a proper instrument not only for correct­
ing a temporary disequilibrium in the international loan market, 
but also for regulating the pace of internal expansion. But it 
was ^adequate by itself only within certain limits. It would 
not be sufficient, for example, when substantial changes in the 
level of industrial costs were called for.
(1 W r  216, p. 96 
^ P a r  221 , p.98
(2) Par 218, p.97
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The Coinmittee admitted that in conditions of extreme 
uncertainty and despression a change in the Bank rate might not 
be sufficient in itself "to attract borrowers for purposes of new 
enterprise". It was thought, however, that this aspect of 
things had been exaggerated and that in normal circumstances the 
banicing system had "indisputable power" to influence investment 
by increasing the quantity of money and reducing the cost of bank 
credit. In the normal course, the new issue market was highly 
responsive to the easing of bank credit. This ensured more real 
investment, larger profits and a greater stimulant to enterprise 
generally.^ ^
The monetary authority was indeed very powerful and the
greater danger was in the direction of letting loose too strong a
(2 )force which could not be controlled later on.v ' In fact there 
is quite a bit of evidence which suggests that the Committee was 
obsessed with the danger that the banks might expand credit too 
fast.
The Committee seems to have been impressed with the 
argument that dealers were highly responsive to changes in the 
short-term rate of interest. House-building and public utility 
undertakings were fairly sensitive to changes in the long-term 
rate of interest.
In Addendum I it was considered that a cheap money 
policy offered the best prospects for stability. The immediate
(3)
^‘ 'Pars. 232 and 233, p.102. 
^^Pars. 234-6, p.103* Cf. Addendum I
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problem was caused very largely by the reluctance of acceptable 
borrowers to come forward. The remedy as a first step was a fall 
in the long term rate of interest or some kind of State action.
Outline of Development of Bank Rate and Open-Market Policies 
before 1933
Before 1930 the functions of central banks were 
confined almost exclusively to acting as government banker, 
protecting the currency from gold and capital movements and 
acting as lender of last resort and clearing agent for the banks. 
After 1850 the note issue declined in significance and it is not 
surprising that we find the emphasis gradually shifting from 
control over currency to control over credit. It came to be 
generally conceded that the availability of credit could be 
influenced by changing the price of credit. Credit control 
however, was administered in a very indirect and impersonal way, 
firstly through Bank rate and later supplemented and reinforced 
by open market operations in Government securities.
By 1870 the Bank of England was a true bankers1 bank 
and London had developed as an international money centre. The 
use of Bank rate as a means of influencing gold movements and 
hence internal conditions dated back to 1825, although it was not 
until the Bank Charter Act of 1844 that the amount of bank money 
was tied to gold (representing a decisive victory for the 
"Currency School") and the idea of a penal rate developed.
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The second half of the 19th Century was the heyday of 
the Gold Standard system of monetary regulation. Indeed, up to 
the First Y/orld War the purpose of Bank rate was to regulate 
the amount of the gold reserve and in that capacity its role may 
have heen somewhat restricted. But what it possibly lacked as 
an initiating force it seems to have made up in the ever-widening 
range of its effects. For example, the idea that the Bank rate
(A )was a powerful psychological weapon grew rapidly. Hawtreyv J 
says that ''when the use of Bank rate to restrict credit became 
an established practice, trades, being aware of the intentions 
of the Bank, were inclined to anticipate them". Thus if the 
initial increase in the Bank rate brought no response, it was 
reasoned that the rate would go higher until the required effect 
was produced.
The theory of the Gold Standard was that it became
profitable to export gold when the balance of payments was
unfavourable and the exchanges adverse. If the imbalance
persisted long enough action v/ould have to taken to protect
the gold reserve. This usually took the form of a rise in the
Bank rate which had the "immediate effect of retaining money here
which would otherwise have been remitted abroad and of attracting
remittances from abroad to take advantage of the higher rate, thus
(2 )checking the outflow of gold and even reversing the stream."' J
^  ^ R.G. Hawtrey : A Century of Bank Rate (London, 1938),
p.249.
(2 )v 'Cf. Interim Report of the Cunliffe Committee on Currency 
and Foreign Exchanges (19^8).
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Conversely when the exchange? became too favourable there would be 
a tendency for gold to flow into the country and the Discount 
Rate would be reduced*
Before World War I the Bank of England was not happy
about imposing a credit policy on the banks but its Bank rate
policy developed to a stage v/here it became a recognized
technique for changing bank reserve positions and for influencing
expectations. The theory developed that a change in Bank rate
soon spread to other interest rates and thereby affected the
amount currently borrowed to finance expenditures whether for
real investment or to add to stock holdings. Thus the Cunliffe 
(1 )Committeev 'said that the raising of the Bank rate and the steps 
taken to make it effective in the market "necessarily led to a 
general rise of interest rates and a restriction of credit.
New enterprises were therefore postponed and the demand for 
constructional materials and other capital goods was lessened.” 
Consumption expenditure would also fall and with stocks being 
"unloaded” the result was a general decline in prices v/hich,
"by checking imports and stimulating exports, corrected the 
adverse trade balance which was the primary cause of the 
difficulty."
Up to the beginning of our period, Bank rate was assum­
ed to be the most suitable instrument for correcting an internal 
disequilibrium. With the disintegration of the gold standard and
~<J) Ibid
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the difficulties which followed World Wer I, $ policy of open- 
market operations was increasingly resorted to as a means of 
stabilizing the pound sterling and making Bank rate more effective 
in the market. Central banking in England responded to the 
challenge of a new era, although policy continued to be influ­
enced by the desire to return to gold at the old parity. It 
seems clear that the initiative for changes in bank rate before 
1930 came largely from changes in external conditions.
In the United States, the recently established Federal 
Reserve System moved haltingly towards a policy of influencing 
interest rates and hence credit conditions by means of open- 
market operations in conjunction with changes, where necessary, 
in the official discount rates of the various Federal Reserve 
Banks. In the United States the emphasis virtually from the 
beginning was on open market operations rather than on Bank rate 
as a penal rate, which had its origin mainly in the nature of the 
debt structure and the disposition among member banks against 
borrowing directly from the Reserve banks.
There may be a tendency to think that the use of Bank 
rate to correct an internal disequilibria depended in some way on 
the existence of the Gold Standard. Looking back in 1951 over 
a 20-year period of cheap money in which the currency was not 
tied to gold we might be excused for thinking that one could not 
work without the other. However, I think that events since 1951
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have shown that this is not so, although it is admitted at once 
that the effects of a change in Bank rate are now somewhat 
different from what they were in the twenties and different again 
from what they were prior to World War I.
Under the Gold Standard the gold reserve was used as 
an indicator of the monetary situation, it "being argued that the 
gold reserve reflected the demand for currency and credit which 
in turn fluctuated with the level of economic activity. This 
"being so it is understandable that some economists were pleading 
for a quicker response by the monetary authorities; although its 
efficacy was unquestioned, Bank rate rarely anticipated the 
economic climate. In this sense the Gold Standard made for a 
considerable inflexibility in policy and with the suspension of 
the Standard it was simply a matter of finding an indicator or 
indicators to replace the gold reserve-indicator which would
enable monetary policy to counteract inflationary or deflationary
(1 )tendencies.v ' An important indicator in Australia is the level 
of London funds while in the United Kingdom it is the level of 
gold and dollar reserves.
There is an essential difference between the management 
of our present monetary system and that which operated under the 
Gold Standard. Under the Gold Standard it was often necessary 
to deflate heavily to maintain stable exchanges, which more often
^‘'Cf. R.G. Hawtrey, op. cit., p.260.
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than not involved a considerable degree of unemployment. Under 
the Bretton Woods system governments may he reluctant to alter 
exchange rates and are required to lodge a formal application with 
the I.M.F. where significant changes are at issue; hut when an 
imbalance occurs the first line of defence is usually to cut hack 
imports and possibly seek temporary assistance from the Fund.
Fiscal and monetary policies may also he used hut the point is that 
governments are not now prepared to deflate heavily to secure 
external balance. If the deficit appears to he due to more 
fundamental causes the appropriate course is to depreciate the 
currency. The question of a dispute between the Fund and a 
member country hardly arises and it is recognized that each 
government must decide fbr itself as to the best means of 
restoring balance without increasing unemployment.
We saw in earlier sections that economists differed in 
some important respects in their approach to monetary questions. 
These differences should not be overlooked; but there would seem 
to have been a pretty general measure of agreement that a change 
in interest rates, however initiated, was an appropriate means 
of securing a balance between savings and investment. Some 
writers emphasized changes in short rates, others long rates; 
the efficacy of a flexible interest policy, moreover, would depend 
partly on the resiliency of the cost structure and partly on the 
particular money market through which its effects were transmitted.
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In England it was a powerful weapon for "bringing the system "back 
to an equilibrium position* This view could hardly have been 
more forcefully presented than in the Report of the Macmillan 
Committee.
Monetary Policy in Australia before 1933
In the 1920’s Australia lacked a money market and the
bond market was an extremely narrow one. The economy was
largely dependent on international trade and particularly trade
with the United Kingdom. Furthermore, a considerable part of
the capital expansion was financed by overseas loans arranged in
London. The Commonwealth Bank had been established in 1911 but
by 1930 its central banking functions had not advanced a great
distance. It played no part either in the control of credit or
the maintenance of the gold standard. It is true that central
banking was "in the air" and that one or two steps were taken in
the direction of equipping the Bank with some of the armoury of
a reserve bank; but for all intents and purposes credit policy
- such as it was - was assumed by the ttrading banks, who did
(1 )not take kindly to the idea of a Central Reserve Ban}:. v 7
From what has been said in the preceding paragraph,it
is hardly surprising that the theory and practice of banking in
Australia before 1930 developed in an ad hoc fashion and was
strongly affected by the prevailing view in London. Sir Ernest
(2 )Harvey’s visit was a case in point.v 7 Australia was a
^  ^ Cf. H.W. Arndt : The Australian Trading Banks (Melbourne,
. v 1957), pp.152-6.
7Cf. L.F. Giblin, op. cit. , pp.41-6.
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dependent economy and it was clear that there could not have been 
a Bank rate or open-market policy in Australia of the kind used 
in more advanced economies. But the close link with the 
United Kingdom provided a good substitute in the absence of 
effective central bank control. Fluctuations in London Funds 
were manifested in changes in both the cash reserve and advance 
deposit ratios. A fall in London Funds v/as a signal for a 
general restriction of credit while a rise foreshadowed an 
expansion of credit. Credit contraction was expedited by a 
rise in both Bank Advance and Fixed Deposit rates while 
expansion was helped by a fall in these rates. In some vague 
sort of way these measures v/ere thought to redress an imbalance 
between savings and investment. In a sense therefore there 
was a policy although it was fairly automatic and responded 
somewhat after the fashion of Bank rate under the gold standard. 
The absence of a developed money and capital market and a virile 
central bank, however, must have severely limited the usefulness 
of this "policy”.
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Section 1 : Steps to Reduce Interest Rates in Australia, 1931-35
This Section is divided into the following sub-sections
viz, :
(a) Provisions in the Premiers’ Plan for reducing interest 
rates.
(b) Steps taken by the banks to reduce advance rates in 
accordance with their undertaking at the Premiers’ 
Conference.
(c) Successive reductions in fixed deposit rates.
(d) Successive reductions in advance rates.
(e) Reductions in savings bank deposit rates.
(f) Movement of bond and share prices.
(g) Reductions in Treasury bill rates.
(h) Reductions in other interest rates.
(a) Provisions in the Premiers’ Plan for reducing interest rates.
To help bridge the gap in government accounts and 
restore public confidence, the Premiers’ Plan of May/June, 193'i, 
provided for :
(i) reductions in government expenditure;
(ii) increased taxation;
(iii) a conversion loan to secure a reduction of 
22^ per cent in the internal interest burden;
(iv) reductions in bank interest rates.
The proposals, which embodied the major recommendations of the
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Copland Committee, were submitted to Cabinet on 6th June and in 
general approved.
The conversion of the internal debt from 5i per cent
and 6 per cent to 4 per cent was expected to result in a saving
to the budget of about £3 million in 1931/32 and to assist general
recovery through a fall in costs. It was to be accompanied by
corresponding reductions in bank, mortgage and other interest
(1 )rates. v '
a total internal debt of £538 million, dissent to conversion was 
made in respect of only 3 per cent, which was in the end
compulsorily converted with the assent of both political part 
The operation was greatly facilitated by the fact that about 40 
per cent of the total holdings were in the hands of banks and 
insurance companies. These institutions were approached during 
the conference and, after some debate, expressed their willingness 
to convert. Most of them believed that interest rates oughtto 
come down.
The Premiers’ Plan contemplated a reduction of bank and 
savings bank rates of interest on deposits and advances, but 
prescribed neither the amount of reduction nor the machinery by 
which it should be brought about. At the Premiers’ Conference 
a voluntary promise was accepted from the commercial banks that
 ^ ^L.F. Giblin, The Growth of a Central Bank (M.U.P. , 1951)
The conversion loan proved a spectacular success. Of
pp. 103-5.
' ;Ibid., p.106 and W.R. McLaurin, Economic Planning in 
Australia. 1929/36. (London, 1937). pp*86-90.
(2 )
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they would reduce their rates on the average of one per cent. At 
a Conference of hankers which was held one week after the Premiers’ 
Conference the hanks very reluctantly agreed to reduce rates on 
fixed deposits and advances hy an average of one per cent. 
Reductions in the rates offered for new fixed deposits were to 
take place at once and those on advance rates were to he made 
with reasonable expedition, the method being left to the hanks
(A)individually.v 1 Fixed deposit rates were reduced on 26th June 
and the reduction in advance rates is discussed in the next 
section. There was no difficulty about an immediate reduction 
in savings hank rates because business was conducted almost 
exclusively hy government sponsored institutions. The Common­
wealth Savings Bank reduced its maximum rate hy one per cent in 
July while the State Savings Bank of Victoria reduced its rate 
hy I? per cent and Savings Bank of South Australia hy \ per cent.
It was also agreed at the Premiers’ Conference that 
special relief should he afforded to private mortgagors. 
Accordingly all States passed legislation scaling down the level 
of fixed money payments hy 22j per cent.
The N.S.W. Act further provided for the reduction of 
dividends on preference shares hy 22^ - per cent. No other State 
did this hut the general practice of reducing fixed obligations 
of all sorts resulted in a number of companies making appeals to 
their shareholders for a voluntary reduction, which was
Giblin op. cit. , p.118 and Report of the Royal 
Commission on Banicing, p.?0.
(1)
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(J\)frequently granted.v '
As far as "bank interest rates were concerned, 
therefore, no attempt was made to force the hanks through 
legislative action to make any prescribed reductions.
(b) Steps taken by the banks to reduce advance rates in 
accordance with their undertaking at the Premiers1 
Conference.
While the banks moved together in bringing down fixed
deposit rates by one per cent in July, there was a notable
absence of enthusiasm for an immediate reduction in advance
rates. There was furthermore no single school of thought.
Some banks moved forward in the belief that lower rates would
help revise the demand for advances v/hile others tended to hang
back. The hesitancy generally in reducing overdraft rates in
compliance with the the Premiers’ Plan can be attributed largely
to the widely held belief in banking circles that the rate was
determined for them by the level of fixed deposit rates and that,
since the average fixed deposit was of twelve months duration,
the maintenance of the profit margin necessitated a lag before
(2 )overdraft rates could come down.v '
V/hile the overall position is somewhat obscure,
writers are generally agreed that the reduction of one per cent
in the average rate on advances had been completed by all the
(banks by the 1st October, 1931•
^^McLaurin, op.cit., pp.88-9 ^  ^ Ibid. , p. 229
(^Cf. Giblin, op. cit. , p.120 and Report of the Royal 
Commission on Banking, op. cit. , pp.70-1.
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As was said earlier, there was no compulsion in this 
matter; the main issue is whether the "banks honoured the under­
taking which they gave to the Premiers. However, in Hew South 
Wales an automatic reduction of 22\ per cent was required and 
three of the other States provided that, if advance rates were not
J
brought down by October 1st, they Jvould be reducedty proclamation.
But this did not prove necessary. The Wallace-Bruce Committee
reported in April, 1932 that the banks had "reduced interest on
overdrafts by an average of about 14 per cent" in accordance
with their agreement under the Premiers’ Plan. ^ !
Information on rates prevailing for cheque-paying banks
as a whole on the eve of the Premiers’ Plan is scanty but for the
year 1929/30 the rate for all cheque-paying banks varied between
7 and 8 per cent, having been increased by \ per cent on the two
(2 )preceding years.* v ' Prior to the Premiers’ Plan the Commonwealth
Bank’s maximum rate for bank overdrafts was 6\ per cent. This
rate had been effective since July, 1925* In July, 1931 the
bank reduced it by one per cent to 5i per cent and the Sydney
banks would appear to have taken similar action at about the
same time, their maximum rate having fallen from 8^ per cent in
(3)July, 1930 to 7 per cent in July, 1931* The Melbourne banks
were slower to make downward adjustments»- In September, 1931 
the National Bank, for example, reduced its minimum overdraft
^  ^ Ibid., pp.89-90 Finance Bulletins
(3)v J McLaurin, op. cit. , p.228.
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rate from 6j per cent to 6J per cent and again to 6 per cent in
(^)December,v '
All banks seem to have become increasingly mindful of
the need for special concessional rates to primary producers.
According to a statement by Mr. Heffer,^^ (Acting Chief Inspector
of the Bank of N.S.W.), the bank’s ruling rate for farmers’
overdrafts was reduced by per cent on 1st July, 1931*
Despite the antipathy of some banks to an immediate
fall in overdraft rates and their insistence that such falls
depended very largely on fixed deposit rates and other costs over
which they had no real control - despite these delaying tactics -
the banks announced publicly that an average reduction of one per
cent had been made from 1st October, 1931 , and the Banicing
Commission in 1937 was apparently satisfied. Giblin points out,
however, that the reduction was not from the level of June, 1931,
(?>)as the Premiers expected, but from the peak in 1930. '
(c) Successive reductions in fixed deposit rates.
To put successive reductions of fixed deposit rates in 
a true perspective, we may list here the rates which obtained 
prior to and as an immediate outcome of the Premiers’ Conference. 
These are as follows
(1 )v 'Royal Commission on Banicing : Minutes of Evidence, p. 138.(2)v 'Evidence given before the Royal Commission on the Wheat 
Industry on 5th July, 1934, and reprinted in Cross 
Currents of Australian Finance (Angus & Robertson, 1936) ,
pp. 280-1.
Giblin, op. cit. , p. 121.
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Rates in Force
26th June, 1931
3 months hi per cent 3i per cent
6 months hi Per cent 3i per cent
12 months 5 per cent 4 per cent
24 months per cent hi per cent
^Further reductions in fixed deposit rates occurred
at the following dates •
(i) November, 1931
(ii) March, 1932
(iii) May/June, 1932
(iv) November, 1932
(v) February, 1933
(vi) April, 1934
(vii) August, 1934
(viii) October, 1934
(ix) December, 1934
With the exception of the adjustment in December, 1934, the
Commonwealth Bank and the trading banks moved together with
comparatively little delay in most cases. Beginning early in 
1933 the Commonwealth Bank initiated all changes in deposit 
rates with the exception of the rise in March, 1936. The 
changes in fixed deposit rates for the relevant period are as
follows :
- 38 -
P e r io d  f o r  v/hich 3 M onths 6 M onths 12 Months 24 M onths
r a t e s  o p e ra te d
1929 /30 4 /o ki% 3% 5i/o
26/ 6/31 to  25/ 11/31 3i% 3t%
2 6 /1 1 /3 1  to  6/ 3 /3 2 3% 3i% 3%% . 4/o
7/ 3 /3 2  to  M ay/June 1932 2 h% 3% 3i% k%
M ay/June 1932 to  3 1 /1 0 /3 2 2/ / 3% 3k% 3i%
1/ 11 /32  to  6/ 2 /3 3 2ifo 2 3% 3\%
7 /2 /3 3  to  11 A / 3 4 2% 2'f/o 2i% 3%
1 2 /4 /3 4  to  8 /8 /3 4  
9 /8 /3 4  to 1 0 /1 0 /3 4  
I I / 1 0 /3 4  to 1 6 /1 2 /3 4
2%
W
W o
i-hfr-W
 ^
 
CM CV 
C
\J
m
2i%
23 I k % 
2i%
1 7 /1 2 /3 4  to  2 3 /3 /3 6 w 2\% 2
2 4 /3 /3 6  to  2 3 /1 /4 0 2% w 2|fo 3%
The r e d u c t io n  i n  f i x e d  d e p o s i t  r a t e s  a s  from  27 t h
November a p p e a rs  to  have  b e e n  ta k e n  a s  a m a t te r  o f  c o u rse  and th e  
b a n k s  a l l  moved a t  once . T h is  s te p  a ro u sed  l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  a t  
th e  t im e , p a r t l y  b e c a u se  i t  was n o t  u n e x p e c te d  and p a r t l y  
b e c a u se  o th e r  more w e ig h ty  m a t t e r s  -  such  a s  p o l ic y  on exchange 
r a t e s  -  en g ag ed  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  th e  B oard  and th e  b a n k s .
The r e d u c t io n s  i n  M arch, 1932 a l s o  a p p e a r  to  have e x c i t e d  l i t t l e  
comment.
I n  May, 1932 , ho w ev er, th e  b an k s  d id  n o t  move to g e th e r .  
T h ree  banks -  th e  W ales , Bank o f  A u s t r a l a s i a  and th e  Union Bank 
announced  a r e d u c t io n  from  3 i p e r  c e n t  to  3 i p e r  c e n t  f o r  tw e lv e
months deposits and from 4 per cent to 34 per cent for two year
deposits.v ' In June these new rates became general. "While
the majority of banks had thought it better not to reduce, first
one institution acted individually, being followed by two others,
the position being thus gradually disintegrated. Three large
banks then decided to take the same step, not so much from
conviction as for the sake of general unanimity and with the
(2 )object of bringing about unison amongst bankers once more".K '
The next reduction of fixed deposit$ rates occurred in 
November, 1932. Prom about this date more interest appears to 
have been aroused on the question of cheap money. The trend 
was observed as a world-wide phenomenon and one which was natural 
enough in circumstances of economic depression and which would 
therefore have occurred in the absence of government inter­
ference. It was argued that as long as fresh enterprise was 
insufficient to absorb fresh savings, the tendency toward cheap 
money would continue. The increasing tendency to place money
on fixed deposit was also regarded as a reason for the lower 
(xNrates.v ' The trend of bank deposits and the ratio between 
interest-bearing and non-interest bearing deposits is as 
follows:-
(A )v Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, May 1932.
Ibid. , June, 1932.(3) Ibid., November, 1932
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. Quarter- Bank Deposits Ratio . of Interest-Bearing to
(£ Million) Non-Interest Bearing Deposits
1929 285.1 1 .6 5
1930 267.0 1.97
1931 258.3 2.19
1932 277.0 2.18
1933 274.7 2 . 0 9
While deposits bearing interest rose by £12.5 million (or by 7 
per cent) between June, 1929 and June, 1932, current account 
deposits in the same period fell by £2 0 . 7 million (or by 19 
per cent).
Further reductions in interest rates on Commonwealth
Treasury Bills and new fixed deposits in the Commonwealth Bank and
the trading banks were announced towards the end of January,
1933 and took effect from 6th February. This marks an important
turning point because it was the first time that the Commonwealth
Bank took a definite lead in the reductions, A.C. Davidson v/as
prominent in urging further reductions in interest
rates and expressed a willingness to follow a lead from the
Commonwealth Bank 11 in further action to reduce interest rates
f1 )along sound lines”.v } Judging from comments by other leading
bankers about the same time, it would seem that these sentiments
became to/widely shared.
Apart from the lead which the Commonwealth Bank could 
give by varying its own fixed deposit rates, the fixed deposit
^  rklfl. » February, 1933*
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rates of the trading banks were said to be influenced by the 
rate on savings bank deposits, the yield on government securities, 
and other similarly secured avenues of investment. Many leading 
bankers when questioned before the Royal Commission on Banicing 
as to the principle followed in fixing deposit rates replied that 
they v/ere largely dependent on market conditions and the policy 
of the Commonwealth Bank and Commonwealth Savings Bank in fixing 
their own deposit rates.
In February, Davidson was urging a further reduction 
in fixed deposit rates.
"A further reduction of.... say, half of one per
cent would ease the interest rates on advances both by 
trading banks and other financial houses. The wool 
report demonstrates that further reductions in these 
rates would be a welcome relief.... The recent steady 
fall in the yields of Australian consols shows plainly 
that interest rates are weakening under the slow 
influence of a declining demand for money. It 
would give a fresh impetus to business if this 
tendency were accelerated by the Commonwealth Bank 
buying enough Australian consols to bring their 
yields nearer to the new rate on two year fixed 
deposits. This would obviate big transfers from 
fixed deposits to Government securities, and 
consolidate the beneficial effect of the lower rate
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in promoting other forms of investment. With fixed 
deposit rates, rates on advance would fall. The 
lower rates at which money could he borrowed would 
bring new fields of expenditure within the scope of 
practicable business, and the v/ay could be open for 
longer term borrowing by Governments to the degree held 
practicable and safe.uv '
Bank fixed deposit rates did not fall again, however,
until April, 1934, although the new rates of 2 -\% and 2j%,
for 6 months, 12 months and 24 months deposits respectively were
regarded as being exceptionally low. The rate of 2% for 3 months
maturity remained unchanged. This reduction was decided upon
by the directors of the Commonwealth Bank on 11th April and took
effect from the following day. The Sydney and Melbourne banks
came into line but the Melbourne banks moved with much reluctance
as "apart from the influence of the Commonwealth Bank and the
Sydney banks, which forced their hands, they were against a
(2 )reduction of rates under present conditions."' '
In August the Commonwealth Bank announced a reduction 
in the rate of interest allowed on fixed deposits for 3 months 
from 2 per cent to 1-g- per cent and the Associated Banks made a 
similar announcement on the following day. The new rates took 
effect from 9th August.
(O (2)Ibid Ibid.. April, 1934-
On 10th October, 1934 it was announced by the Chairman 
of the Commonwealth Bank that the Board had decided to make a 
further reduction of in the rate of interest allowed on fresh 
fixed deposits for 6, 12 and 24 months. The new rates, taking
effect on 11th October, were 1j$, 2%, and 2j%. The two
Sydney banks reduced their rates similarly as from 12th October* 
The Associated Banks in Victoria took the same step but with some 
feelings of reluctance as is indicated by the following statement: 
"The Victorian banks, without in any way 
reflecting upon the decision of the Commonwealth Bank 
Board, would have preferred to keep the old rates 
stable for some time longer. They hold the view that 
frequent alterations are somewhat upsetting to the 
business community...until comparatively recently the 
trading banks always quoted higher rates for term 
deposits than the Commonwealth Bank, but today it will 
be seen that they are now all in line.’* v 1
The new rates were slightly lower than those reached 
in the cheap money era of the 1090ts. In September, 1896, three 
leading banks reduced their rate for 12 months fixed deposits 
from 3 per cent to 2-g- per cent and for 6 months deposits from 
1 to 1 % in Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania while the 
rest of the banks continued to allow 3 per cent for 12 months 
fixed deposits. Rates remained low for a number of years after 
1896, as the effect of droughts held back enterprise.
Ibid., October, 1934»
The final downward adjustment in fixed deposit rates
was announced by the Commonwealth Bank in December. It was for 
■§■ per cent on 3 months and 6 months maturities, and took effect 
from 17th December. The trading banks, however, decided not to 
follow on this occasion.
(d) Successive reductions in advance rates
Apart from the one per cent reduction which was 
generally made effective by 1st October, 1931, announcements 
of reductions in advance rates of private trading banks were 
made on four successive occasions - in August, 1932, March, 1933 
May, 1933 and July, 1934* As noted earlier, however, these 
announcements are only part of the story as there appear to have 
been considerable variations from time to time in rates charged 
by each bank to different classes of borrowers according to 
ability to pay and the degree of essentiality of the industry 
concerned. The provision of finance was of course influenced 
by other considerations besides the interest charge.
Changes in the maximum overdraft rate of the Common­
wealth Bank to this period were as follows :
Date New Rate
November, 1934
July, 1932
January, 1933 
April, 1934
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When th e  t r a d i n g  h a n k s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  advance r a t e s  a f t e r  M arch, 
"1936, th e  Commonwealth Bank d id  n o t  r a i s e  i t s  advance  r a t e s  and 
th e  p e r  c e n t  r a t e  was i n  f a c t  r e t a i n e d  t i l l  A u g u s t ,  1932.
No r e d u c t i o n s  were announced by  th e  p r i v a t e  b a n k s  a s
a whole b e tw ee n  O c to b e r ,  1931, u n t i l  th e  end o f  A u g u s t ,  1932,
a l t h o u g h  an a l l - r o u n d  r e d u c t i o n  h ad  b e e n  m ooted f o r  some m onths
and th e  Commonwealth Bank had  a c t e d  i n  J u l y .  In  t h i s  p e r i o d
t h e r e  were o f  c o u r s e ,  some downward moves by i n d i v i d u a l  b an k s
u s i n g  t h e i r  own d i s c r e t i o n  and w i th  s p e c i a l  r e f e r e n c e  to  th e
r e q u i r e m e n ts  o f  th e  more n e c e s s i t o u s  c a s e s .  I n  J u l y ,  1932 , th e
Sydney banks  r e d u c e d  t h e i r  maximum r a t e  from  7 p e r  c e n t  to  6 p e r
(1 )c e n t v w h i le  i n  Sep tem ber t h e  N a t io n a l  Bank re d u c e d  i t s  minimum 
r a t e  from  6 p e r  c e n t  t o  5i  p e r  c e n t  -  a b o u t  -g- p e r  c e n t  h i g h e r  
t h a n  t h a t  r u l i n g  f o r  th e  Sydney b a n k s .  The announcem ent by  th e  
M elbourne b a n k s  a t  th e  end o f  A ugust s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  r e d u c t i o n s  
w ould  ta k e  e f f e c t  n o t  l a t e r  th a n  1 s t  O c to b e r ,  1 9 3 2 . ^ ^
The g e n e r a l  f a l l  i n  advance  r a t e s  i s  b r o u g h t  o u t  by  th e  
f a c t  t h a t  a t  3 0 th  J u n e ,  1935 , t h e r e  ?/ere no l o a n s  above 6-g p e r  
c e n t  and t h a t  o v e r  80 p e r  c e n t  o f  advances  w ere  c a r r y i n g  i n t e r e s t  
c h a rg e s  o f  l e s s  t h a n  5 p e r  c e n t ,  a l th o u g h  th e  p re d o m in a n t  r a t e  
was a b o u t  5 p e r  c e n t . p u r i n g 1934 and 1935 two o f  th e  b a n k s  
q u o te d  a maximum r a t e  o f  5 p e r  c e n t  on a l l  a d v a n c e s . ^  "Where
0 )
( 2 )
(3)
(4)
M cL aurin , op, c i t . , p .2 2 8 .
A u s t r a l a s i a n  I n s u r a n c e  and B anking  R e c o rd ,  Sep tem ber 1932 
Cf. R e p o r t  o f  th e  R oyal Commission on B a n k in g ,  T ab le  I I ,
P* 31 5*
I b i d . , P.92.
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p r im a ry  p r o d u c e r s  a re  c o n c e rn e d ,  th e  A s s o c ia t e d  Banks have
(1 )d e c id e d  upon a maximum c h a rg e  o f  5 p e r  c e n t  p e r  annum. '
(T h is  had  b e e n  re d u c e d  t o  5 i  p e r  c e n t  i n  May, 1933) • The new
r a t e  o p e r a t e d  from  1 s t  J u l y .  T here  i s  a l s o  e v id e n c e  t h a t  many
b a n k s  c h a rg e d  no more th a n  4 i  p e r  c e n t  where a b i l i t y  to  pay  was
(2 )d o u b t f u l  and i n  ex trem e  c a s e s  i n t e r e s t  c h a rg e s  were s u s p e n d e d .* v ' 
Mr. D av idson  welcomed th e  r e d u c t i o n  announced  by  th e  
Commonwealth Bank on 2 1 s t  J a n u a r y ,  1933* to  a maximum o f  4 f  p e r  
c e n t  f o r  bank o v e r d r a f t s .  He hoped i t  was th e  p r e c u r s o r  o f  
f u r t h e r  a c t i o n  by  th e  Commonwealth Bank i n  ’'g i v i n g  a l e a d  to  and 
a s s i s t i n g  th e  t r a d i n g  b an k s  i n  r e d u c in g  t h e i r  r a t e s  o f  
i n t e r e s t . "
As from  1 s t  J u l y ,  1934 , th e  Bank o f  N.S.W. and C .B .C . 
o f  Sydney announced  t h a t  th e  maximum r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  on bank  
o v e r d r a f t  would  be 3 p e r  c e n t  com pared w i th  6 p e r  c e n t  p r e v i o u s l y .  
The minimum was a l s o  re d u c e d  from  5 p e r  c e n t  t o  4 i  p e r  c e n t  
w h e rea s  th e  M elbourne  b an k s  w ould  a p p e a r  t o  have  r e t a i n e d  th e  5 
p e r  c e n t  r a t e .  The Commonwealth B ank’ s maximum r a t e  was re d u c e d  
to  4 i  p e r  c e n t  i n  A p r i l ,  1934 and 4 i  p e r  c e n t  i n  November.
( e ) R e d u c t io n s  i n  S a v in g s  Bank d e p o s i t  r a t e s
From J u l y ,  1931 to  J a n u a r y ,  1935 th e  Commonwealth
S a v in g s  Bank re d u c e d  i t s  maximum d e p o s i t  r a t e  f i v e  t im e s .  O th e r_
'  1Announcement by  C hairm an o f  D i r e c t o r s  o f  A s s o c ia t e d  Banks 
o f  V i c t o r i a  on 1 9 th  J u n e ,  1934 , and r e p r i n t e d  i n  C ro ss  
C u r r e n t s ,  op. c i t . , p p . 277-8 .
(2 'C f .  Mr. I i e f f e r ’ s s t a t e m e n t  on 5 th  J u l y ,  1934.
(*>)v ' A u s t r a l a s i a n  I n s u r a n c e  and. B anking  R e c o rd ,  F e b r u a r y ,  1933*
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savings "banks made a similar number of adjustments. At 30th 
June, 1930, both the Commonwealth Savings Bank and the State 
Savings Bank of Victoria allowed a maximum of 4 per cent on 
current deposits. In December, 1934 both institutions announced 
that as from 1st January,1 ^ 35 the rate of interest allowed on 
deposits up to £300 was to be 2 per cent. Thus in a matter of 
about 5 years the rate had been cut by half. In the same period 
the Savings Bank of South Australia reduced its maximum rate 
from k i  per cent to per cent while the Hobart Savings Bank 
and the Launceston Bank for Savings reduced theirs from 4i per 
cent to 2 %  per cent.
Two of the early reductions in the deposit rate of the 
Commonwealth Savings Bank were announced concurrently with a 
reduction in the maximum overdraft rate. This comparison, 
together with successive reductions made by the State Savings
Bank of Victoria, are given in the following table :
Maximum Rates
Date from which C.S.B. S.S.B. of Commonweal th
new rates operated Deposit Victoria Bank Overdraft
Rate Deposit Rate Rate
w n p r (C)
July, 1925 64
October, 1928 4 4
July, 1931 (c) 3 54
August, 1931 (c) 3i
December, 1931 (c) 3i
April, 1932 (0 ) 3
Date
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C.S.B. S.S.B. Vic . C ’wealth Bank
July, 1932 2f 5
December, 1932 (c) 2%
J anuary, 1933 4^
March, 1933 (c) 24
April, 1934 4i
June, 1934 (c) 24
November, 1934 Mr
January, 1935 (c) 2 2
(a) C ommonwe alth Bank Annual Report, 1956-57.
(b) State Savings Bank of Victoria, Annual Report, 1954-55*
(c) Adjustments effective from 1st of Month.
The Commonwealth Savings Bank was responsible for 
initiating reductions in savings bank deposit rates during this
(A )period. According to McLaurin' ' the co-operation of the
Commonwealth Savings Bank was of material assistance in bringing
down fixed deposit rates although the Royal Commission on
(2 )Bankingv ' concluded that there was very little evidence to 
suggest that in this period great use was made of savings bank 
activities for the purpose of regulating credit.
The trading banks, however, were apparently aware of 
the potential control oyer credit which the Commonwealth Bank 
possessed by virtue of its extensive interest in the savings bank 
field. This power is exemplified in the words of Mr. Davidson:
(1) (2)op. cit., p.231 op. cit. , pp.71-2
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”It is possible that trading hanks may fear the
loss of deposits to the Savings Bank or through the
investment in Government securities of money
previously deposited. The Commonwealth Bank holds
the key to all these doors. By purchasing Government
securities itself the Central Reserve Bank can, by an
almost negligible expansion of Central Bank credit,
bring down the yield on such securities and make them
less attractive as an alternative to the fixed
deposit of money. By its control of the Commonwealth
Savings Bank it (i.e., the Commonwealth Bank) may
almost be said to dominate the Savings Bank situation.
It can thus give a lead to the trading banks and the
other Savings Banks in declaring a reduction of fixed
deposit rates, a lead which, in their own interests,
(1)the trading banks are sure to follow.” v '
The trend for this period in the deposit rates of
(2 )all Savings Banks is as folloY/s : ' '
(^ )' ' Australasian Insurance and Banking Record. February, 
1933.
K Report of the Royal Commission on Banking, pp.337-8.(2 )
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30th June C • ü.B. S.S.B.
of
Vic.
Savings 
Bank of
S. A.
Hobart
Savings
Bank
Launceston 
Bank for 
Savings
1930 4 4 41 44 44
1931 4 4 44 44 44
1932 3 3 34 3 3i
1933 24 24 3 2f 2f
1934 2i 2i 3 2| 2f
1935 2 2 2| 2| 2f
(f) Movement of Bond and Share Prices
In 1928/29 the yield on Australian Commonwealth Loans 
(all issues) was 5*35 per cent. In 1929/30 it increased to 
5.71 per cent. In 1930/31 the "bond market was disorganized "but
apart from the crisis period of March-June, 1931» "the average 
was about 7 per cent. The Premiers’ Plan provided for the 
conversion of the internal debt to securities "bearing interest 
at the rate of 4 per cent per annum "but this rate was not actually 
realized in the market until September, 1932, and no cash was 
raised from the loan market in this period. The yield on all
(A )issues in 1931/32 averaged 5 per cent.v '
In the next three financial years the yield on Common­
wealth Securities continued to fall so that in 1934/35 the
(2 )average for all issues was 3»32 per cent.v J
A year "by year analysis of the "behaviour of the "bond 
yields during the cheap money era is undertaken in Part IV and
( 1 )(2)Cf. Monthly Review of Business Statistics, Ibid.
No. 4
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the nature of the statistical information available is set out 
in Part III. The broad movement of Australian share prices 
during this period is also given in Part III.
(g) Reductions in Treasury bill rates
In the period under review Treasury bills were 
discounted at the following percentage rates :
October, 1930 6.0
July, 1931 4.0
November, 1932 3.50
January, 1933 3.25
February, 1 933 2.73
June, 1933 2.50
April, 1934 2.25
October, 1934 0OJ
January, 1933 1.75
The first issue of Treasury bills was made in 1927 but 
were initially issued strictly for lag of revenue purposes and 
paid off within the financial year. In 1929/30, however, they 
were issued as a means of providing funds to meet revenue deficits 
as well as loans for public works. In the three years to 30th 
June, 1933> Treasury bills to the extent of £48 million had been 
issued, £28 million being held by the trading banks at that date 
and £20 million by the Commonwealth Bank. There was no further 
rise in the volume of bills until World War II.
This substantial increase in Treasury bills was of 
course, directly related to the cessation of overseas borrowing
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and the poor response to internal loan issues, although as the 
loan market improved efforts were made to curtail further issues 
and to fund old ones. Resort to Treasury hill finance helped the 
hanks to tide over a difficult period hy offsetting the effects 
on liquidity of the fall in London funds and advances. It also 
assisted Governments to some extent. In 1930/31 and 1931/32, 
for example, Treasury hills represented about 14 per cent and 25 
per cent respectively of total funds employed hy governments.
The Treasury hill discount rate is, of course, an 
administered rate. As shown in the table, it was reduced hy 2 
per cent soon after the Premiers' Plan and hy a further one half 
per cent in November, 1932. A number of further downward adjust­
ments were made in succeeding years and in January, 1935 the rate 
was fixed at 1.75 per cent. In June, 1931 the Commonwealth Bank 
gave an assurance that it would meet hills at maturity and this 
had the result of making the hills more and more attractive to 
hanks as a suitable form of investment for their liquid funds.
The demand for Treasury hills in that sense rose - and certainly 
after 193*, faster than supply. The rate paid on Treasury hills 
therefore fell faster than most other rates. While the Treasury 
hill rate fell from 3i per cent to if per cent between November, 
1932 and January, 1935 the fall in advance rates for the trading 
hanks was from about 5i per cent to 4i per cent.v '
Gihlin, op. cit. . p.156n.
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The Treasury "bill rate was in no way a parallel 
instrument for influencing other interest rates on the lines of 
the Bank Rate in the United Kingdom although it is conceivable 
that it could have performed such a function had there been an 
active open market in bills. Despite the Commonwealth Bank’s 
power to alter the discount rate at will, this power is an 
arbitrary one and does not in itself either induce other interest 
rates to change or depend necessarily on such changes* Its 
main significance is found to lie in its relation to the profits 
of the trading banks.
The rate paid on Treasury bills was principally a 
means of assisting the banks. It helped them at a time when 
their liquid resources were increasing but when they were 
experiencing acute difficulty in expanding loans. There is one 
sense, however, in v/hich it may have been relevant to the 
structure of interest rates and that concerns the willingness of 
the banks to reduce overdraft rates which were generally less 
sensitive to market conditions than fixed deposit rates. In 
the thirties fixed deposit rates appear to have been highly 
sensitive to market influences and variations in the ratio of 
interest - bearing to non-interest bearing deposits were 
symptomatic of important changes in the economy. There was also 
a tendency on the part of the banks to preserve a fairly constant 
margin between advance and deposit rates. On the face of it, 
therefore, it would appear that market pressure for lower rates,
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given the maintenance of this customary margin, which was 
accompanied by a reduction in the Treasury bill discount rate, 
could adversely affect bank profits and make the banks less 
willing to effect a reduction in overdraft rates. It follows, 
that unless the authorities desired an alteration in this margin, 
which is exceedingly improbable in the circumstances, they would 
hesitate before altering the rate, unless of course more bills 
were available to be taken up by the banks. This is one sort 
of limitation which may have existed to prevent a too rapid fall 
in the rate.
In practice, therefore, the Treasury bill discount 
rate may have been less flexible than is commonly imagined; it 
may have been strongly influenced by market, conditions and 
banicing rigidities. On the other hand, it was very high before 
the depression and fell faster after 1931 than did other rates.
This was no doubt due in some measure to the growing attractive­
ness of bills to the banks as a form of investment which overtaxed 
the available supply. Despite the comment in the above para­
graph there is virtually no evidence of the Treasury bill discount 
rate having been a significant factor in the structure of 
interest rates in the 1930* s. It was not an initiating force 
in the market.
(4) Reductions in Other Interest Rates
Other interest rates which may claim special attention 
in this section are :-
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(a) rates of interest charged on mortgage loans by the
Savings banks;
(b) rates on Commonwealth Savings Bank loans to Local
Government authorities;
(c) maximum rates charged by the Commonwealth Bank for
Rural Credit advances.
The course of (a) and (b) were greatly influenced by 
changes in the rate payable on savings bank deposits which as 
we have seen was in turn influenced by fixed deposit rates and 
the prevailing market price of government securities.
probably more autonomous in character. It was reduced by one per 
cent in July, 1931 and further successive reductions took the 
rate to 3i per cent in July, 1934 - a very significant fall in 
four years. The changes between 1925 and 1940 were as follows :
The rate payable on Rural Credit advances was
Date from which new 
rate operated
Rural Credits Department - 
Commonwealth Bank 
(Maximum Rate)
October, 1925 
March, 1927 
January, 1929 
July, 1930
July, 1933
July, 1932
July, 1931
January, 1933
6%
5i%
6%
5%
Ui%
k%
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Date Maximum Rate
July, 1934 3l
July, 1940 34
Source : Commonwealth Bank Annual Report, 1956/57
Rates of interest charged on mortgage loans by the 
various savings banks together with the rate on credit foncier 
housing loans of the State Savings Bank of Victoria, which, 
however, have become important only in recent years, are set 
out below. The Commonwealth Savings Bank did not seek mortgage 
loans during most of this period.
Year ended State Savings Mortgage Loans(a) State Savings 
30th June Bank of Vic. Savings Hobart Bank of Victoria
Bank of Savings Credit Foncier
S. A. Bank Loans(b)
Houses Dwellings
and Shops
1929 6 — 6J 6 i  -  7 6 n. a. n. a.
1930 7 64 -  7 6 6 f  - 74 6 4 - 7
1931 6 6 4 - 7 6 6 6
1932 54 5 - 7 5 6 6
1933 5 5 - 5 4 44 5 5
1934 44 -  44 44 - 54 44 44 5
1935 4 -  44 44- 5. 4 i 44 44
1936 44 44-5 44 44 44
(a) Report of the Royal Commission on Banking, Table 2 5 ,
p.335.
(b) Report of the State Savings Bank of Victoria for year
ending 30/6/55. Outstanding loans during this 
period were only about £5 million for houses and
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£13 million for dwellings and shops. New Loans 
advanced fell very sharply after 1930 and in the 
case of loans for dwellings and shops did not 
show any appreciable recovery until 1936.
Housing loans hov/ever rose sharply in 1933«
The rate of interest charged on loans to Local 
Government authorities by the Commonwealth Savings Bank was 
reduced by one per cent in 1932. Successive reductions are 
set out in the following table :
Year to C.S.B. Loans to Local31st December Gove rnment Authorities
m r
1930 5i e-i
1931 6 G~2
1932 5 6
^933 4i 4i
1934 3§ 4J
1935 3i 4i 3f
1936 4 4f 3|
(a) Commonwealth Bank Annual Report, 1956/57. This is
a varying rate which increases or decreases with
the rate paid to depositors. Cf. Commonwe alth
Bank Statistical Bulletin, Banking Supplement, 
May, 1954.
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Section 2 : Explicit Motives for Adoption of Cheap Money Policy
This Section is divided into the following sub­
sections, viz. , :
(a) Introduction
(h) The Early Keynesian Argument for Cheap Money
(c) The Principal Arguments used for Cheap Money
(i) Distributional argument
(ii) Budgetary argument
(iii) Cost Reduction argument
(d) Reasons for Choosing the Direct Method of
Reducing Interest Rates in 1931»
(a) Introduction
The era of cheap money began during the Great Depres­
sion. In Australia, as elsewhere, interest rates were brought 
down by measures which formed part of wider steps to deal with 
the economic catastrophe. Under the influence of later 
theory v/e might be inclined to suppose that the object of these 
measures was to stimulate recovery by reducing interest rates and 
thereby encouraging investment. In other words, we might be 
tempted to think that the early Keynesian argument weighed 
heavily in the minds of those advocating cheap money.
Actually there is very little evidence that this 
argument for cheap money played a significant part in Australia 
at the time. We find it in some of Copland’s writings, and
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also Davidson’s. At the end of 1933 Copland declared that an
era of very low interest rates was necessary to restore
investment to a position where current savings could he absor^ea.
In 1931 Davidson traced out the early Keynesian argument and
claimed that it supported the sequence of measures actually
(2 )taken in Australia.v ' In Davidson’s view unemployment was
due to low profit expectations which could only he reversed hy
a reduction in interest rates. However both writers introduced
an important qualification : The condition for stimulating
recovery along these lines was the avoidance of inflationary
finance and a conscious effort to restore balanced budgets.
(b) The Early Keynesian Argument for Cheap Money
(In the Treatise on M o n e y published in 1930, Keynes 
maintained that a major cause of the slump had been the pursuit 
of policies (notably the return to gold at the old parity and 
the Reparation payments) which had raised the natural rate of 
interest to a level which could not be justified by the under­
lying economic situation. A substantial fall in the long-term 
rate of interest was a necessary condition for economic recovery.
According to Keynes, the rate of interest was an 
appropriate means of ensuring an approximate equality between the
^  ^ D.B. Copland : Australia in the World Crisis 1929/33
(C.U.P. 1934), PP. 159-63.
Shann and Copland : Battle of the Plans (Angus and
Robertson Ltd., 1931), pp.68-9*
J.M. Keynes : A Treatise on Money (Macmillan & Co. , Ltd. ,
1930).
(2 )
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v a lu e  o f  sa v in g s  and in v estm en t. When t h i s  was a t ta in e d  the  
r a te  o f in t e r e s t  was s a id  to  he a t i t s  "natural'' l e v e l  (though  
n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  th e  r ig h t  l e v e l ) ,  and p r ic e s  would he f a i r l y  
s t ä h le .  Whenever a d iv erg en ce  occu rred  betw een sa v in g  and 
in v e stm e n t, th e re  was a ls o  a d iv erg en ce  betw een the m arket and 
th e  n a tu r a l r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t .
At th a t  tim e Keynes was o f  the o p in io n  th a t  the  
m onetary a u t h o r i t i e s  cou ld  e x e r c is e  e f f e c t i v e  c o n tr o l over the  
r a te  o f  in vestm en t through a p p ro p ria te  v a r ia t io n s  o f  market 
r a te s  o f  in t e r e s t .  To m eet a f a l l  in  p r i c e s ,  he s tr o n g ly  
ad vocated  a f a l l  in  the r a te  o f i n t e r e s t  as t h i s  would r a is e  
the v a lu e  o f  c a p i t a l  goods and th ereb y  in c r e a se  in vestm en t and 
employment. The b a s ic  assum ption  was th a t  the a t t r a c t iv e n e s s  
o f  new in vestm en t depends upon p r o s p e c t iv e  income r e l a t i v e l y  
to  th e  r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t .  A cheap money p o l ic y  v/ould a ls o  
reduce the r a te  o f sa v in g  and in c r e a se  the r a te  o f  p r o f i t  fo r  
th o se  engaged in  the p ro d u ctio n  o f  consum ption goods.
T h is argument appears to  have had few  c lo s e  ad h eren ts
in  the e a r ly  1930 f s ,  n o t b ecau se  o f  any f a i lu r e  to  un derstand
th e  argument or to  grasp the im portance o f  a r e v iv a l  in
(^  )in v estm en t as i s  su g g es ted  by M cLaurin, * bu t b ecau se  the  
sh o r t-r u n  problem  was regarded  a s b e in g  e s s e n t i a l l y  a m atter  o f  
r e s to r in g  c o n fid e n c e  through a p r o g r e s s iv e  approach to  b a lan ced  
b u d g e ts . A f a l l  in  in t e r e s t  r a t e s  cou ld  h e lp  th e r e . I t  i s
"To op. c i t . , p .9 6 .
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true that the Copland Committee, while stressing the importance
of cushioning the fall in national income by spreading the loss
equitably, declared that of "even greater importance” than the
relief to budgets resulting from interest reductions "would be
the indirect effects on industry brought about by a general
(1 )reduction in interest rates. ' However, these "indirect 
effects" were not elaborated for the reason that the Committee’s 
terms of reference related exclusively to the immediate problem 
of restoring confidence and spreading the income loss equitably^ 
Although after the Premiers’ Plan we can find some 
scattered references to suggest that low interest rates were 
considered important because of the direct stimulus they would 
give to investment, the argument was never fully explained and 
was never the central theme. Indeed there is no evidence of a 
cheap money policy being thought of as a continuing objective 
before 1933*
Even the arguments of Copland and Davidson mentioned 
earlier rested on the assumption that a Plan would be evolved 
to create a favourable atmosphere for an expansion of investment. 
The reduction in interest rates provided for under the Premiers’ 
Plan was therefore inspired by other factors. As a rule the
^^Battle of the Plans, op. cit. , p. 96.
2^ ^Cf. L.P. Giblin, The Growth of a Central Bank. Take 
for example the following passage on page 102: "...
The report studiously abstained from any discussion 
of future policy for the restoration of production and 
employment. It was concerned with the immediate 
problem of restoring confidence..."
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banks were opposed to  low i n t e r e s t  r a te s  and the Commonwealth 
Bank Board avo id ed  the is s u e  as much as p o s s ib le .  The 
K eynesian  v iew  th a t  c e n tr a l  banks cou ld  e x e r c is e  e f f e c t i v e  
c o n tr o l over the l e v e l  o f  in vestm en t by a p p ro p ria te  v a r ia t io n s  
in  r a te s  o f  i n t e r e s t  can be c o n tr a s te d  w ith  the Commonwealth 
Bank Board’ s in s i s t e n c e  th a t  in t e r e s t  r a te s  were s e t  by f a c t o r s  
o u ts id e  i t s  c o n tr o l .  The Board d id  n o t seem v ery  in t e r e s t e d  
in  the f a l l  in  in t e r e s t  r a te s  and g e n e r a lly  co n sid er ed  the  
m atter  from th e p o in t  o f  view  o f  the e f f e c t  on government 
f in a n c e . ^  ^
Towards the end o f  1933 Copland d e c la r ed  th a t  a low er  
r a te  o f  in t e r e s t  v/as th e  o n ly  e f f e c t i v e  means o f  c h a n n e llin g
sa v in g s  in to  in vestm en t th a t  would in v o lv e  new sp en d in g  and
( 2 )employment. v ' Indeed he went as fa r  as to  say th a t  "any 
p ro p o sa l th a t  would n ot o f f e r  a f a l l  in  the lo n g -term  r a te  o f  
i n t e r e s t  had l i t t l e  m er it  as a c o n tr ib u t io n  to  r e c o v e r y .”
The g r e a t  danger o f  an exp an sion ary  m onetary p o l i c y ,  how ever, 
was th a t  i t  would r a is e  in t e r e s t  r a te s  and th e r e fo r e  im pose an 
a d d it io n a l  s t r a in  on the Budget. T his would in c r e a se  the  
d e f i c i t  and req u ire  an in c r e a s in g  amount o f  new c r e d it  and 
cu rren cy  to  be c r e a te d  fo r  b a la n c in g  th e  b u d gets in  s u c c e s s iv e  
y e a r s . In th e se  c ircu m sta n ces  i t  was argued th a t  an 
in f la t io n a r y  p o l ic y  would soon g e t  out o f  hand and b r in g  about a 
c o l la p s e  o f  the c u r r e n c y . U n t i l  c o n fid e n c e  was r e s to r e d
^  ^I b id . , p p .116-7  ^ 'D .B . Copland, op. c i t . , pp. 139-163
( 3 h b i d .  , p .6 3 ( ^ T bid. . p p .6 2 -3 .
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there was little hope of bringing interest rates down and
(1 )therefore little prospect of economic recovery.v '
Copland’s view therefore was that the early Keynesian 
argument for cheap money, while perfectly valid in normal times, 
was of little more than academic interest in 1931» Davidson 
likewise thought that recovery rested on a fall in interest rates 
because of the fillip it would give to investment but considered 
that this would only be jeopardized by an inflationary monetary 
policy. Given greater stability in the public finances, low 
interest rates must stimulate recovery and arrest the drift in 
the price level.v '
(c) The Principal Arguments Used for Cheap Money
We see from the preceding section that the course of 
policy in 1931-33 was overshadowed by the need to restore 
confidence, and, what was then believed essential to it, a return 
to balanced budgets. The argument for cheap money hinged very 
largely on this connection. Interest rates were not reduced in 
the Premiers’ Plan because anyone thought of a direct connection 
with the level of investment; increased private investment was 
inconceivable without budget equilibrium and the return of 
confidence. There were three principal reasons why a fall in 
interest rates was considered desirable in 1931*
In the first place, a fall in interest rates was an 
appropriate method of adjusting sacrifices between income
^''ibid. , p.66. (2)Cf. Battle of the Plans, op. cit. ,
pp. 58 and 69.
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groups and of enabling the Premiers’ Plan to he acceptable to 
all parties. In short it was a means of spreading the income 
loss, not so much to redistribute income as to restore the pre­
depression distribution. The argument was that holders of
fixed money claims should make a contribution to the loss of
•Areal income. This is a social rater than an economic argument. 
It rests on a value judgment as to whether in the circumstances 
it was right and just for rentiers to share in the burden 
despite the nature of contracts that had been entered into. 
However, it was a question to which economists had to turn their 
attention in devising a plan of economic recovery. Wages had 
been cut, farmers’ incomes reduced and company profits had 
fallen sharply; only those in receipt of fixed incomes had not 
suffered directly from the Depression and many large holders 
had gained from the rise in the value of money.
In the crisis conditions of 1931 prompt agreement 
on a plan of action was essential. A 22\ per cent reduction in 
income from government bonds was a means of securing such an 
agreement and the proposal therefore assumed a place of first 
importance at the time. It appealed in point of equity.
Since World War II we have acquired a wide range of weapons for 
affecting the distribution of income, progressive income tax 
being by far the most important. There is still a school of 
thought which plugs for low interest rates on distributional
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grounds but chiefly "because of these new weapons and the 
persistence of inflation since the war, these views have not 
"been able to regain their former appeal or importance in the 
general scheme of things.
The argument advanced in 1931 appeals as a sensible
andone given the circumstances/the absence of techniques v/hich 
we now possess after nearly two decades of the Welfare State,
The argument which made the deepest impression in 
the early 1930fs was that an immediate fall in interest rates 
was desirable on budgetary grounds. In view of the widespread 
belief at the time that the restoration of confidence hinged 
very largely on the attainment of budgetary equilibrium, this 
argument was naturally an important one. A fall in interest 
rates, so long as it was not accompanied by an expansion of 
central bank credit, would assist all governments to balance 
their budgets and therefore help restore confidence. It was 
essentially a short-run problem. Once governments had got 
their houses in order a further fall in interest rates might 
have other beneficial effects, including the ability to raise 
substantial sums from the loan market.
Given the balanced budget philosophy of the day, this 
argument for cheap money was sound. The conversion operation 
made a significant contribution to balancing budgets in 1931/32.
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The saving v/as approximately £5*5million and the actual deficit
(1 )about £18 million* ' The benefit of course, extended to 
future years also.
With governments now pledged to budget for deficits 
or surpluses according to the state of the economy, the argument 
as used in 1931 is no longer important. Fixed interest payments 
have grown at a considerably slower pace than have other items 
of government expenditure; in 1931 however, the interest cost 
was high in relation to the total budget expenditure of 
Commonwealth and States so that it was worth while cutting this 
item back along with the other more variable ones.
The third argument was that lower interest rates would 
speed recovery by encouraging the farmer to expand output more 
than he would otherwise have done. This v/as expected to afford 
some early relief to the balance of payments.
In other v/ords it was assumed that interest was a 
significant element of cost to the primary producer and that the 
export industries were highly sensitive to changes in costs and 
prices.
We would not accept either of these assumptions today 
partly because the centre of gravity has shifted from price to 
income effects.
In 1931 it was widely believed that recovery must
(2 )begin in the rural sector.v ' The Premiers’ Plan was framed on
(^Cf. Giblin, op. cit. , pp. 103-5 and 123-4.
(~)cf. D.B. Copland and C.Y. James, Cross Current ofAustralian Finance. A book of Documents. (Angus and 
Robertson, 1936), pp.277-8, 295-7, 300.
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the assumption that costs must come down. This particular 
argument, however, was expressed vaguely and no attention was 
given to elasticities to ascertain just how much difference a 
change in interest rates would he likely to make to the volume 
of export production. It was assumed without proper enquiry 
that the export producer was highly sensitive to a change in his 
price-cost ratio or profit margin. We now know that a fall 
in the margin is just as likely to induce an expansion of rural 
production as is a rise in the ratio. When a producer has no 
control over his price, and there is either a fall in this price 
or a rise in costs, his behaviour is prone to be directed towards 
maximizing income in the short run by increasing output.
The prevailing view now is that the direct cost 
effects on industry of changes in interest rates are not very 
important. The Australian economy is heavily dependent on the 
level of world prices. A fall in export prices necessitates 
internal readjustments which now take the form of fiscal- 
monetary restraints (together with import controls) aimed at 
regularizing the flow of money demand and not cost adjustments 
which could only succeed if production were highly responsive 
to price changes. In the case of Australia’s principal exports 
there is a marked lack of such responsiveness.
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(d) Reasons for Choosing the Direct Method of Reducing Interest 
Rates in 1931
I have indicated how the Premiers’ Plan started the 
hall rolling in the direction of cheap money and what the main 
motives of those advocating cheap money were. Brief reference 
may now he made to the question of why this method of bringing 
down interest rates v/as chosen in preference to others such as 
open-market operations and the creation of credit envisaged 
under Theodore’s Plan.
The Commonwealth Bank made very little attempt to 
support the bond market during the depression. Giblin says 
that up to 1936 open-market operations of the central bank were 
relatively small and somewhat inconsistent, so that no definite
(A )policy is indicated by them.' ' Open market operations were
rejected because of the nature of the market for government
securities and a feeling that the Bank’s assets should be
(2 )conserved to meet emergencies.v '
The ’’direct” method of reducing interest rates came 
about largely through a fear that other methods would produce 
inflation and therefore hinder a quick reduction in interest 
rates. In 1931 an issue of Treasury Bills to cover deficits 
was identified with i n f l a t i o n . I n  September, 1930, three 
leading economists recommended an expansionist monetary policy 
based upon the purchase of government securities by the central
^  ^ Op. cit. , p.183 McLaurin, op. cit. p.227 
(3) c.f. D.B. Copland, op. cit. , pp.62-3
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bank ’’with a view to maintaining the general level of prices. "
However, in May, 1931, this course was rejected on the ground
that the budgetary situation had become more serious.
The Copland Committee referred briefly to other
methods of exacting a contribution from bondholders. One of
these was to raise the price level by an expansion of central
bank credit but this was rejected in the belief that it would
(2 )destroy confidence in the currencyv ' and that ’’with such a 
loss of confidence both interest rates and exchange rates would 
rise.”' • The increase in interest rates would be damaging 
to conversion operations and impose an additional strain on 
the budget. The other method cited was a further tax on 
income from property but the objectionthere was it would not 
reduce interest rates and would therefore not benefit the v/age- 
earner paying off a house and other debtor classes.
Theodore considered that his plan for a fiduciary 
issue of Treasury notes would cause a fall in interest rates 
while the Copland Committee believed the result would be a 
rise in interest rates. We may briefly comment on this.
The Theodore Plan may well have increased interest 
rates, or at least made an early fall more difficult. This is
(1 )v ' Memorandum submitted to the Treasurer and signed by 
G-iblin, Dyason and Copland, Ibid. , pp.66-7
W.R. McLaurin, op. cit. , p.81.
(3) Battle of the Plans, op. cit. , pp.92-3
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because of the highly unfavourable political and economic 
climate and the deeply rooted conviction that any policy which 
departed from the ideal of a balanced budget v/as inflationary, 
and as such prejudicial to what was then regarded as fundamental 
- a reduction of costs. The Plan may have had an adverse affect 
on public opinion because it was identified with inflation and 
more particularly because it was a planned expansion of credit.
A measure of credit expansion through the issue of 
Treasury bills did in fact taken place in 1930 /31 and- 1 9 31 /32  
without a sharp rise in liquidity preference. In 1 9 31 /32  
extra-budgetary finance to the extent of £9 million was found 
without giving rise to inflation on further loss of confidence.
But this received comparatively little publicity and the
(A )Commonwealth Bank strenuously resisted the trend.v '
Copland in reviewing depression policy in 1933
claimed that the desire of the inflationists to control and
reduce interest rates was inconsistent with their proposals.
This was because they underestimated the effect of their
(2 )proposals on public confidence. v 7 Monetary and banking 
policy was not enough : the structure of production must be 
considered along with the effect on public opinion of a 
vigorous monetary policy. The Australian experiment (i.e. , 
the Premiers’ Plan) succeeded because it gave attention to 
both these limiting influences.^
(1) (2 )C.f. G-iblin op. cit. pp. C*f. Copland, op. cit. ,
152-3 p7S3
(3) C.f. Copland : The Lessons of Monetary Experience, Essays in Honour of Irving Fisher (London 1937)*
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It is rather difficult to say how much credit
creation would have resulted from Theodore’s Plan, The
fiduciary issue was to he limited to £18 million hut it was
also envisaged that the Commonwealth Bank would need to make
heavy purchases of securities ”in order to get the average yield
(1 )hack to 5 per cent.”' ' Future government loans were to he 
issued at a rate not exceeding 5 per cent and interest on hank 
overdrafts was to he reduced correspondingly.
The course of events and prevailing views on public 
finance suggest that the market would have reacted strongly 
against such a plan. At the end of 1930 there was a serious 
loss of confidence and interest rates were rising. A year 
later the economy was still very vulnerable and an expansionary 
monetary policy would most likely have intensified the demand 
for liquidity. The Plan was heavily suspect and if it had 
failed to restore confidence it is unlikely that it would have 
reduced interest rates at all quickly.
Given the preoccupation in 1931 with balancing both 
government and oversea accounts, an expansionary monetary policy 
which threatened the stability of the price level was one likely 
to exert a downward pressure on the marginal efficiency of 
capital schedule. In the absence therefore of the prospect 
of a fall in the rate of interest, the level of investment would 
have fallen. The policy which the investor expected and which 
would, in his opinion, create a more favourable investment
(1) Battle of the Plans, op. cit. , p. 2
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c lim a te  was one o f f e r in g  the p r o sp ec t o f  an e a r ly  f a l l  in  the
in te r n a l  c o s t  le v e l*  As lo n g  as the r ig h t  p o l ic y  v/as regarded
as "being o f  t h i s  n a tu r e , an y th in g  which ran d ir e c t ly  cou n ter  to
i t  cou ld  s c a r c e ly  have en joyed  a fa v o u ra b le  r e c e p t io n , in  the
f i r s t  in s ta n c e  a t  any r a te .  A p o l ic y  o f  m onetary exp an sion
(1 )w hich l e f t  l i t t l e  p r o sp ec t o f  a c h ie v in g  a "balanced b u d g e tv 7 
v/ould alm ost c e r ta in ly  have been  in te r p r e te d  as an in f la t io n a r y  
p o l i c y .
The fundam ental p r o p o s it io n  then  i s  th a t the Theodore 
P lan  was i l l - t i m e d .  Thus G ib lin  s a id  th a t  w h ile  the P lan  was 
rea so n a b le  and l o g i c a l  in  p r in c ip le  i t  d id  n o t seem to  take  
s u f f i c i e n t  accou nt o f  th e  p r a c t ic a l  and t e c h n ic a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
nor to  have ap p ra ised  a t  t h e ir  f u l l  v a lu e  th e  s tr e n g th  o f  the
h o s t i l e  econom ic f o r c e s ............."he (Mr. Theodore) d id  n o t seem
f u l l y  to  a p p r e c ia te  the p o l i t i c a l  and em otion a l r e a c t io n s  o f  
h i s  countrym en, and c lu n g  to  the l a s t  to  th e  b e l i e f  th a t a
p a n ic  f l i g h t  o f  co n fid e n c e  cou ld  be c o r r e c te d  by p r o c e s s e s  o f
„ ( 2 )r e a s o n . 7
^   ^ C . f .  G ib l in , op. c i t . , p p .159-60
( 2 ) I b i d . , p . 95
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Section 1:
Nature and Source of Statistics Used
The trend of interest rates in Australia from 192Ö-29 
to 1956-57 is set out in Tables 1 to 4 and an international 
comparison of interest rates in Tables 5 and Ö.
Fixed Deposit rates of the Australian Trading banks, 
Commonwealth Savings Bank Maximum Deposit rates, and Treasury- 
bill discount rates averaged for each financial year are shown 
in Table 1. These statistics have been taken from Finance 
Bulletins of the Commonwealth Statistician. Yields on both 
short and long-dated Commonwealth Securities are also shown in 
Table 1 . Figures for the period 1941-57 are from Finance 
Bulletins while yields on long-dated securities prior to 1941 
are from early issues of the Monthly Review of Business 
Statistics. From 1933 /34  to 1940 /41  figures relate to 
securities with maturities of 10 years or more and taxed at 
1930 Commonwealth rates and were originally published on a monthly 
basis in Commonwealth Bank half-yearly Reports. However, 
because of their close correspondence with the series of "All 
Issues" appearing in the Monthly Review, the latter series has 
been adopted for the period 192Ö/29 to 1 9 3 3 /3 4 . No figure for 
the 1930/31 year was published.
No satisfactory statistics of yields on short-term 
securities are available prior to 1936 or for 1939/40 or 
1940/41. The figures that are available for both short and
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medium-dated securities are set out in Table 2, Average 
market yields at the end of June of each year from 1929 to 
1936 as used by the Banking Commission are also shown in Table
2.
Bank overdraft rates for both the Commonwealth Bank 
and other banks and Savings Bank Deposit rates appear in Table 
3* Overdraft rates are from Finance Bulletins, N.S.W. 
Statistical Registers and Commonwealth Bank Reports. This 
table also contains actual Fixed Deposit rates, Treasury bill 
discount rates and rates charged on advances by the Rural 
Credits Department of the Commonwealth Bank, thus differing from 
Table 1 where rates are averaged out for the year.
Deposit rates for the three principal savings banks 
are derived from the respective Annual Reports. The deposit 
rates of the Trustee Savings banks of Hobart and Launceston are 
not shown but have generally followed a pattern similar to the 
Savings Bank of South Australia. Nor is there any reference 
to the recently established private savings banks and the 
Savings Bank Division of the Rural and Industries Bank of 
Western Australia which have applied the same rates for ordinary 
accounts as the Commonwealth Savings Bank and the State Savings 
Bank of Victoria.
At 30th June, 1936, the interest rate on amounts up 
to £300 in the Trustee Savings banks of Hobart and Launceston 
was 2% per cent (deposits of amounts larger than £300 were not
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then accepted) and the rate on amounts up to £500 at the 
Savings Bank of South Australia was likewise 2% per cent. The 
rate subsequently fell to 2\ per cent in the war period. Since 
then the rate on deposits with the Trustee Savings banks has 
increased by stages to 3 per cent at 1st March, 1956, on amounts 
up to £450. Prom 1st March, 1957> this was raised to £500 and 
amounts in excess up to £1,500 were accepted for the first time, 
bearing interest at 1-g- per cent per annum. Thus the present 
position is that the rates for amounts up to £500 deposited 
with the Trustee Savings banks is marginally above that for 
other savings banks but less for amounts in excess of the £500 
limit.
Table 4 shows rates of interest charged on mortgage 
loans and credit foncier lending. The source of this infor­
mation varies, somewhat as is indicated in footnotes to the 
table. Interest charges on mortgage loans and loans on own 
policies by Life Assurance companies are not readily available 
for the whole period. However, the maximum rate on own policy 
loans, together with other maximum rates permitted under 
National Security Regulations are shown in Part IV.
The only comprehensive indexes of share prices 
available to show a trend from 1930 to 1957 are those compiled 
by the New South Wales Government Statistician and published 
in the Monthly Review of Business Statistics. These relate 
to companies which conduct business wholly or largely in New 
South Wales. The base year originally used was 1928/29 but is
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now the average of three years ended June, 1939. I have ad­
justed the earlier figures in the 34 active shares index in order 
to conform with that base.
Other information on share prices includes the 
Melbourne Stock Exchange indexes of 32 ordinary shares and 15 
preference shares for the pre-war years and the Commonwealth 
BankTs index of share prices for the more recent period. This 
index has been compiled from Sydney Stock Exchange quotations 
and relates to companies which, in the main, carry on business 
in New South Wales.
However, the only share price indexes that have been 
graphed are Mr. LambertonT s ^  main indexes (graph TTA") and some 
of those published by the N.S.W. Government Statistician 
(graphs and "82”).
The movement of interest rates and share prices for 
each calendar year between 192Ö and 1957 in Australia, United 
Kingdom, United States and Canada is compared in Tables 5 to 8 
and on graphs TtH” , f,JtT and rTKn. The source of this information 
is the U.N. Statistical Year books. The Banking Commission^ 
figures have been used as an indication of the behaviour of bond 
yields in Australia between 192Ö and 1932 as the U.N. figures 
only extend back to 1932.
(1)See Economic Record, August, 195$, and D. McL. 
Lamberton, Share Price Indices in Australia 
(Sydney, 195#).
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S e c t io n  2 :
The Trend o f  I n t e r e s t  R ates from 1930 to  1957
C on fin in g  a t t e n t io n  f i r s t  to  A u s tr a lia  we se e  from  
the accompanying ta b le s  and graphs th a t  in t e r e s t  r a te s  ro se  
sh arp ly  on th e  eve o f  the G reat D e p r ess io n , f e l l  to  very  low  
l e v e l s  in  th e  D ep ressio n  y e a rs  and ind eed  throughout the  
t h i r t i e s ,  w ith  but a tem porary pause in  1 9 3 5 -3 6 , were k ep t low  
during the war and l a t e r  fu r th e r  reduced w ith  a slow  d e c lin e  
u n t i l  1 9 5 0 . S in ce  1950  i n t e r e s t  r a te s  have r is e n .  Looking  
a t the p e r io d  as a whole we are im pressed w ith  th ree  th in g s  :
(a ) th e  e x c e e d in g ly  low  l e v e l  o f  bond y i e l d s  and f ix e d  
d e p o s it  r a te s  in  the t h i r t i e s  compared w ith  the  
tw e n t ie s ;
(b ) the s t a b i l i t y  o f  in t e r e s t  r a te s  during the war*
(c )  the com plete r e v e r s a l  o f  the cheap money tren d  s in c e  
1 9 5 0 , w ith  a d m in is tered  r a te s  la g g in g  b eh in d  the  
bond r a te .
Bond y i e l d s  ro se  sh a rp ly  in  1930  and in  th e  f i r s t  
h a l f  o f  1931 b u t f e l l  soon a f t e r  the P rem iers’ P lan  came in to  
o p e r a tio n .
A fte r  f a l l i n g  m arkedly betw een 1930-31 and 1 9 3 4 /3 5 ,  
bond y i e l d s  edged up in  1935 /36  and aga in  in  1936 /37  a lth ou gh  
th e re  was no c le a r ly  d e f in e d  tren d  in  the pre-w ar y e a r s  and 
the lo n g -term  r a te  a t  no tim e exceed ed  4 per c e n t . Y ie ld s  were 
ten d in g  to  f a l l  as the war broke o u t. Bond p r ice s- were pegged
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during the war and continued to firm after the war. Selling 
pressure developed in 1951 and since that time, with brief 
respites in 1954 and 1957, the trend of bond yields has been 
upward. The average yield on long-dated securities was slightly 
lower and on short-dated securities appreciably lower in 
1957/50 than in 1956/57.
Rates paid by the trading banks on fixed deposits 
were also regarded as affording a good indication of the cheap 
money trend before the war. The traditional method of 
restricting credit was for the banks to raise their deposit and 
advance rates, and this was done in January, 1930* At the end 
of June, 1931, however, in accordance with the undertaking given 
voluntarily at the Premiers’ Conference, the banks reduced 
their fixed deposit rates on new deposits by one per cent for 
all maturities. Successive reductions took place until March, 
1936, which was the occasion of the Commonwealth Bank’s 
experiment with an issue of Treasury bills to the public.
Graph ”C” shows the movement of fixed 
deposit rates over the whole period. Some interesting 
features of this movement are :
(a) the large number of adjustments in the thirties - 
eleven in a downward direction and one upwards;
(b) in the war rates on fixed deposits were reduced on 
five occasions and there was no increase until July, 
1952. Subsequent increases were agreed upon in 
January, 1955, and. March, 1956. In December, 1956
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the 24 months rate was raised from 3 to 3i per cent;
(c) in 1933 and. 1934 the Commonwealth Bank took an 
important lead in reductions of both fixed deposit and 
advance rates, although the reduction announced by 
the bank in December, 1934, was not followed by the 
trading banks, and
(d) in the mid-thirties rates reached levels lower than 
were recorded in the preceding great era of cheap 
money in the 1890’s.
While bank advance rates generally moved in sympathy 
with fixed deposit rates, there were fewer adjustments and also 
much hesitancy, particularly in the early stages. No uniformity 
of treatment was observed by the banks. Rates quoted varied 
from bank to bank and were not as a rule published. Special 
concessional rates operated for necessitous cases and were 
sometimes suspended indefinitely. The Sydney banks tended to 
push ahead with successive reductions while the Melbourne banks 
wanted to hold the line. However, all banks placed considerable 
importance on a reduction in primary producers’ costs.
According to the Royal Commission on Banking, the average rate 
on bank advances fell from 7*12 per cent in June, 1931 , to 
4.92 per cent in June, 1935*
Treasury bill discount rates and interest on savings 
banks deposits were quick in responding to the cheap money 
conditions of the early 1930’s. Between 1935 and. 1952 the
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Commonwealth S av in gs Bgnk d e p o s it  r a te  was e f f e c t i v e l y  s ta b iliz e d  
a t 2 per cen t but the r a te  on T reasury b i l l s  was reduced from  
1 .7 5  pe** cen t to  1*50 per c en t and im m ediately  a f t e r  the war to  
1 .0 0  per cen t and in  1949 to  0 .7 5  per c e n t . S av in gs Bank 
d e p o s it  r a te s  were in c r e a se d  in  1952 when cheap money was 
o f f i c i a l l y  abandoned. The r a te  on Treasury b i l l s  was a ls o  
in c r e a se d  b u t ,  as was m entioned in  P art I I ,  the s ig n if ic a n c e  
o f  t h i s  r a te  in  A u s tr a lia  has been  l im it e d  to  i t s  e f f e c t  on 
Bank p r o f i t s .  The b eh av iou r  o f  the o th er  ’’a d m in is ter ed ’' r a te s  
would seem to  c a l l  fo r  l i t t l e  comment. They were pegged during  
m ost o f  the war p e r io d  under N a tio n a l S e c u r ity  R e g u la tio n s  and 
were n o t p erm itted  to  r i s e  in  m ost c a s e s  u n t i l  1952.
Share p r ic e s  f e l l  s t e e p ly  in  1929 /30  and 1930/31 and 
d id  n o t r eco v er  much ground u n t i l  1933/34* However, compared 
w ith  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s ,  r eco v ery  s e t  in  a t a com p ara tive ly  e a r ly  
s ta g e  and co n tin u ed  u n in te r r u p te d  u n t i l  1937* In th a t  year  
th e  market en jo y ed  a boom but i t  d id  n o t l a s t ,  the tren d  o f  
p r ic e s  b e in g  downward betw een 1937 and 1941- T h is p ic tu r e  i s  
b ro a d ly  tru e  fo r  both  ord in ary  and p r e fe r e n c e  sh a r e s , a lth ou gh  
p r e fe r e n c e  sh a re s  f e l l  much l e s s  in  th e  d e p r e s s io n  and began  
t h e ir  slow  pre-w ar d e c lin e  e a r l i e r  than ord in ary  sh a re s . 
I n f la t io n a r y  c o n d it io n s  would appear to  have b een  r e sp o n s ib le  
f o r  the d e c l in in g  p o p u la r ity  o f  p r e fe re n c e  sh a re s  s in c e  1948. 
T h is was accom panied by th e  w id e-sp rea d  u se  o f  debenture f in a n c e
and the advent o f  the ’’u n secu red ” n ote  fo r  medium and lo n g -term  
borrow ing.
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Section 3t
The Trend of Interest Hates in an International Setting
The trend of interest rates and share prices from 
1928 to 1957 in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and 
Australia is shown in graphs ttH”, "JM and "Ktf.
The phenomenon of falling interest rates for a large 
part of the thirties was not confined to Australia. It was 
to he observed in almost every advanced industrial community.
In the United States, for example, the average rate on new 
issues of Treasury hills fell from 4*42 per cent in 1929 to 
0.14 per cent in 1938 while hond yields in the same period fell 
from 3.6O per cent to 2.69 per cent. In the United Kingdom 
consols dropped from 4*60 per cent to 2.90 per cent and the 
Treasury hill rate from 5»30 per cent to 0.60 per cent.
Looking at the decade as a whole, there was a 
substantial fall in all countries; hut it would he a mistake 
to think of it as a smooth uninterrupted movement. There is 
a notable lack of uniformity when we come to consider turning 
points. Whereas interest rates in 1930 and for part of 1931 
rose sharply in Australia, they were generally falling in other 
countries. Bond yields in Australia did not commence to fall 
until September, 1931 despite a significant decline in 1930 
in other countries, including Sweden and Switzerland. At 
the same time it is an interesting contrast that when hond 
yields did turn down in Australia they fell much more steeply
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(that is, prior* to 1935) than in other countries. The decline 
in bond yields did not gain momentum till 1932 in the case of 
the United Kingdom, and 1933 and even later in the case of the 
United States and Canada. Indeed in Canada the course of bond 
yields bears resemblance to the situation in Australia only for 
the years 1933 and 1934 and again in 1938 and 1939* In 1932 
bond yields rose sharply in Canada but fell even more sharply 
in Australia. In 1933 bond yields in Canada started to fall 
again and this continued practically without a break until 193b. 
In Australia, however, the fall in bond yields had petered out 
by the end of 1934 and in the ensuing 18 months or so there was 
an increase of about one half of one per cent after which there 
v/as no clear trend until war-time conditions forced the rate 
down again.
The fall in the prices of industrial shares from 1929 
to 1931 was much less pronounced in Australia, the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand than it was in the United States and 
Canada. However, this hardly comes as a surprise when we 
consider the great heights which the speculative boom had 
reached in the United States and Canada compared with much 
milder outburts in other countries. Of more interest is the 
fact that industrial share prices in Australia recovered quite 
markedly between 1931 and 1932 and there was no further 
deterioration in the 1931/32 fiscal year. In this period share
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p r ic e s  were g e n e r a lly  f a l l i n g  in  o th er  c o u n tr ie s .  In  New 
Z ealan d , hov/ever, th ere  was no s u b s ta n t ia l  movement in  e i t h e r  
d ir e c t io n .  T h is e a r ly  reco v ery  o f  share p r ic e s  in  A u s tr a lia  
was accom panied by a c o n s id e r a b le  f irm in g  o f  bond p r ic e s .
The tren d  o f  bond p r ic e s  in  A u s tr a lia  le n d s  su b stan ce  
to  the c la im  th a t  the D ep ressio n  was f e l t  e a r l i e r  and th a t  
reco v ery  came soon er than  in  o th er  c o u n t r ie s ,  but n o \  c le a r - c u t  
d iv id in g  l in e  can be drawn betw een dear and cheap money. The 
tu r n in g  p o in t  occu rred  a t d i f f e r e n t  tim es in  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n tr ie s .  
L ik ew ise  a f t e r  the war, n o t a l l  c o u n tr ie s  broke w ith  
cheap money a t  th e  same tim e. In  the U n ited  S ta te s  the T reasury
b i l l  r a te  was p e rm itted  to  r i s e  as e a r ly  as 1947 and- was l a t e r  
fo llo w e d  by r i s e s  in  the F ed era l R eserve D isco u n t r a te  and in  
bond y i e l d s .  In  b o th  the U n ited  Kingdom and th e  U n ited  S ta te s  
a c t iv e  m easures taken  to  a r r e s t  the r i s e  in  p r ic e s  in  1950-51
I
in c lu d e d  a r i s e  in  in t e r e s t  r a t e s .  " C on so ls” had r is e n  in  
1947 as the market d e fe a te d  D a lto n ’ s b id  fo r  cheaper money but 
Bank Rate was n o t r a is e d  u n t i l  November, 1951 and May, 1952.
In A u s tr a l ia ,  on the o th er  hand, bond y i e l d s  were 
reduced  in  1947 and d id  n o t r i s e  u n t i l  e a r ly  in  1951* Heavy 
m arket support co n tin u ed  a f t e r  y i e l d s  had r i s e n ,  and th e  end o f  
cheap money was n o t o f f i c i a l l y  r e c o g n iz e d  u n t i l  J u ly ,  1952 , 
r a th e r  l a t e r  than in  m ost o th er  c o u n tr ie s .
In O ctober ,  1950 ,  Western Germany r a i s e d  i t s  d i s c o u n t
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rate from 4 to 6 per cent and in Canada the rate was raised 
from 1.50 to 2,00 per cent*
There has been no return to cheap money conditions 
since 1951* Interest rates have fallen, hut never for very 
long and in Australia bond yields have done no more than "level 
out" at the higher levels. In most countries, however, interest 
rate policy has regained something of its pre-1931 flexibility, 
an objective which has been difficult to achieve in Australia 
where the capital market is still comparatively under-developed.
Since 1951* therefore, the trend of interest rates 
has been upward* Betv/een 1951 and 1956 there were nine changes 
in the Federal Reserve Discount rate (seven of which were rises) 
seven changes in the U.K. Bank Rate (four rises) seven also in 
the Canadian rate (with six rises) and nine changes in Western 
Germany* s rate (only three of which were rises).
Speaking generally interest rates have been much less 
flexible in Australia than in other countries since 1951*
Reasons for this are considered later in Parts V and VI.
There was a strong upward thrust of share prices 
in all four countries and in New Zealand also between 1942 and 
1946. In Australia this continued, and with but a slight 
pause in 1949* until 1951-52. In the United Kingdom share 
prices fell in 1948 and 1949 but have risen at a very rapid pace 
since 1952. This rise was however easily surpassed by the 
movement of share prices in the United States and Canada between 
1953 and 1956.
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We cannot fail to observe the very close correspondence 
between interest movements in the United States and Canada.
In very general terms, the movement of interest rates in Aus­
tralia since the war has corresponded rather more closely to 
movements in the United States than in the United Kingdom, but 
the fit is not very good and some striking divergences are :
(a) the behaviour of bond yields between 1945 and 1949, 
in 1954 and 1957;
(b) the behaviour of share prices since 1 9 5 1»
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Section 4:
The Structure of Interest Rates, 1930-1957
When economists talk about "the” rate of interest 
they are usually referring to the current market yield on long­
dated government bonds. This is undoubtedly the most important 
interest rate in the Australian capital market, although it 
would be unreal to overlook other interest rates. The interest 
problem consists after all in relating a complex structure of 
indebtedness to changes in the terms on which borrowing and 
lending take place. Proceeding on the basis that share yields
(A )are a sort of interest rate,' ' our structure of interest rates 
may therefore be presented broadly as follows :
(a) Central Bönk Discount Rate
(b) Treasury bill discount rate
(c) Other money-market rates
(d) Bank fixed deposit, overdraft and savings bank rates
(e) Bond market rate (short term)
(f) Bond market rate (long term)
(g) Other (administered) rates including rates on mortgage 
loans by insurance companies and savings banks
(h) Rates on debentures and other fixed interest securities 
issued by industrial enterprises
(i) Preference share yields
(j) Ordinary share yields
(A )' 'Joan Robinson : The Rate of Interest and Other Essays
(Macmillan) (1952), p.?n.
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Items (a), (to) and (c) have had very limited 
importance in Australia, although in recent years an "uriofficial*' 
market in "short" money has emerged, principally in association 
with the rapid growth of hire purchase. The Commonwealth 
Statistician has never published share yields, nor, to my 
knowledge, is this information readily available from any other 
source. It could, of course, toe calculated from shares prices 
tout this is a very laborious process. Market yields on company
debentures have not been published systematically.
(1 )A.T.K. GrantN ' has emphasised the fact that it is not 
possible to look at the demand and supply of one particular 
class of security in isolation from the ctemand and supply of 
other securities. The qualities which go to make up the 
various assets in the capital market hinge to a large extent 
around the uncertainty of future capital values and income 
yields and potentialities. Any satisfactory approach to the 
interest problem must start from the interdependence of various 
interest rates and from the significance of liquidity to 
individuals and businesses alike. Thus yields on company 
debentures, for example, are not determined independently of 
prevailing yields on Commonwealth securities. With due 
allowance for differing tax treatment and varying risk premiums 
we would, in the normal course, expect them to follow a similar 
pattern. We must, however, allow for the fact that the bond 
rate is now rarely permitted to find its own level, a fact
^  ^  The Post-War Capital Market (Macmillan. 1936)
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which, when superimposed on a situation of "excess” investment 
demand, can only result in a greater widening of the gap "between 
debenture and bond yields.
Our statistical information does not permit us to 
trace this relationship. We can, however, compare yields on 
short-dated (2 year) securities with yields on long-dated (12 
year) securities. Each series is shown in Graph ”D", together 
with the average rate on 2-year Fixed Deposits for the relevant 
period, namely, 1934/35 to 1958/57* As pointed out earlier, 
yields on short-term securities are not available in a 
satisfactory form prior to 1936.
To assist in elucidating this relationship, attention 
is invited to Graph "E^” , which sets out differences between :
(a) long-term market yields and short-term market yields,
(b) long-term market yields and the average yearly rates 
for 2-year Fixed Deposits, and
(c) medium-term and long-term security yields (available 
only for the period 1931/32 to 1944/45)*
Graph "Eg” has little meaning in itself but is included for 
the sake of completeness. Differences between long-term market 
yields and Treasury bill discount rates (averaged out for each 
year) and between maximum trading bank advance rates (also 
averaged out for each year) and long-term market yields are 
shown in this graph.
The absolute difference between yields on short and
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lo n g - d a te d  s e c u r i t i e s  d id  n o t  v a ry  g r e a t l y  d u r in g  th e  w ar b u t ,  
ju d g in g  from  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  o th e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  i t  w ould 
a p p e a r  to  have  b e e n  much h ig h e r  th a n  i n  th e  p re -w a r  y e a r s ,  
a l th o u g h  we c a n n o t say  t h i s  w ith  any r e a l  co n fid e n ce *  S in ce  
th e  w a r, ho w ev er, s t a t i s t i c s  have im proved  and we a re  a b le  to  
o b se rv e  a t  l e a s t  th r e e  im p o r ta n t  ch an g es in  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
In  1945-46  and 1946-47 th e  gap w idened  c o n s id e r a b ly ,  w h ich  was 
c e r t a i n l y  n o t  c au se d  by  any g e n e ra l  w eaken ing  in  th e  p r i c e s  o f  
lo n g e r - d a te d  s e c u r i t i e s .  Loans were o v e rs u b s c r ib e d  by l a r g e  
am ounts up to  1950 y e t  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  was 
u n d e rg o in g  some im p o r ta n t  c h an g e s .
The gap n a rro w ed  in  1947 /48  b u t  w idened  a g a in  in  
1948 /49  and t h i s  t r e n d  c o n tin u e d  and c u lm in a te d  i n  th e  
s e n s a t io n a l  r i s e  to  a d i f f e r e n c e  o f  c lo s e  on 2 p e r  c e n t  in  
1 9 5 1 /5 2 . In  b o th  1950/51 and 1951 /52  th e r e  was l e s s  w i l l i n g n e s s  
to  go " lo n g ” and th e  gap th e r e f o r e  w idened . The p o s i t i o n  was 
o f  c o u rs e  a f f e c t e d  by th e  abandonm ent o f  a num ber o f  c o n t r o l s  
w h ich  i n  e a r l i e r  y e a r s  had  e f f e c t i v e l y  red u c ed  th e  c o m p e ti t io n  
f o r  i n v e s t i b l e  f u n d s ,  a s  w e ll  a s  by th e  r i s e  i n  l i q u i d i t y  
p r e f e r e n c e .  S in c e  1951 /52  i n v e s to r s  have a p p a r e n t ly  shown a 
g r e a t e r  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  go " lo n g "  th a n  " s h o r t " ,  b e c a u se  th e r e  h a s ,  
u n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  b e en  a c o n t in u in g  n a rro w in g  th e  gap d i f f e r e n t i a l ,  
t o  th e  c o m p a ra t iv e ly  low  l e v e l  o f  0 .7  p e r  c e n t  i n  1956/57*
T h is  was how ever accom pan ied  by  a c o n tin u a n c e  o f  th e  demand 
f o r  p r i v a t e  f u n d s ,  a d e c l in e  i n  th e  u se  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  s h a r e s
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and a generally unsatisfactory response to Commonwealth loan 
raisings with the need for some market support. The rise of 
short-term rates between 1952/53 and 1956/57 may have been 
influenced also by the increasing volume of debt with from 2 
to 5 years to maturity. Thus at 30th June, 1957» approximately 
47 per cent of the total debt outstanding matured in 5 years or 
less, compared with 20 per cent at 30th June, 1952. It is 
obvious that the structural problem is an exceedingly complex 
one with many interacting forces and that it offers scope for 
a good deal more research.
Another feature of graph "D” is the fairly close 
correspondence between the relationship we have just been 
discussing and the movement of the differences between long­
term bond yields and 2-year fixed deposit rates. Furthermore, 
on the available evidence it would seem that the relationship 
between market yields on short and long-dated securities was 
a much more stable one in the thirties than either during or 
since the war. The difference was generally smaller and there 
were occasions when yields on short-dated securities exceeded 
the longer dated market yields.
The number of imponderables is multiplied many times 
when an analysis is attempted between the behaviour of bond 
yields vis a vis share price movements. No such analysis 
is attempted here and without statistics of share yields it is 
doubtful whether it would be a very rewarding study anyhow.
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The trend of hott^-dated security yields and share prices are 
shown in graphs " , "Fg" an(i
The relationship "between bond and share yields is 
normally an exceedingly loose one. In the short run share 
prices can he affected by any number of factors which have no 
bearing at all on the current bond rate. It is obvious that 
bond prices can rise only so far; the higher they go the 
greater the risk of capital loss and the greater the relative 
advantages, even after allowing for other risks, of investing 
in shares. Likewise, except in the most abnormal circumstances, 
share prices may be expected to fall very much further and 
faster than bond prices. On the other hand, the absolute 
level of the bond rate is, theoretically, regarded as establishing 
a limit to the movement of share prices. Share prices are 
related to profitability, which in the long run must always 
exceed the interest on the capital employed, if such capital is 
to be retained in the business. The large and well established 
concerns, may of course, be able to get by with a dividend 
yield of only U per cent or even less but the relevant yield in 
that case is not the dividend yield but the earnings yield and 
in fact the true yield is neither when intangible assets assume 
importance. The "true1' yield must in all cases exceed the bond 
yield because of the much greater element of risk.
This is but an illustration of the fact that the 
general level of share prices has little meaning in itself and
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c e r t a in ly  l i t t l e  m eaning in  r e la t io n  to  our stu dy o f  i n t e r e s t  
r a te s  and o f  cheap money. On the o th e r  hand movements in  share  
p r ic e s  may happen to  r e f l e c t  a change in  the l i q u i d i t y  
p r e fe r e n c e  o f  th e  p u b lic  or o f  s w itc h in g  betw een bonds and sh a re s .
There i s  c e r t a in ly  l i t t l e  l ik e l ih o o d  th a t  ‘'s w itc h in g ” 
was im portant in  the d e p r e ss io n  y e a rs  a lth ou gh  i t  co u ld  have been  
so  betw een  1934/35 and 1937/38. In 1951/52 and 1952/53 money 
was p r e fe r r e d  to  a s s e t s  g e n e r a lly  and betw een  1953/54  and 
1 9 5 6 /5 7  i t  i s  a g a in  p o s s ib le  th a t  some o f  the w eakening in  
"bond p r ic e s  was caused  by a h e a l t h ie r  share m arket. T h is  
m a tter  i s  d is c u s s e d  in  P art VI. The changing im portance o f  
f i x e d  d e p o s it  and o th er  a d m in istered  r a te s  r e l a t iv e  to  the  
bond r a te  h as a t t r a c te d  comment in  o th er  p a r ts  o f  the t h e s i s .
-  f i t -A.  -
TABLE I
C.S.B. T re a s u ry ______Commonwealth Government
A u s t r a l i a n  T ra d in g  Banks
D e p o s i t s  
Maximum 
R a te  o f  
I n t e r e s t
B i l l s
D isc o u n t
R a te s
S e c u r i t i e s  ( a )  Taxed 
a t  C u r r e n t  Common­
w e a l t h  R a te s
I n t e r e s t  on F ix e d  D e p o s i t s S h o r t - d a t e d L o n g -d a te d
3 m onths 6 m onths 12 m onths 24 m onths 2 y e a r s 12 y e a r s
19 2 8 /2 9 4 .0 0 4 .0 0 4. 50 5 .0 0 3 .9 0 4 .5 0 5 .3 5
1 9 2 9 /3 0 4 .2 0 4 .3 0 4 .7 0 5 .1 0 4 .0 0 5 .22 5.71
1930/31 4 .5 0 4 .8 0 5 .0 0 5 .3 0 4 . 0 0 5 .8 8 n .  a .
1 9 3 1 /3 2 3 .0 0 3 .4 0 3 .8 0 4 . 1 0 3 .0 0 4 .1 7 4 .9 9
1 9 3 2 /3 3 2 .2 0 2 .7 0 3 .0 0 3 . 2 0 2 .6 0 3 .3 5 3 .9 8
193 3 /3 4 2 .0 0 2 .4 0 2 . 7 0 2 . 9 0 2 .5 0 2 .4 4 3 .5 3
1934 /35 1 .3 0 1 .8 0 2 ,3 0 2 . 6 0 2 .1 0 1 .9 5 3 .3 3
1935/36 1 .3 0 1 .8 0 2 .4 0 2 . 6 0 2 .0 0 1 .7 5 3 .7 7
1936 /37 2 .0 0 2 .5 0 2 .7 5 3 . 0 0 2 .0 0 1 .7 5 3 .9 4
1937 /38 2 .0 0 2 .5 0 2 .7 5 3 . 0 0 2 .0 0 1 .7 5 3.71
1938 /39 2 .0 0 2 . 5 0 2 .7 5 3 . 0 0 2 .0 0 1 .7 5 3 .8 4
1939 /40 1 .9 0 2 .4 0 2 .6 0 2 . 9 0 2 .0 0 1.71 3 .6 7
1940/41 1 .5 0 2 .0 0 2 .2 5 2 e 50 2 .0 0 1 .5 0 3 .1 3
1941/42 1 .4 3 1 .7 3 1 .9 8 2 .2 3 2 .0 0 1 .5 0 2 .4 0 3 .2 4
1942 /43 1 .2 5 1 .5 0 1 .7 5 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 1 .5 0 2 .4 8 3 .2 4
19 4 3 /4 4 1 .1 3 1 .3 9 1 .6 4 2 .0 0 2 .0 0 1 .3 4 2 .4 5 3 .2 4
1 944 /45 0 .5 6 0,81 1 .2 8 1 .7 8 2 .0 0 1 .1 7 2 .4 7 3 .2 5
1945/46 0 . 5 0 0 .7 5 1 .1 0 1 .6 0 2 .0 0 1 .0 0 2 .1 9 3 .2 4
1946 /47 0 . 5 0 0 .7 5 1 .0 0 ( 6 ) 1 .5 0 2 .0 0 1 .00 1 .9 3 3.21
1947/48 0 .5 0 0 .7 5 1 .0 0 1 .5 0 2 .0 0 1 .0 0 2 .3 4 3 . 1 6
1948 /49 0 .5 0 0 .7 5 1 .0 0 1 .5 0 2 .0 0 0 . 9 6 2 . 0 7 3 .1 2
1949 /50 0 .5 0 0 .7 5 1 .0 0 1 .5 0 2 .0 0 0 . 7 5 1 .9 5 3 .1 3
1950/51 0 .5 0 0 .7 5 1 .0 0 1 .5 0 2 .0 0 0 . 7 5 1 .9 9 3.21
1951/52 0 . 5 0 0 .7 5 1 .0 0 1 .5 0 2 .0 0 0 . 7 5 2 .0 5 3 .9 5
( c )  1 9 52 /53 0 .9 6 1.21 1 . 4 6 ( 8 ) 1 .7 3 2 .2 3 0 . 9 8 3 .0 3 4 .5 4
'1 9 5 3 /5 4 1 .0 0 1 . 2 5 1 . 5 0 1 .7 5 2 .2 5 1 .0 0 3 .1 0 4 .4 4
1954 /55 1 . 1 3 1 .3 8 1 . 6 3 1 .8 8 2 .3 8 1 . 0 0 3 .4 9 4 .5 0
1955 /56 1 . 5 8 1 .8 3 2 .0 8 2 .3 3 2 .5 6 1 . 0 0 4 .3 9 4 .7 6
1956/57 2 . 2 5 2 .5 0 2 .7 5 3 .2 0 2 .7 5 1 .0 0 4 .71 5 . 0 6
( a )  R a te s  f o r  s e c u r i t i e s  m a tu r in g  i n 2 and 12 y e a r s e s t im a te d from  r a t e s  on s e c u r i t i e s
m a tu r in g i n  0 -5  and 10 o r  more y e a r s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  F ig u r e s  r e l a t e  to l a s t
Wednesday i n  m onth.
(t>) R a te was 1. 5% on f i r s t £ 1 0 ,0 0 0  o f D e p o s i t  and  1 .00% on amounts i n  e x c e s s o f  £ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .
( e )  The o r d e r  made hy th e  Commonwealth Bank u n d e r  th e  N a t io n a l  S e c u r i t y  (E„0. ) R e g u la t io n s  
f i x i n g  maximum r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  was re v o k e d  on 2 9 th  J u l y ,  1952.
(d) Prom 1 /8 /1 9 5 2  r a t e  was 1.75% on f i r s t  £10,000 of a M  1 , 50?o on am ounts i n
e x c e s s  o f  £ 1 0 ,0 0 0 .
<?4- £
TABLE II
YIELDS ON COHMOm/EALTH SECURITIES: 1928/29 TO 1956/57
Year All Issues
A • C. L.
(M.R.B.S.)
Short Dated 
2 years (a)
5 and 
under 
10 years
Long Average market 
Dated yields
years 12 years
(c) (d) (f)
1928/29 5.35 5.251929/30 5.71 6.05
1930/31 n.a. 13.001931/32 4.99 5.41 4.73
1932/33 3.93 4.08 3.75
1933/34 3.53 3.43 3.54 3.251934/35 3.32 3.24 3.53(e) 3.511935/36 3.76 3.73 3.77(e) 3.33
1936/37 3.39 (b) 3.57 3.35 3.94(e) 3.94(g)
1937/33 3.68 (b) 3.30 3.66 3.71(e) 3.71(g)
1933/39 3.34 (b) 3.67 3.33 3.34(e) 3.84(g)1939/40 3.71 3.64 3.67(e)
1940/41 3.04 3.13(e)1941/42 2.40 2.97 3.24
1942/43 2.43 2.77 3.24
1943/44 2.45 2.69 3.24
1944/45 2.47 2.46 3.251945/46 2.19 2.71 3.24
1946/47 1.93 3.211947/43 2.34 3.16
1943/49 2.07 •- 3.121949/50 1.95 3.13
1950/51 1.99 3.211951/52 2.05 3.95
1952/53 3.03 4.54
1953/54 3.10 4.44
1954/55 3.49 4.501955/56 * 4.39 4.76
1956/57 4.71 5.06
(a) Taxed at Current Commonwealth rates and estimated from rates 
on securities maturing in 0-5 years.
(b) Under 5 years and taxed at 1930 Commonwealth rates.
(c) Finance Bulletins Nos. 33 and 39. Taxed at 1930 Commonwealth 
rates. Also N.S.W. Statistical Registers prior to 1934/35. 
Medium dated 7 years from 1942/46.
(d) Taxed at Current Commonwealth rates and estimated from rates 
on securities maturing in 10 or more years.
(e) Taxed at 1930 Commonwealth Rates.
(f) Report of the Royal Commission on Banking. End of June 
figures in each case, except 1929/30 and 1930/31.
(g) 10 years and over and taxed at 1930 Commonwealth rates.
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TABLE 3
ACTUAL ADMINISTERED RATES 0? INTEREST : 1928/29  TO 1956 /57
Year T r e a s u r y  B i l l  
D is c o u n t  R ate
Commonwealth 
Bank R u ra l  
C r e d i t s  D ep t. 
Max. R a te
F ix e d  D e p o s i t s  : 
Cheques 
P a y in g  Banks L
O v e r d r a f t
R a te s
(Max. R a te s )
S a v in g s  Bank 
D e p o s i t  R a te s
3 m ths 6 m ths 12 m ths 2 4  m ths C’w i th O th e r C .S .B . S .S .B .  o f S.B . o f
Bank Banks V ic . S. A.
1928/29 4 . 5 5 .5 4 . 0 4 . 0 4 .5 5 .0 6. 5 8 .0 3 .9 4 .7 5
1929 /30 6 .0 4 . 0
1930/31 5 .5 6 .0 4 .5 4 .7 5 5 .0 5 .2 5 8 .5 4 .5
1931/32 6 .0 5 .0 3 .5 3 .7 5 4 . 0 4 .2 5 5 .5 7 .0 3 .0 3 .5 3 .5
1932 /33 4 .0 4 .5 2 .5 3 .0 3 .5 4 .0 5 .0 6 .0 2 .7 5 3 . 2 5
1 9 3 3 /3 4 2 .5 4 .0 2 .0 2 .5 2 .7 5 3 .0  f 4 .7 5 2 .5 2 .7 5 3 .0
1934 /33 2 . 2 5 3 .7 5 2 . 2 5 2 .5 2 .7 5 4 .5 5 .0 2 .1 2 . 2 5
1935 /36 1 .7 5 1 .0 1 .5 2 . 2 5 2 .5 4 .2 5 2 .0 2 . 0
1936/37 2 .0 2 .5 2 .7 5 3 .0 5 .5
1937/38 5 .7 5 2 .7 5
1938/39 3 .0
1939 /40 2 .7 5
1940/41 3 .5 0 1 .5 2 .0 2 .2 5 2 .5
1941/42 5 .0  * 2 .5 0
1942 /43 1 .5
19 4 3 /4 4 1 .2 5 1 .5 1 .7 5 2 .0
1 9 44 /45 1 . 2 5 1 .0 1 . 2 5 1 .5 2 .0 4 .7 5 * 2 . 2 5
1945/46 1 .0 0 .5 0 .7 5 1 . 2 5 1 .7 5
1946 /47 0 .5 0 .7 5 1 .0 1 .5 4 .5 0 *
1947/48
1948 /49
19 49 /50 0 .7 5
1950/51
1951/52
1952 /53 4 .0 1 .0 1 . 2 5 1 . 5 1 .7 5 4 .7 5 5 .0 2 . 2 5 2 . 2 5 z • ro
195 3 /5 4 1 .0
1954 /55 1 . 2 5 1 .5 1 . 7 5 2 .0 2 .5 0 2 . 5 0
1955/56 4 .2 5 2 . 2 5 2 .5 2 . 7 5 3 .0 6 .0 6 .0 2 .7 5 2 .7 5 2 . 7 5
1956/57 3 .5
* H ig h e s t  p e r m i t t e d  hy o r d e r s  u n d e r  N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  R e g u la t i o n s .
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TABLE 14-
RATES ON MORTGAGE LOANS AND CREDIT FÖNCIEK LENDING
1928/29 TO 1956/57
Year State Savings Bank of Private First Mortgages Rate on Mortgage Rural Bank of N.S.W.Victoria - Credit Registered in N.S.W. Loans : Savings Advances for homes
Foncier Loans on (6) Bank of South (a)Dwellings and Shops Australia
(c)
1928/29
1929/30 6.5 - 7.0 6.5 - 7.0 6.25
1 930/31 1931/32
6.0
5.0 - 7.0
1932/33 5.0 5.0 - 5.5 5.0
1933/34 5*6 4.5 - 5.5
1934/35 4.5 5.3 4.5 - 5.0 4.75 - 5.01935/36 5.2 4.25 - 5.0 4.5
1936/37 5.3 4.751937/38 5.4
1938/39 5.51939/40 
1940/411941/42 
1942/43 
1943/44
4.25
5.0
1944/45 4.9 4.0 - 4.51945/46 3.89 4.7 3.75 4.25
1946/47 4.5 3.5 - 3.751947/48 
1948/49 1949/50 
1950/51 1951/52 4.13
4.4
3.5 - 4.25
1952/53 4.50 4.7 3.5-4.75 5.0
1953/54 4.9
1954/55 5.21955/56 5.8 5.0
1956/57 6.5 5.25
(a) Annual Report of State Savings Bank of Victoria 1954-55*
(b) Monthly Review of Business Statistics and N.S.W. Statistical Registers. UrbanSecurities only*
(c) Annual Reports of the Savings Bank of South Australia,
(d) N.S.W. Statistical Registers.
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TABLE S'
GOVERNMENT BOND YIELDS - LONG-TERM *
Canada U n i te d S t a t e s U n i te d  Kingdom A u s t r a l i a New Z ea la n d
15 y e a r bonds P a r t i a l l y T axab le C onso ls ( a ) ( F T ( c )
( a ) Ta^gBjxempt Im posable$
1928 3 .9 8 3 .3 3 4 .4 7 - * ,
1929 4 .3 5 3 .6 0 4 . 6 0
1930 4 . 1 6 3 .2 9 4 .4 8
1931 4 .0 7 3 .3 4 4 .3 9
1932 4 .5 2 3 .6 8 3 .7 6 4 .4 4
1933 4.11 3.31 3 .3 8 3 .7 5 3 .9 4
1934 3 .5 9 3 .1 2 3 .0 8 3 .3 2 5 .5 3
1935 3 .2 8 2 .7 9 2 .8 9 3 .5 9 3 .3 3
1936 2 .9 7 2 .6 9 2 .9 4 3 .8 9 3 .7 7
1937 3 .1 7 2 .7 4 3 .2 8 3 .8 6 3.61
1938 3 .0 9 2 .6 1 3 .3 8 3 .7 6 3.81
1939 3 . 1 6 2.41 3 .7 2 3 .9 2 4 .2 4
1940 3*28 2 .2 6 3 .4 0 3 .3 0 3.61
1941 3 .1 0 2 .0 5 3 .1 3 3 .2 3 3 .3 7
1942 3 . 0 6 2 .0 9 2 .4 6 3 .0 3 3 .2 4 3 .2 0
1943 3.01 1 .9 8 2 .4 7 3 .1 0 3 .2 3 3 .1 8
1944 2 .9 9 1 .9 2 2 .4 8 3 .1 4 3 .2 4 3 .1 8
1945 2 .9 3 1 .6 6 2 .3 7 2 . 9 2 3 .2 5 3 .1 8
1946 2.61 2 .1 9 2 .6 0 3 .2 4 3.01
1947 2 .5 7 2 . 2 5 2 . 7 6 3 .1 7 3 .0 0
1948 2 .9 4 2 .4 4 3.21 3 .1 4 3 .0 3
1949 2 .8 3 2 .3 1 3 .3 0 3 .1 2 3 .0 0
1950 2 .7 8 2 . 3 2 3 -5 4 3 .1 4 .3 .0 3
1951 3 .2 4 2 .5 7 3 .7 8 3 .5 3 3 .0 8
1952 3-59 2 .6 8 4 .2 3 4 .3 4 3 .8 5
1953 3 .6 8 2 . 9 2 4 . 08 4 .4 8 4.01
1954 3 .1 4 2 . 5 2 3 .7 5 4 .4 6 3 .9 8
1955 3 .0 8 2 .8 0 4 .1 7 4 .5 2 4 .1 5
1956 3 .6 3 3 .0 6 4 .7 4 5 .0 3 4 .6 5
1957 4 .1 7 3 .4 7 5.01 5 . 0 2 4 .82
1
( a ) A verage y i e l d  o f  a l l  Commonwealth bonds m a tu r in g  i n  TO y e a r s o r  m ore.
(6 ) T h e o r e t i c a l  y i e l d  o f  12 y e a r  Commonwealth b o nds .
(c ) 1937 /43 : 3 -2% b o n d s  o f  1 9 53 /57 ; 1 9 4 4 /5 4 : 3% bonds o f  1 9 6 0 /6 3 ; b e g in n i n g  1955 , bonds w ith
10 y e a r s  o r  o v e r  to  m a t u r i t y .
sr
(d )  192 8 /3 5  Dominion L .T . "bonds; b e g in n in g  1936 , t h e o r e t i c a l  15  y e a r s  Dominion "bonds.
(e )  192 8 /3 5  : "bonds due o r  c a l l a b l e  a f t e r  12 y e a r s ;  b e g in n in g  1936 bondf due o r  c a l l a b l e  a f t e r
15 y e a r s .  ------------- _  ------------------- £
* U.N. S t a t i s t i c a l  Y earbooks .
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TABLE (q
T r e a s u r y  " b i l l  r a t e s  *
A u s t r a l i a  
l a . p  - 3 M o n th s .
Canada
Tender  -  3 m onths
U n i t e d  Kingdom 
T ende r  -  3 months
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
T en d e r  -  3 months
1928 4 .1 7 4 . 1 3 3 .9 7
1929 4 . 7 5 * 5 . 2 5 4 .4 2
1930 5 » 62 2 . 5 4 2 .4 9
1931 5 . 0 0 3 .4 9 1 . 4 0
1932 3 .7 5 1 . 6 4 0 . 8 8
1933 2 .6 5 0 .5 9 O. 5 2
1934 2 . 2 5 0 .7 3 0 . 2 6
1933 1 .7 5 1 .4 9 0 .5 2 0 . 1 4
1936 1 .7 5 0 . 8 4 0 .5 8 0 . 1 4
1937' 1 .7 5 0 .7 2 0 . 5 6 0 . 4 5
1938 1 .7 5 0 .5 9 0.61 0 . 0 5
1939 1 .7 5 0.71 1 .3 2 0 .0 2
1940 1 .5 8 0 .7 0 1 .0 3 0.01
1941 1 .5 0 0 .5 8 1.01 0 . 1 0
1942 1 .5 0 0 . 5 4 1 .0 0 0 . 3 3
1943 1 .46 0 . 4 8 1.01 0 . 3 7
1944 1 .2 5 0 . 3 9 1 .0 0 0 .3 8
1945 1 .0 4 0 . 3 6 0 .8 8 0 . 3 8
1946 1 .0 0 0 .3 8 0.51 0 . 3 8
1947 1 .0 0 0.41 0.51 0 .6 0
1948 1 .0 0 0 . 41 0.51 1 . 0 4
1949 0 .8 3 0 . 4 8 0 . 5 2  • 1 . 1 0 .
1950 0 . 7 5 0 . 5 5 0.51 1 .2 2
1951 0 .7 5 0 . 8 0 0 .5 6 1 . 5 5
1952 0 . 8 5 1 .0 7 2 .2 0 1 .7 7
1953 1 .0 0 1 .6 9 2 . 3 0 1 .9 3
1954 1 .0 0 1 . 4 4 1 .8 0 0 . 9 5
1955 1 .0 0 1 .62 3 .7 3 1 .7 5
1956 1 .0 0 2 . 9 2 4 .9 3 2 . 6 6
1957 1 .0 0 3 .7 6 4 . 8 0 3 .2 6
* U.N. S t a t i s t i c a l  Y earbooks
TABLE 7
M arket P r i c e s  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  S h a re s
*
Canada U n ite d  S t a t e s U n ite d  Kingdom A u s t r a l i a New Z ea la n d
1929 92 86 77 48 79
1932  ■ 22 22 ' 46 28 55
1937 71 60 83 58 85
.1938 59 b. 6 69 57 82
1939 57 47 63 59 79
1941 40 39 57 60 84
1942 38 35 67 54 84
1943 49 46 81 65 95
1944 49 50 89 66 102
1945 58 59 96 68 106
1946 68 66 107 77 113
1947 62 60 109 90 119
1948 67 62 98 98 117
1949 64 60 87 94 113
1950 80 74 88 111 123
1951 107 91 102 134 129
1952 110 100 89 101 105
1953 100 100 100 100 100
1954 1 $4 122 131 106 111
1955 150 171 155 116 119
1956 177 200 139 113 121
1957 169 192 146 121
f
135
U.N. S t a t i s t i c a l  Y ear B ooks.
£  8  *sc, ; / 3  = , 0 0 ]
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TABLE 8
RATES OF DISCOUNT OP CENTRAL BANKS *
■V 2  ....
C a n a d a U n i t e d  S t a t e s U n i te d  K ingdom W est G erm any
P .R . B o a rd  o f  New Y o rk
A v e ra g e  1929 5 .1 6 5*30
1938 1 .0 0 2 .0 0
Prora I  1 948 1 .5 0 1 .2 5 2 .0 0 5 .0
V II  1948 1 .5 0 4 . 5  (; V 1949)
1950 2 .0 0 • 4 . 0  (; v n 1949)
VII  1950 
X 1950
1 .7 5
2 .5 0 (XI 1951) 6 . 0
V 1952 4 .0 0 5 . 0
I  1953 2 .0 0 3 .5 0 (IX 1953) 4 . 5  i( V I I I  1952)
I I  1954 1 .7 5 4 . 0  i i 1953)
IV 1954 1 .5 0 3 .0 0 (V 1954) 3 . 5  iv i 1953)
i i  1955 1 .5 0 3 .5 0 ( I  1955) 3 . 0  I(V 1 9 5 4 )
IV 1955 
V I I I  1955 2 .0 0
1 . 7 5
2 .0 0  ( V I I )  
2 . 2 9  ( IX )
4 .5 0 ( I I  1955)
3 . 5
X 1955 2 .2 5
XI 1955 
I I I  1956
2 . 7 5 2 .5 0 r - ' r o  ( &  H r i ) ,
4 . 5
IV 1956 3 .0 0 2 .7 5 5 . 5  (v)
V I I  195b
V I I I  1958 3 . 2 5
3 . 0 0
IX 1956
X 1956 3 .5 0
5 . 0
I  1957
I I  1957 ( a ) 5 .0 0
4 . 5
( a ) B e g in n in g  N ovem ber , 1 9 5 6 , f l u c t u a t i n g  r a t e s a r e  d e t e r m in e d  w e e k ly  a t  1- o f  1 p e r c e n t
a b o v e  t h e  l a s t p r e c e d i n g  a v e r a g e  t e n d e r r a t e  f o r  3 m o n th  T r e a s u r y b i l l s .
The e f f e c t i v e r a t e s  h a v e  r a n g e d  b e tw e e n 3 .7 7  ijx -N o v e m b e r , 1958  t o 4 .0 6  on
3 0 / 6 / 5 7 .
U .N . S t a t i s t i c a l  Y e a r b o o k s .
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INTR0DUCTI0N
The primary purpose of this part is to discover why 
interest rates moved the way they did in the cheap money era 
from 1931 to 1950, and more particularly to assess the relative 
importance of policy and the pressure of market forces as 
influencing interest rates from time to time. This calls for 
a fairly detailed study of economic trends and an assessment 
of their importance relative to various policy measures.
The interest rate we are primarily concerned with 
is the bond rate because this is the rate v/hich is most 
sensitive to changes in economic conditions, to government 
policy measures and to the psychology of the public and business 
world. The bond rate has had special importance in Australia 
where there has been no open-market for Treasury bills and no 
Bank rate to signal the direction of official thinking. Much 
of the literature of the thirties would suggest that fixed 
dexjosit rates were the key to the interest structure. Most 
leading bankers giving evidence before the Banking Commission 
in 1935/36, however, considered that the best datum line was 
the current market yield on Commonwealth securities. Clearly 
both rates were important in this period and a change in one 
led to a change in the other end thence to other rates. With 
the decline in the importance of fixed deposits and the growing 
importance of the public sector of the economy during and since 
the v/ar, fixed dex^ osit rates have lost most of their earlier 
significance in the banking structure and more attention than
-1  0 7 -
eve r is now focussed on the bond rate.
The following aialysis proceeds in terms of the 
supply and demand for money which is the method employed by 
Keynes in his General Theory. As a preliminary to such analysis 
I therefore set out the essential features of this theoretical 
framework.
Interest is not a reward for waiting but rather for
parting with liquidity. Interest is a purely monetary
phenomenon, a payment for the use of money. The rate of
interest equates the relative advantages of holding securities
with the advantages of holding cash. On the one hand there is
liquidity preference or the demand for money, and on the other
the quantity of money. The demand for money must equal the
supply. Liquidity preference is an ex-ante concept while the
)supply of rponey is, of course, " ex post".v J
The demand for money has two principal facets. In 
the first place cash is needed to finance the current level of 
business activity (transactions demand) and as a precaution 
against future expenditure which at present is of an uncertain 
order. These Keynes classified under which is really the 
demand for money to hold with the intention to spend in the 
future. is income elastic but interest inelastic. In the
second place there may be additional money desired to be held 
as a hedge against expected variations in the rate of interest.
(1 )v ' c.f. T.W. Swan :"Some Notes on the Interest
Controversy", Economic Record. December, 1941«
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This is termed the speculative demand for money or Mg. Mg 
is interest elastic "but normally income inelastic. It is 
mainly this factor which distinguishes the Keynesian analysis 
from other analyses.
With a given set of expectations, the lower the 
rate of interest, the greater the chances that it will rise in 
the future, until a level is reached (say 2-J- per cent for long 
dated bonds) when people would he willing to hold an unlimited 
quantity of cash. If expectations change people will he 
willing to hold more or less cash at a given rate of interest 
than previously. If such a variation in cash cannot he readily 
accommodated the rate of interest must change to secure again 
an equilibrium between the demand and supply of money. If 
there is, for example, a fear that interest rates will soon 
rise, some money will he demanded for the speculative motive.
If is unchanged the existing interest level can only he 
retained by an increase in the supply of money. If the 
monetary authorities refuse to increase the money supply, the 
rate of interest will rise.
In practice a case as clear-cut as that is rarely 
encountered because is constantly changing. Every increase 
in income induces an upward shift in the L function (the demand 
for money). With a fixed supply of money such an upward shift 
produces an increase in the rate of interest. In this case
there is an increase in the velocity of money. However, it
often happens that an increase in income is accompanied by a
-1  09 -
reduction in the amount of money which it is desired to hold as 
an idle asset for speculative reasons, and a relatively small 
rise in the money supply may therefore he sufficient to prevent 
interest rates from rising.
In Australia during the cheap money period from 193*1 
to 1950 the bond market was influenced by a number of factors.
The chief causes of variations in the supply of money were :
(a) the balance of payments
(b) Treasury bill finance
(c) bank advances
(d) central bank action, such as :
(i) open market operations 
(ii) support to loan issues from central Bank and 
Savings Bank funds.
The demand for money has been related to the level of investment, 
income and employment and also to bank lending and debits to 
customers’ accounts. It was also influenced by the Premiers’ 
Plan, by the availability of real resources and by expectations 
of changes in economic conditions and in Government policy.
Both demand and supply have of course, been affected during 
and since the war by direct controls, fiscal policies and 
quantitative and qualitative credit controls. Special Account 
policy was designed to immobilize liquid funds and thereby vary 
the level of bank lending and hence the supply of money in 
future periods.
-11 ei­
lt would be possible to analyse such factors in 
terms of Robertson’s loanable funds analysis. This has the 
advantage of confining attention to flows over a period of time 
and of therefore avoiding the awkward problem of lags and 
mixing up "ex post” and "ex ante” concepts; it is also simpler 
and accords more with common usage. On the other hand it has 
the disadvantage of not highlighting sufficiently the matter 
of speculation and business psychology which is so important 
in short-run analysis. There is also the awkward problem 
of defining and identifying savings. The supply of loanable 
funds is said to be governed mainly by the level of current 
savings and the increase in bank advances, while the demand is 
made up broadly of investment expenditure, net hoardings and 
consumption expenditure in excess of current income.
- 1 11 -
Section 1 : 1931-1939 
(a) 1931-32
In 1931/32 the market rate for Commonwealth bonds 
fell from about 7 per cent to hi per cent. In less than 4 
months, that is from 30th September, 1931 > to 7th January,
1932, the rate fell from 6.21 per cent to 4.85 per cent,
However, for the remaining five months or so of the year there 
v/as comparatively little movement.
The main pressure for lov/er bond yields came from an 
increase in the money supply and the fall in private investment. 
There is also some evidence that the Premiers’ Plan allayed 
panic and prevented a further rise in liquidity preference.
The average yield on all Commonwealth Securities 
fell by about 32 per cent during the year. Of this fall about 
12 per cent would appear to have been caused by the increase in 
the money supply, 12 per cent by the depressed state of 
production and trade and the remaining 8 per cent by the 
favourable psychological impact of the Premiers’ Plan.
The money supply increased by 5-3 per cent during 
the year, compared with a decrease of nearly 7 per cent in the 
preceding year and 5 per cent in 1929/30. The only other year 
in the thirties when this increase was surpassed was 1933/34*
Deposits of the private trading banks and all savings 
banks rose by £24 million in 1931/32. Liquid assets of the 
private trading banks rose by about £26 million mainly as a
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result of the expansion of Treasury hills. In the same period 
hank advances fell hy £12 million. Both movements were to some 
extent indicative of the depressed state of enterprise.
public fell slightly during the year is rather scant hut it is 
significant that the principal institutional investors - savings 
banks and Life Offices - helped materially to sustain the market 
demand for Commonwealth bonds. Holdings of Commonwealth 
securities, other than Treasury hills, hy all savings hanks rose 
hy nearly £5 million, while holdings hy Life Offices rose hy 
approximately £9 million. This latter increase was particularly
year increased hy only £7 million. In earlier years a major 
part of their increased funds had gone into mortgages, which 
however were severely curtailed in the depression years.
amounts in Commonwealth bonds; the ratio of fixed to current 
account deposits, however, was regarded as an important indic­
ator of business conditions. While the absolute increase in 
fixed deposits was larger than in current deposits, which might 
indicate some unwillingness on the part of the public generally 
to buy bonds, the ratio between them was virtually constant at 
the high level appertaining in the two preceding years. There 
was however a slight fall in the ratio of fixed and savings 
hank deposits to current deposits. The share market was
The evidence that the liquidity preferences of the
significant in view total assets during the
Australian trading banks have not invested large
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h e a v i ly  su sp e c t and i t  i s  q u ite  p o s s ib le  th a t  the bond market 
r e c e iv e d  some b e n e f i t  on th a t  accou n t.
The low  l e v e l  o f  p r iv a te  in vestm en t was accom panied  
by a f a l l  in  the cu rren t t r a n s a c t io n  demand fo r  money, as w e ll  
as in  the d e c l in e  in  r e q u e s ts  f o r  bank accommodation. Bank 
c le a r in g s  f e l l  from a w eek ly average o f  £33*8 m i l l io n  in  1930/31  
to  £ 2 8 .3  m i l l io n  in  1 9 3 1 /3 2 . E xp ressed  as a p ercen ta g e  o f  t o t a l  
d e p o s i t s ,  bank c le a r in g * in  t h i s  p e r io d  f e l l  from 7*5 to  6 .0 .
T o ta l d e p o s it s  ro se  as a p ercen ta g e  o f  the n a t io n a l  income and 
the income v e lo c i t y  o f  money (Y/M.J) f e l l  from 7*0 per c en t to  
6 .2  per c e n t .
I t  seems h ig h ly  im probable th a t  sp e c u la t io n  was a t a l l  
im portant a t t h i s  s ta g e . An era  o f  cheap money was n ot  
e n v isa g e d . I f ,  as was commonly a s s e r t e d ,  th ere  was a grave  
in f la t io n a r y  danger in h e r e n t in  the in c r e a se  in  T reasury b i l l s  
and th a t  the economy would very  soon be submerged a g a in  in  a 
boom, we m ight have e x p e c te d  some r e a c t io n  a g a in s t  th e  f a l l  in  
i n t e r e s t  r a te s .  There i s ,  how ever, no ev id en ce  o f  t h i s  havin g  
o ccu rred . A la r g e  p a r t o f  the in c r e a se d  funds o f  the  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  in v e s to r s  were used  to  purchase government bonds.
I t  seems th a t  "expert" m arket o p in io n , such as i t  w^s, was 
in c l in e d  to  h e a v i ly  d is c o u n t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i n f l a t i o n  w h ile  
p r ic e s  and employment rem ained so low . On balance i t  seems 
th a t  e x p e c ta t io n s  about the p o s s ib le  fu tu r e  l e v e l  o f  in t e r e s t
- 114 -
rates exerted a minor influence on the bond market by comparison 
with the increase in the money supply and the dearth of new 
investments, which were of approximately equal importance*
(b) 1932-53
Market yields fell from about 4j per cent to 3i per 
cent during the year. The Commonwealth loan issued in 
November failed by nearly £5 million but the May loan was over­
subscribed by approximately £3*5 million*
The continued strength of the bond market is explained 
very largely by the failure of private investment to show any 
noticeable signs of recovery during the year. There is also 
some evidence that institutional investors were moving strongly 
into government securities in the process of readjusting port­
folios to the changed economic scene. The volume of money 
however did not exert much influence on interest rates on this 
occasion.
In 1932-33 deposits of the private trading banks 
fell by £2 million, despite a slight improvement in the balance 
of payments position with overseas reserves rising by some £8 
million and a welcome rise of £5 million in bank advances. 
Although difficult to identify, central bank operations were, on 
balance, deflationary. In the previous year their effect had 
been decidedly expansionary. According to Giblinv ' 1932/33
(1) op. cit. , p.189
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was the year in which the Commonwealth Bank made the greatest 
effort to reduce the liquidity of the banks, but the combined 
result was partially offset by the rise in London Funds which 
prevented any substantial fall in bank liquidity. At the end of 
the year the cash reserve ratio was 36.3%
Against this, however, was the increase of £2k
million during the year in the holdings of government securities,
other than Treasury bills, by all cheque paying banks and
millionsavings banks. Of this increase, £5/had been contributed by 
the private trading banks and £2.3 million by savings banks.
Life Officers increased their holdings, by £5 million, which 
once again is significant when viev/ed in the light of a total 
increase in all other assets of only £2.1 million. As with the 
experience of bank lending, this was to some extent conditioned 
by the failure of enterprise to push ahead with investment plans. 
But it may also provide some evidence that liquidity preferences 
were lower, reflecting a degree of speculation that interest 
rates would continue to fall.
The fall in interest rates cannot be explained by any 
one factor alone. The low marginal efficiency of capital 
however would explain most of the decline. The money supply did 
not increase but neither did liquidity preference. Thus Giblin, 
who regarded 1935 as the year in which investment displayed its 
first notable recovery, said : "Up to this point there must have 
been a grov/ing accumulation of funds available for investment,
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which went readily into loans as soon as confidence in bonds
was restored. After 1934 these funds would have been diverted
(1 )to private investment, including the building up of stocks.,,v '
Although the level of investment remained in a very 
depressed state, factory employment rose by 9 per cent and the 
Gross National Product by 4 per cent during the year. The fall 
in the income velocity of money was arrested during the year and 
the ratio of fixed to current account deposits fell from 218 to 
209* Bank clearings were somewhat higher than in the preceding 
year both in total and as a percentage of bank deposits. The 
transactions demand for money was however still very low, even 
if marginally above the previous year’s level.
Thus the fall in interest rates in 1932-33 was very 
largely a response to market forces and not to decisions of 
policy. At this stage the Bank Board was very much concerned 
with the growth of liquidity but was beginning to look with 
increasing favour on the decline in market yields on government 
securities. The Board wanted low interest rates but not cheap 
money! This seemingly paradoxical attitude calls for some 
comment.
There is no doubt that the Board wanted low interest 
rates. It was mainly a question of how this was to be achieved. 
McLaurii2^ays that the Board did not attempt to force a rapid 
reduction in interest rates, although they undoubtedly favoured
Ibid.., p. 176 op. cit. , p. 2;
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a gradual reduction. Interest rates were a means towards an
end and the end was a reduction in government expenditure.
The Board was very concerned that Governments might fail to
(1 )carry out planned reductions in expenditure.v ' The advocacy 
of a rapid reduction in interest rates, however, might have 
involved the Board in sanctioning more credit expansion, and 
this, of course, was not desired.
The opposition to credit expansion seemed to stem 
largely from a fesr that a "boom was "just around the corner."
The existence of "excess" liquidity was apparently a threat to 
the stability of the system. Our paradox is resolved, however, 
when it is realised that the Board envisaged that the boom would 
be accompanied by a loss of confidence, followed by a rise in 
interest rates. It is exceedingly difficult to understand how 
the Board could have taken such a possibility seriously in the 
prevailing circumstances; nor does it follow that anyloss of 
confidence would have caused a rise in interest rates. Hov/ever 
such an idea was in keeping with "classical" thinking and was in 
fact argued - with considerable justification on that occasion - 
by some noted economists early in 1931 to oppose Theodore’s 
Fiduciary Notes Plan.
The point then is that the Board was slow to see that 
an expansion of Treasury bills under prevailing circumstances 
would be more likely to reduce than to increase interest rates.
^^Giblin, op. cit. , p.117 2^^Vide Part II, ante
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Prom early in 1933 the Board Began to initiate changes in fixed 
deposit rates and by the end of the year there were definite 
signs that its attitude to the whole question of interest rates 
had changed. This aspect is considered at a later stage.
At first the Board was rather uncertain as to the 
importance which should be placed on the advent of low interest 
rates and what encouragement, if any, it should give to further 
the trend. In the early stages the Board’s attitude was 
essentially the same as the trading banks, namely that interest 
rates were set by factors outside its control. Bond prices 
were, in other words, determined by the forces of supply and 
demand - the balance of payments, the propensity to spend and 
the level of private investment, for example - factors which 
were not within its province to influence directly. This 
attitude was the logical outcome of the Board’s interpretation 
of its own functions as being concerned primarily with the 
stability of the currency and not with the state of production 
and trade. Given this pre-occupation with the price level, 
banking trends and the fear of inflation, the Board took the 
view that it did not much matter if rates rose or fell although 
as long as low rates v/ere compatible with a stable price level 
there was something to be said in their favour. They could 
help to reduce costs and in particular ease the budgetary 
burden for government*. Moveover a stable bond market 
facilitated loan raisings, upon which so much depended.
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(c) 1933-1934
This year saw a continuance of the cheap money trend.
The market rate fbr Commonwealth bonds fell from 3i per cent to
3\ per cent during the year and two public loans were
successfully floated raising a total amount of £22.6 million,
including a subscription of £3 million from the Commonwealth
(1 )Savings Bank.v '
Although investment appears to have recovered some 
ground during the year, it was as yet too weak to have any 
marked impact on the bond market . A large part of the pressure 
for lower interest rates came from the increase in the quantity 
of money. Deposits with the private trading banks and all 
savings banks rose by 6.3 per cent - the highest for any year 
betv/een 193"! and 1940* This v/as due mainly to the marked 
recovery in export prices. The terms of trade went to their 
highest level since 1928/29 and international reserves rose by 
£23 million. The cash reserve ratio reached a record level of
38 per cent. For the year as a whole, central bank operations
were fairly neutral.
As in the preceding year, there was some evidence of 
a revival in the demand for money, although the demand for bank 
accommodation was still very sluggish. Bank Clearings, which 
had fallen by about one-third between 1928/29 and 1932/33» rose 
by 10 per cent in 1933/34, and the ratio of fixed to current
(1) Ibid., Table A, p.175*
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account deposits fell from 194 to 173* These developments 
were matched broadly by the rise in income. The Gross National 
Product rose by 9 per cent and the trade union percentage of 
unemployment, fell to 23 per cent.
No difficulty was experienced in bringing the bond 
rate down to 3i per cent during the year. This was due, for 
the most part, to the expansion of the money supply and the 
continuing low level of investment demand; but it was probably 
aided also by a revision of expectations as a result of the 
decline in favour of the view that a boom was "just around the 
corner".
Economists had now ceased to emphasise the 
inflationary consequences of central bank credit and claimed 
instead that the expansion of Treasury bills had been a vital 
factor in promoting recovery. It had not only increased the 
money supply but relieved the pressure on the loan market and 
hence on the demand for funds. With the return of confidence 
credit expansion must reduce interest rates and actually 
relieve the strain on budgets.
(d) 193U-35
Towards the end of 1934 bond prices began to fall, 
although for the year as a whole the rise in bond yields was 
only J per cent.,from 3i per cent to 3i per cent. At the end 
of 1934 the market was still yielding 3i per cent and a public 
loan had been floated successfully in November at 3 per cent.
-1 2 1  -
At the end of the financial year a £12,5 million loan was 
floated to give an effective yield of £3,8.5 per cent and was 
undersubscribed by approximately £1.7 million.
The hardening tendency of interest rates in the second 
half of the financial year had its origins in the fall in the 
supply of money and in the banks! cash reserves following upon 
an adverse swing in the balance of payments.
During the year export prices fell by nearly 17 per 
cent and the level of gold and foreign exchange holding by £29 
million. Exports fell by £11 million while imports rose by 
£15 million and overseas reserves at the end of June, 1935, were 
less than at the end of June, 1933*
Although bank advances rose by £17 million in 1934/35 
investment was still in a hesitant mood. Trading Bank deposits 
fell by £5 million and the movement from fixed to current 
account deposits continued. The income velocity of money, 
however, actually fell slightly during the year owing to the 
relatively small rise of 3 per cent in the Gross National 
Product. At the end of the year the Trade Union percentage of 
unemployment was about 20 per cent.
The movement of the various aggregates during the 
year were such that while the volume of money (defined to 
include savings bank deposits) showed no appreciable increase 
as it had done in the preceding year, the demand for money 
for the transactions motive would not have increased much either.
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In the absence of special factors bearing on liquidity preference 
we would not therefore have expected any pronounced swing in 
bond prices in either direction.
The Commonwealth Bank brought a steadying influence 
to bear on the bond market in 1934/35* While the precise 
extent of assistance rendered is difficult to gauge, it would 
appear from Giblin that it was between £5 million and £10 million. 
In the previous year the Central Bank (including the C.S.B.) had 
been a net seller in the bond market. Bank liquidity fell to
what was regarded as a danger point in June, 1935» but it would
have fallen further in the absence of advances from the 
Commonwealth Bank and open market purchases.
It is probably going too far to say that the
Commonwealth Bank was pursuing in this year a conscious policy
of cushioning the effect on the internal economy of an adverse
movement in the terms of trade. But the year was a turning
point in monetary policy because it was the first time that
the Board pledged itself to a policy of low interest rates when
(1 )the market was tending to push rates up again.x 7 By 1935 
the Board was emphasising the importance of maintaining low 
interest rates, not because it would encourage private investment 
but because it would assist government financial operations.
After 1933 the Bank Board, while pressing vigorously 
for the funding of Treasury bills, allowed a measure of credit
(1)c.f. Giblin, op. cit.t p.173, PP.155-7 and p.245
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expansion so long as it involved little publicity and took the 
form of the acquisition of long-dated marketable securities.
In 1935 the Commonwealth Bank abandoned its funding policy and 
emphasised the need to prevent any increase in the amount of 
outstanding bills. This new policy - one which to a large 
extent had been forced on the Board by the increasing difficulty 
of public loan raisings and strong opposition from the Loan 
Council - enabled the Board to advocate low interest rates with 
greater consistency and equanimity than had hitherto been 
possible.
Cheap money was, in a sense, at the crossroads in 
1935* Balance of Payments difficulties were again emerging and 
it was argued in some quarters that to meet them it would be 
necessary to jettison the cheap money policy. Bond prices had 
begun to weaken at the end of 1934 and the real testing time 
for cheap money as a continuing objective had arrived. The 
Board, however, refused to allow market forces free play and 
showed a determination to keep interest rates low. It pledged 
itself to a policy of low interest rates and supported the market
(A )quite strongly. ' This policy was, if anything, strengthened 
in 1936 when the Board was opposed to a rise in interest rates 
as a means of offsetting boom conditions and in 1937 and 1938 
when the Board vigorously applied open market techniques to 
ward off the recession. The Board’s conception of its functions 
had obviously changed. Although it had displayed some weakness
) Giblin, op. cit. , p.173 and p.243*
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in allowing the trading hanks to raise fixed deposit rates in 
open defiance of its wishes, its refusal to persevere with the 
open market policy illustrates the importance which was being 
placed on preventing interest rates from rising.
In summary, the hardening tendency of interest rates 
in 1934/35 was promoted to a large extent by the unfavourable 
balance of payments position. On the other hand, the rise in 
income was relatively small and the Central Bank for the first 
time deliberately supported the market to counter the tendency 
of interest rates to rise.
(e) 1935-36
The market yield on Commonwealth securities went from 
3.51 per cent at the end of June, 1935, to 3*88 per cent at the 
end of June, 1936, which was a larger increase than had occurred 
in 1934/35* Two public loans were raised but the response was 
far less encouraging than in either of the two preceding years. 
The total amount raised was £17 million, the redemption yield 
being 3*78 per cent for the November loan and 3*88 per cent for 
the June loan, the latter being under-subscribed by £1.8 million. 
Holdings of Commonwealth securities (other than Treasury bills) 
by all cheque-paying banks and savings banks, which had risen 
in earlier years, fell by £5 million in 1935/36. Trading bank 
holdings fell from £23 million to £15 million.
For the year as a whole central bank operations in 
Government securities were fairly neutral but in the final
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quarter of 1935 the Commonwealth Savings Bank in an effort to 
steady the bond market purchased some securities from the public, 
about half of which (£1 million) represented a continuing
(A )addition to the credit base. ' However, this and other action 
proved insufficient to prevent a further deterioration in the 
loan market and a weakening of bond prices.
Nevertheless the events of the year show that the 
Board was more determined than ever to avoid surrendering cheap 
money. Its policy in the past had been dictated firstly by the 
concern for the high level of banking liquidity and the 
importance of meeting the inflationary danga?by funding Treasury 
bills while the loan market was buoyant, and secondly by the 
realization that the most it could hope for when the market was 
not so buoyant was the prevention of an increase in the amount 
of bills outstanding from year to year. The third and final 
phase was the attempt to establish an open market in Treasury 
bills and this brought to a head a conflict between the Central 
Bank and the trading banks, which had been brewing for several 
years. In a sense this phase was won by the trading banks in 
that they were able to defeat the Board’s immediate intention; 
but of even greater importance was the Board’s unwillingness to 
persist with the experiment if it meant forcing up interest 
rates. It became increasingly evident to the Board that its 
powers for controlling interest rates and indeed for administering
(1) Ibid., pp.184-5-
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the. broader aspects of monetary policy were inadequate. At
the time the Board wanted to avoid a rise in the rate of
interest because of a possible adverse effect on government loan 
(a )raisings.v ' It did not favour meeting the boom conditions of 
1936 with a rise in interest rates for this reason. On 18th 
March the Chairman of the Board said: ”The Commonwealth Bank 
does not desire interest rates to rise unless it is abundantly
clear that such increase has become necessary through general
(2 )economic and financial conditions.,”v J
The rise in bond yields during the year can be 
attributed very largely to the growing demands of Australian 
industry for new capital and for the financing of stocks.
During the year there was a notable expansion in private invest­
ment and trade was more active. The number of building permits 
issued for new dwellings averaged 1025 a month in 1935/36 
compared with 763 a month in 1934/35* an increase of approximately 
34 per cent. The Gross National Product rose by 12 per cent
in 1935/36 and the Trade Union percentage of unemployment fell 
to 14 per cent.
These factors caused a sharp rise in the demand for 
money to satisfy the transactions motive. The demand for money 
rose faster than the supply and interest rates therefore rose.
The ratio of fixed to current account deposits fell from 173 to
C  ) Ibid. , pp. 152-84..
(2) Report of the Royal Commission on Banking, p. 65
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167, a trend that had been well in evidence in earlier years.
Bank clearings - a rough measure of the velocity of money - had 
risen faster than the volume of money during the year; but one 
of the best indicators of business activity is income velocity, 
or the ratio of income to current account deposits, and this 
had risen from 6,0 per cent to 6.6 per cent in 1935/36, after 
having fallen slightly in the previous year.
This was therefore a boom year in which the demand 
for funds outran the supply. Export prices rose by 27 per cent 
but imports and other invisible payments were also much higher, 
with the result that overseas reserves fell by £4 million.
In 1934/35 and 1935/36 imports had increased by £27 million and 
bank advances by £26 million. In 1935/36 the trading banks 
unloaded £8 million of securities on the market which, as it 
does not appear to have been offset by central bank purchases, 
would help to explain the failure of bank deposits to rise during 
the year. While Giblin'1 ^  considers that the activities of 
the trading banks were not important with respect to government 
loans, he admits that selling in 1935/36 contributed to the 
failure of loans and to some market weakness.
The growth in the demand for investible funds, the 
low level of bank liquidity, and the failure of deposits to 
rise may lead us to wonder why the rise in bond yields in 1935/36 
was of such relatively modest dimension. The answer may be
To Ibid. , p. 1 80
- 128 -
that the Commonwealth Bank reduced the extent of institutional 
selling by its greater willingness to use Savings Bank funds 
for purposes of controlling the volume of credit and hy its 
reiterated statements on the importance of retaining cheap money,
(f) 1936-37
The yield on long-dated securities fell from 3*94 per*
cent in June, 1936 to 3*73 per cent in June, 1937* However, for
the year as a whole the average yield was 3*94 per cent compared
with 3*77 per cent in 1935-36. Monthly yields for the period
(1 )are shown in the following table:' 1
Last Wednesday in A v e r a g e  of S e c u rities Average of Securities
Month M a t u r i n g  b e f o r e  1944 M a t u r i n g  1944 and 
After.
1936 - June 3.78% 3.9U%
- July 3.78% 3.9k%
- December 3.80% 4 .00%
1937 - April 3.39% 3.89$
- June 3.37% 3.75%
The loan market? exhibited further weakness in 
1936/37 but with some improvement towards the end of the year. 
An amount of £15*4 million was obtained from two public loans 
raised during the year with £2 million being lodged by under­
writers with respect to the November loan. The effective 
yield for the November loan was £3*19*4 per cent and for the 
April loan £3*19*1 per cent.
( 1 ) c.f. Commonwealth Bank reports
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Export prices again rose - this time by 23 per cent - 
but on this occasion the rise in imports fell a good way short 
of the rise in exports. The level of overseas reserves 
increased by £35 million, trading bank deposits by £21 million 
and savings bank deposits by £5 million. As is set out in the 
above table, security yields were lower at June, 1937 than at 
June, 1936, although most of the improvement was concentrated 
in the second half of the financial year. In its half-yearly 
report of 30th June, 19375 the Commonwealth Bank, referring to 
the fall in bond yields, said : ’’The decline has been due to 
the high prices of Australian exports and to the flow of 
capital from abroad ... there does not appear to be any reason 
why these lov/er rates should not continue”.
The supply of money increased faster than the demand, 
but demand was strong. The Gross National Product rose by 
nearly 9 per cent and the Trade Union Percentage of unemployment 
fell to 11 per cent which at the time was regarded as a 
reasonably healthy level. Retail and wholesale prices rose 
slightly# Retail sales in Sydney were 5 per cent above the 
level of the preceding year. Private investment expenditure, 
however, which had staged a notable recovery in 1935/36, 
slackened considerably in 1936/37 which may partly explain the 
failure of imports to rise as steeply as in the preceding year. 
In these circumstances it is not surprising that the bond 
market gained strength as the year progressed. Judging from
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Commonwealth Bank Reports investment did not slacken until the 
second half of 1936/37*
The income velocity of money did not increase during
the year, neither did trading hank advances. The favourable
movement in the balance of payments, however, was not permitted
to exert its full effect on bank deposits and cash reserves.
The Commonwealth Savings Bank began selling securities early
(1 )in 1937* By October net sales had reached £11 million.v 7 
It is not possible to gauge the precise extent of the contrac­
tionary influence in 1936/37 by such means but it was quite 
large on past standards. The resilience of the market to these 
operations is indicative of its underlying strength. Open 
market policy however was reversed at the end of 1937 as boom 
gave way to signs of impending recession.
(g) 1937-38
Yields on long-dated Government securities averaged 
3.71 per cent in 1937/38 compared with 3*94 per cent in the 
previous year. Yields in 1937/38 were generally lower than 
in 1935-36. In the first half of the year the yield fell from 
3.75 per cent to 3*70 per cent but rose again^the second half 
of the year. For the year as a whole bond prices moved within 
fairly narrow limits. Changes in monthly yields during the 
year are compared below with yields for the corresponding 
months of the preceding year :
"To Ibid., p.246
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Average of Securities Maturing 1 944
1936-37 1937-3*
July 3*94 3.80
December 4.oo 3.70
J anuary 4.oo 3.59
March 4.00 3.68
June 3.75 3.77
Two loans were raised during 1937/38 - in November 
and May and with effective yields slightly above 3j per cent. 
Total proceeds amounted to £18,6 million which was a better 
result than in 1936/37» The May loan, however, required some 
assistance from the Savings Bank as market yields hardened with 
the advent of recession.
The most outstanding feature of the year was the 
rapid rise in imports which reflected a high level of internal 
demand. Imports rose in value by 23 per cent while exports 
fell by about 3 per cent. The inflow of capital, however, 
assisted the balance of payments position with the result that 
overseas reserves fell by only £8 million. Bank deposits,
however, increased by £10 million during the year mainly as a 
result of the £24 million rise in bank advances.
This year is of great interest because it was the 
first time since 1928/29 that a boom had been sustained for 
long without the accompaniment of a rise in export prices.
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The export price index fell by 12 per cent during the year.
The rate of private investment, which had slackened in 1936/37 
spurted forward again in 1937/38, although as mentioned earlier, 
recession fears were very strong hy March, 1938. The invest­
ment hoom was accompanied by a high level of bank advances and 
imports.
The money supply rose by 3.5 per cent which v/as high
considering the fall in export prices and some official selling
of securities in the early part of the year. Indeed it is
rather misleading to consider the year as a whole in this way;
bond yields fell in the first quarter of 1937 but rose in the
first quarter of 1938. These diverse movements can be explained
very largely by balance of payments fluctuations and prospects and
by the open market operations of the Central Bank which had now
become a regular feature of the Board* s technique for affecting
(1 \the credit base. According to Giblinv ' it was a ’’deliberate 
and determined policy”.
In all the circumstances it is rather surprising I 
think that the bond market withstood the test of the change from 
boom to recession in the final quarter of 1937/38 so well.
Despite the sharp fall in banking liquidity, there was no sharp 
rise in the liquidity preferences of the public or of business.
In view of the difficulty of public loan raisings this may be 
attributed to the effect - partly psychological - of the 
reversal of open market policy and the wider recognition of the
CD Ibid., pp.181-3, 2U7, 250
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pow ers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  o f  th e  C e n tr a l  B ank , w hich  th e  
B ank ing  Com m ission had  no do u b t h e lp e d  to  f o s t e r .  Money was 
pumped i n to  th e  m ark e t on a m o d era te  s c a le  in  b o th  1938 and 
1939 and  i t  was n o t  u n t i l  A ugust 1939 t h a t  y i e l d s  on lo n g - te rm  
s e c u r i t i e s  re a c h e d  4 p e r  c e n t .
(h ) 1938-39
The a v e ra g e  y i e l d  on lo n g - d a te d  governm ent s e c u r i t i e s  
ro s e  i n  1938 /39  "but a t  th e  end  o f  th e  y e a r  was s t i l l  s l i g h t l y  
be low  4 p e r  c e n t .  A c o m p ariso n  o f  m on th ly  y i e l d s  f o r  1936-37» 
1937-38  and 1938-39  i s  g iv e n  in  th e  fo l lo w in g  t a b l e  :
L a s t  W ednesday 
i n  Month
1936-37
A verage o f
1937-38
S e c u r i t i e s
1938-39
A verage o f  S e c u r i t
M a tu rin g  1944 and a f t e r i e s  10 y e a r s  and
o v e r
J u ly 3 .9 4 3 .8 0 3 .7 3
S ep tem ber 3 .9 3 3 .8 3 3 .8 6
Decem ber 4 .0 0 3 .7 0 3*93
J a n u a ry 4 .0 0 3 .5 9 3 .7 9
M arch 4 . 00 3 .6 8 3 .8 8
June 3 .7 5 3 .7 7 3 .9 7
Loan m ark e t d i f f i c u l t i e s  w ere i n t e n s i f i e d  d u r in g
th e  y e a r  b e c a u se  o f  th e  l a r g e  c o n v e rs io n  o p e r a t io n  o f  D ecem ber, 
1938. The F e b ru a ry  lo a n  f a i l e d  b a d ly  w ith  £ 3 .6  m i l l i o n  b e in g  
lo d g e d  by u n d e r w r i t e r s  o u t  o f  t o t a l  p ro c e e d s  o f  £ 8 .5  m i l l i o n .
I n  th e  M ay/June lo a n  o n ly  £4*75 m i l l i o n  was o b ta in e d ,  o f  w hich
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£900,000 was lodged by underwr*iters. Effective yields were
£3.17*6 and £3*19.2 respectively.
Although the adverse balance of payments situation 
caused a drain on bank deposits in Australia, offsetting factors 
were an increase in bank advances, a rise in outstanding Treasury 
bills and central bank support of the bond market. Between 
June, 1938, and June, 1939, Trading Bank deposits rose by £2 
million.
The demand for money was also lower because of the 
fall in the level of economic activity. The Gross National 
Product fell by 3*4 per cent, unemployment rose and the Export 
Price Index fell by about 20 per cent. Gold and foreign 
exchange holdings fell from £85 million in June, 1938, to £61 
million in June, 1939* The pace of private investment expend­
iture slackened considerably and Governments faced revenue 
deficits for the first time in years. Wholesale trade fell by 
1.7 per cent and bank clearings by 2 per cent. Bank liquidity
went to a record low level, despite some central bank assistance.
Why then did bond prices weaken during the year?
The answer must I think be found largely in the trend of world 
events and their effect on investor expectations. The re­
appearance of budget deficits may also have unsettled the
market. In 1938-39 the Commonwealth Bank’s holding of bonds
(1 )increased by £11 million as a deliberate inflationary measure.
~TöIbid., p.295
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Section 2 : 1939-1946 
(a) 1939-41
Before the promulgation of the National Security 
Regulations in November, 1941 and February-March, 1942, yields 
on Commonwealth Securities were falling. Between December,
1939 and June, 1941, the fall was of the order of J  per cent.• 
Yields on long-dated securities averaged 3*13 p e r cent in 1940/41 
compared v/ith 3*67 Pe r  cen t in 1939/40 and 3*84 per cent in 
1938/39* The fall in medium dated security yields during the 
same period was somewhat greater. After 1941 the long term 
market rate was stabilized at about 3*25 per cent and the short­
term market rate at about 2 .45  per cent. After the War these 
yields fell further. The market1s stability between 1941 and 
1946 was, of course, associated with war-time controls and is 
discussed in the succeeding section.
The following points seem to form a necessary back­
ground for a consideration of the cheaper money trend between 
1939 and 1941 :
(i) Government policy had been influenced - if slowly - 
by the experience of the thirties. As early as 
1936 the Bank Board was opposing the raising of 
interest rates to moderate boom conditions and by 
1939 subscribed to the view that interest rates 
should be kept as low as possible.
(ii) In 1938/39 the authorities were engaged in fighting 
a business recession and, as indicated earlier,
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some d i f f i c u l t y  was e x p e r i e n c e d  i n  h o ld in g  th e  
bond r a t e  be low  4 p e r  c e n t .  The t h r e a t  to  th e  
cheap  money p o l i c y  how ever was a v e r t e d  by  d e c i s i v e  
a c t i o n  i n  ex p an d in g  th e  c r e d i t  b a s e ,
( i i i )  The lo a n  m a rk e t  was v e ry  weak i n  S ep tem b er ,  1939-
( i v )  The C e n t r a l  Bank, i n  v iew  o f  th e  t r e n d  o f  b u s i n e s s
g e n e r a l l y  f e l t  l i t t l e  com punc tion  i n  p e r m i t t i n g  a 
m easu re  o f  c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n  t i l l  a b o u t  th e  m idd le
o f  1 9 4 0 . The r e s u l t  was a f a l l  i n  m a rk e t  r a t e s
o f  i n t e r e s t .  Prom th e n  onw ard , how ever ,  th e  
economy c l im b e d  s t e a d i l y  o u t  o f  r e c e s s i o n  and th e  
l e v e l  o f  unemployment f e l l  r a p i d l y .  G r e a t e r  c a r e  
had  t h e r e f o r e  to  be  e x e r c i s e d  in  c r e d i t  e x p a n s io n .  
In  th e  e v e n t  i t  was b u t t r e s s e d  by  an  e l a b o r a t e  
n e tw o rk  o f  econom ic c o n t r o l s ,  such  a s  was n o t  
e n v is a g e d  i n  1940.
I n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f e l l  i n  th e  f i r s t  two y e a r s  o f  th e  w ar. 
T h is  was p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  m a rk e t  c o n d i t i o n s  were more f a v o u r a b le  
b u t  a more im p o r t a n t  i n f lu e n c e  now was th e  G overnm ent’ s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to  b r i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  down t o  t h e i r  lo w e s t  
p r a c t i c a b l e  l e v e l s .  Bank l i q u i d i t y  was i n c r e a s e d  by th e  r i s e  
i n  London b a l a n c e s  and by  o f f i c i a l  p u r c h a s e s  o f  s e c u r i t i e s  and 
commodity a d v a n c e s .
The a u t h o r i t i e s  were d e te rm in e d  to  red u c e  i n t e r e s t
- 137 -
r a te s  over  th e  whole p e r io d  o f  war. In h i s  1940/41 Budget 
Speech the T reasu rer  c la im ed  th a t  y i e ld s  on government s e c u r i t i e s  
had f a l l e n  on the average by one per c e n t s in c e  the war and th a t  
r a te s  on T reasury b i l l s ,  bank d e p o s it s  and o v e r d r a fts  had a ls o  
been  reduced . S im ila r  r e fe r e n c e s  in  o th e r  Budget sp eech es  
and F in a n c ia l  S ta tem en ts make i t  c le a r  th a t  the Government was 
d oin g  e v e r y th in g  p o s s ib le  to  keep bond y i e l d s  down.
Low i n t e r e s t  r a te s  were d e s ir e d  to  m inim ize th e  c o s t  
o f  Government b orrow in g , b u t more g e n e r a lly  to  ensu re th a t  sa v in g s  
f lo w ed  r e a d ily  in to  Government lo a n s  and were th ereb y  d iv e r te d  
to  the more e s s e n t i a l  req u irem en ts. C om p etition  fo r  sa v in g s  
was l a t e r  reduced through b oth  p h y s ic a l  and f in a n c ia l  c o n tr o ls .
The l a t t e r  c o n s is t e d  o f  c o n tr o l over  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  c a p i t a l  
i s s u e s  and bank ad van ces. A su b s id ia r y  rea so n  fo r  k eep in g  r a te s  
low  d u rin g  the war was to  ensu re th a t  bond h o ld e r s  would n o t  
s u f f e r  a c a p i t a l  l o s s  on th e ir  in v e s tm e n ts .
The term s o f  trad e  improved in  t h i s  p e r io d . In  
1 9 3 6 /3 9 , which i s  commonly regarded  as a r e c e s s io n  y e a r ,  
in t e r n a t io n a l  r e s e r v e s  f e l l  by £25 m i l l io n .  T h is tr e n d , how ever, 
was r ev e rse d  in  1940 , and in  J u n e, 1941 , r e s e r v e s  s to o d  a t  £95 
m il l i o n  -  an in c r e a se  o f  n e a r ly  £35 m i l l io n  in  two y e a r s .
T h is f a c to r  accou nted  fo r  about h a l f  the in c r e a se  in  the money 
su p p ly  and c o n tr ib u te d  to  the s i t u a t io n  in  which f in a n c e  was n o t  
a problem  in  the f i r s t  two y e a rs  o f  war. G ib lin  sa y s  th a t  
" i t  was found im p o ss ib le  to  spend th e  money p rov id ed  and care
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had to "be used to avoid the deflationary effect of the freezing
(1 )of large Treasury balances."v 1
It is not possible to gauge from official figures the 
extent of Commonwealth Bank: and Commonwealth Savings Bank 
participation in market support during this period but the 
trading banks increased their holdings by about £40 million, of 
which £26 million was subscribed to new issues. According to 
Giblin the Commonwealth Bank also subscribed £10 million and the 
C.S.B. £7 million in this period. Thus of total loan raisings 
of £115 million during the period, £43 million was subscribed by 
the Central Bank and the trading banks. This is an indication 
of the magnitude of the support prograirane which contributed to 
the increase in bank deposits and liquidity, of which about £15 
million was later frozen in special accounts.
The demand for money rose far less than the supply. 
This is evidenced in the figures of gross national expenditure, 
in the fall of £8 million in bank advances and the high level of 
banking liquidity. Gross private investment rose in 1939/40 
but fell in 1940/41 as war expenditure increased. However, the 
important point is that the amount of finance available for 
capital expenditure was apparently more than adequate to meet 
these requirements. Gross national expenditure rose by 6.5 per 
cent in 1939/40 and 8.3 per cent in 1940/41* Considering the
op* cit. , p.290
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r i s e  in  the p r ic e  l e v e l  o f  about 10 per cen t in  th e  two y e a r s ,  
th e s e  in c r e a s e s  were n ot h ig h  even  by com parison w ith  pre-w ar
sta n d a rd s .
r
The f i r s t  r e d u c tio n  in  f ix e d  d e p o s it  r a te s  occulted.
in  Jan u ary , 1940 and r a te s  were reduced on th r e e  more o c c a s io n s
up to  March, 194-2. A ll  moves were s tr o n g ly  r e s i s t e d  by the
tr a d in g  banks b u t the Board sto o d  firm  which as G ib lin  rem inds
u s ,  was in  s t r ik in g  c o n tr a s t  to  th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  1936  when the
tr a d in g  banks in c r e a se d  r a te s  in  o p p o s it io n  to  the Commonwealth
Bank and the Bank f e l t  com p elled  to  fo l lo w . In  advance r a te s
th e re  were th r e e  r e d u c tio n s  up to  March, 1 9 4 2 , eq ual in  a l l  to
(1 \
n e a r ly  J per c en t ( to  maximum r a te  o f  5$)*
(b) 1 941 -1946
In the f i r s t  two y ea rs  o f  war th e  m onetary a u t h o r i t ie s  
had supp orted  th e  bond market n o t so much to  p reven t in t e r e s t  
r a te s  from r i s in g  as to  ensu re th a t  th ey  were kep t as low  as 
p o s s ib l e .  The economy m oreover was n o t y e t  a t  f u l l  s t r e t c h ,  
th e re  b e in g  th e r e fo r e  some scope fo r  r e f la t io n a r y  m easures q u ite  
ap art from the more g e n e r a l arguments fo r  low i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .
From the end o f  1941 , how ever, th e se  c o n d it io n s  ceased  to  o b ta in  
and p o l ic y  became more a m atter  o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  th e  bond market 
to  secu re  a p a r t ic u la r  low  r a te . T h is p o l ic y  -  o f te n  r e fe r r e d  
to  as m o n e tiz a tio n  o f  th e  debt -  added g r e a t ly  to  the l iq u id  
a s s e t s  in  the hands o f  th e  p u b l ic ,  bu t th a t  d id  n o t seem to  matter
TöI b id . . pp .282  and 287
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under a policy of controlled inflation. With most avenues of 
spending effectively shut off and no immediate risk attached to 
holding bonds, there was every incentive to hold long term 
securities.
A marked change came over the situation with the entry 
of Japan into the war and particularly with the fall of Singapore, 
in February, 1942. By the end of 1941 the transitional problems 
were largely overcome and unemployment reduced to negligible 
proportions. In the first phase of the war it had been possible 
to finance war expenditure from the proceeds of public loans 
and taxation, that is, without recourse to Treasury bill finance. 
In the second half of 1941 the matter was in some doubt and the 
Bank Board still endeavoured to have new bills redeemed as the 
proceeds of public loans came to hand. However, by the end 
of the year the requirements of war forced the abandonment of 
this policy.
In 1941-42 gross national expenditure rose by nearly 
16 per cent or about twice the rate of increase of the preceding 
year. It rose by a further 14 per cent in 1942/43* As gross 
private investment fell during these years and consumption 
expenditure was pretty constant, the increase in war expenditure 
wes even more marked. By the end of 1941 the Government was 
no longer embarrassed with Treasury surpluses. The immediate 
danger to Australia required very large increases in 
expenditure which were far in excess of what could be obtained
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from loans or taxation. Though taxation was increased sub­
stantially up to 1943-44 and large amounts obtained from loans, 
it was recognised that there were limits beyond which you could 
not push them and that better results could be secured from a 
policy of controlled inflation. That was the policy that was 
evolved, though with some initial hesitation, and by 1942 the 
Bank Board had accepted the inevitability of a rapid expansion 
of Treasury bills. With the danger so close to home, people 
accepted the tightening of economic controls without too much 
fuss.
This experience was not, of course, peculiar to 
Australia and policy v/as pretty much a rule of thumbaffair in 
those days. There was very little time for theorising. 
Expenditure had to proceed irrespective of the source of finance. 
In taxation policy the emphasis was placed on the need to 
reduce excessive spending power rather than on the mere 
availability of finance. The same can be said for loan 
raisings after 1941*
In what did the policy of controlled inflation con­
sist and what were its consequences for interest rates and 
economic conditions generally? Apart from controls over men 
and materials, over imports, capital issues, prices and consumer 
rationing, all of which greatly limited the range of investment 
opportunities, there were the all-important National Security 
(Economic Organisation) Regulations of November, 1941, and
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February-March, 1942. These regulations were designed to
prevent secondary inflation developing from the growth of 
central hank credit, to avoid excessive hank profits and to 
speed up the diversion of resources to the requirements of war. 
In some respects these regulations gave legal sanction to prior 
voluntary arrangements. Under the regulations the Commonwealth 
Bank was given power to require the trading hanks to lodge 
surplus investihle funds in special accounts and to direct the 
hanks to follow a particular advance policy. The regulations 
also prohibited the trading hanks from either subscribing to 
loans or puchasing bonds from the public without the consent 
of the Commonwealth Bank and established control over maximum 
rates of interest for most classes of lending or borrowing.
High rates on fixed deposits were regarded at the 
time as constituting a serious competitor to Government loans.
It was also thought that fixed deposit rates were the key to 
the whole interest structure. The banks had reluctantly 
agreed to reduce fixed deposits rates in the early stages of 
the war.
The National Security Regulations gave the Common­
wealth Bank power to fix maximum rates of interest for most 
types of lending or borrowing, other than by the Commonwealth 
Government. Details of orders issued under the Regulations
are as follows :
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Maximum Rates of Interest fixed by Commonwealth 
Bank under National Security (Economic 
Organisation) Regulations.
Date of Order
13/3/42 12/1/44 9/8/44 24/11/45
Trading Bank Overdraft 
Rate 5 14
Loans By Pastoral 
Companies 5i
Loans to Local Authorities- 
Government Guaranteed 3f 3i
Other 3 i 3f
Loans "by Building and 
Co-operative Societies 5 i 5i 5
Loans By Building Societies 
guaranteed By State 
Gove rnment£ 31
Loans By Life Assurance 
Companies on Life 
Policies 5 41
Fixed Deposits -
3 months 14 1 12 12
6 months H U 34 34
12 months H 14 1
24 months 2 2 14 14(a)
Victorian Savings Bank 
Deposit Stock i| 14 H 1
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Maximum Rates of Interest (Contd*)13/3/42 12/1/44 9/8/4U 24/11/45Savings Bank Deposits
(C.S.B. and State Savings 
Bank of Victoria)
First £500 2
£501 -£1 000 H 1
(Other Savings Banks)
First £500 2i
£501-£1,000 11 14 1 —  ' 4
(a) Rate of 1% for amounts in excess of £10,000. 
The control over bank and other interest rates,
however, does not explain the stability of bond prices in this 
period. On the one hand private spending was severely 
restricted by means of both physical and financial controls and 
by high taxation and on the other the Government supported the 
bond market with a view to countering any sudden collapse of 
confidence.
According to Giblin the Sinking Bund was at all times 
a firm supporter of bonds, supplemented when necessary by the 
Commonwealth Bank. Discussions with the Stock Exchange 
resulted in a minimum price being put on bonds from June, 1940, 
which prevented any serious fall in price before the Bank could 
come to the rescue. The greatest net purchase from the public 
which the bank had to make in a year was about £11 million in 
1941/42; in the three following years net purchases were of the 
order of £3 to £4 million.
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During the period of war the money supply more than 
doubled, with an increase of approximately £750 million. The 
increase in Treasury bills and London funds account for about 
£500 million. As bank advances fell by about £90 million in 
this period it would appear that there was an addition of 
approximately £340 million to deposits as a result of support, 
either directly or indirectly to the bond market, or about £300 
million between 1941/1946. A substantial part of this was 
represented by Commonwealth Savings Bank subscriptions to public 
loans. Broadly speaking the increase in the funded debt in 
this period was £1,100 million, of which about £300 million or 
just less than one third was concentrated in official hands.
Thus official market support was at the rate of about £60 
million a year, only slightly more than the 1946/47 rate.
Trading bank deposits increased by £280 million between 1939 
and 1945 but £220 million was immobilized in Special Accounts.
This result did not lead to runaway inflation. But 
in all countries suppressed or controlled inflation left its 
mark; it created a disposition against fighting inflation 
after the war and prompted the slogan that what was physically 
possible v/as also financially possible. Controls masked the 
real effect of the war-time credit expansion and led to the 
view that central bank credit was innocuous. The monetization 
policy undoubtedly helped foster such a belief because under
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th a t  p o l ic y  th e  is s u e  o f  lo n g -te rm  "bondsseemed to  lo s e  a l l
s ig n i f i c a n c e .  I f  the r is k  o f  c a p i t a l  l o s s  was removed what
was the p o in t  o f  paying in t e r e s t  on th e  debt?  Why n ot f in a n c e
a l l  ex p en d itu re  through the c r e a t io n  o f  i n t e r e s t  f r e e  c e n tr a l
bank c r e d it?  I t  was argued th a t  you do n o t cou n ter  i n f l a t io n
by r a is in g  th e  r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t  b u t by p r o g r e s s iv e  ta x a t io n
(1 )and d ir e c t  c o n t r o l s . v '
( A )
K J See fo r  example E .F . Schumacher : " P u b lic  F inance -  I t s  
R e la t io n  to  F u ll  Employment" in  S tu d ie s  in  A p plied  
Econom ics prepared  a t  the Oxford U n iv ers i ty  I n s t i t u t e  
o f  S t a t i s t i c s  (O xford , 19457 , p p .1 2 0 -1 .
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Section 3 : 1946-1950 
(a) 1946-47
(i) State of the Bond Market
In 1946/47 yields on long-dated securities fell from
3.25 per cent to 3*15 per cent. Yields in 1945/46 averaged
3.24 per cent and in 1946/47, 3*21 per cent. Yields on short-
dated bonds fell from 2.47 per cent in 1944/45 to 2.19 per cent
in 1945/46 and 1.93 per cent in 1946/47* The principal changes
in yields on both short and long-dated securities are as follows;
Short-dated Long-dated
2 years 12 years
(per cent) (per cent)
July, 1945 2.49 3*23December, 1945 2.46J anuary, 1946 2.27
February,1946 1.92March, 1946 1.82
June, 1946 1.79 3*23
September, 1946 1.88
December, *1946 1.96 3*21
March, 1947 1*99 3.18
June, 1947 1*92 3*15
The year was marked by a rapid increase in the demand 
for money to satisfy the transactions motive and a relatively 
small increase (1.5 per cent) in the money supply. In the 
absence of official intervention in the market, these factors 
would have exerted pressure for a rise in bond yields. Strong 
market support however, was necessary to prepare the market for 
the advent of a 3g per cent coupon rate for long-term 
government securities. Commonwealth Bank and Commonwealth 
Savings Bank holdings of Commonwealth securities, other than
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T reasury b i l l s ,  in c r e a se d  by £53 m i l l io n  d u rin g  the y ea r .
( i i ) S ta te  o f  the Loan Market
Both Commonwealth lo a n s  is s u e d  in  1946 /47  were over­
su b sc r ib e d  by many m i l l i o n s .  The lo n g -d a te d  s e c t io n  o f  the  
O ctober lo a n  was is s u e d  a t 3 i  per cen t w hich was in  l in e  w ith  
the m arket. The amount sought on th a t  o c c a s io n  was £64 m i l l io n .  
In A p r i l ,  1 9 47 , the coupon ra te  was reduced from 3 i  per cen t to  
3a per c en t and th e  amount sought was £25 m i l l io n .  Once aga in  
th e  lo a n  was o v e r -su b sc r ib e d . The in t e r e s t in g  p o in t ,  how ever, 
i s  th a t  the announcement o f  the impending r e d u c tio n  was made 
in  November, 1946 , when the market was r e tu r n in g  3 i  per c e n t .
By A p r il the market r a te  had f a l l e n  to  3*16 per c e n t ,  which  
how ever, was s t i l l  sh o rt o f  the r a te  a t which th e  new lo a n  was 
f lo a t e d .  T h is would su g g e s t  th a t  d e s p ite  the g r e a t  in c r e a se  
in  consum ption and in vestm en t spending and the ra th er  s lu g g is h  
growth o f  th e  money su pp ly  during the y e a r , th ere  was s t i l l  a 
c o n s id e r a b le  su rp lu s  o f  founds which went r e a d ily  in to  government 
lo a n s . T h is was in  p a r t a r e f l e c t io n  o f  the p a t r io t i c  resp on se  
to  the ap p ea l fo r  funds a s s o c ia te d  w ith  developm ent and p a r t ly  
a r e s u l t  o f  l im it e d  in vestm en t o p p o r tu n it ie s  e lse w h e r e .
The p ic tu r e  i s  r e v e r se d  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  the sh o r te r  
term  s e c u r i t i e s .  In  th e  March, 1946 lo a n  the coupon r a te  had 
b een  reduced from 2-g- per cen t to  2 per cen t bu t the market had 
reach ed  t h i s  r a te  somewhat e a r l i e r  and in  March the cu rren t y i e l d  
was 1 . 82  per c e n t ,  and in  June j u s t  sh o rt o f  1 . 8 0  per c e n t .
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In 1946/47 however, yields edged up very near to the coupon rate.
In 1946/47 there was a narrowing of the gap between 
short and long term market yields. This was caused partly by 
the generally very optimistic outlook coupled with the knowledge 
that it was the Government’s intention to keep interest rates 
low. Thus a fall in liquidity preference may have been 
responsible for some switching between short and longer dated 
securities. Furthermore, while current account deposits rose 
by £38 million during the year, savings and fixed deposits fell 
by £18 million.
With effect from 1st January, 1947» the maximum rates 
charged on fixed deposits and advances of trading banks, on 
pastoral company advances and on new loans made on policies by 
life assurance offices were reduced by J per cent. These 
decreases were made under the Economic Organization Regulations, 
(iii) Level of Spending
The continued operation of most of the wartime con­
trols - particularly price and investment controls - prevented 
the rise in consumer spending from having much of an immediate 
influence on either commodity or security prices. But the 
growing desire to throw off wartime restrictions, coupled with 
the rise in wages and reduced taxation would appear to have 
caused a rise in the propensity to consume. The full employment 
policy was bearing fruit in securing a maximum use of resources 
and a resulting increase in output. As income rose, spending
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rose also "but apparently at a faster rate and there must have 
"been some drawing off of cash balances built up in the earlier 
years when there had been less scope for spending.
Net expenditure of public authorities fell from £325 
million in 1945/46 to £226 million in 1946/47 but spending for 
the community as a whole increased rapidly. Consumption 
expenditure was 18 per cent higher and gross national expenditure 
7.6 per cent higher, than in 1945-46. Employment in factories 
rose by 8 per cent and private investment was starting to move 
forward strongly again. Evidence of the increased demand for 
money is provided by the rise of about 21 per cent in debits to 
customers’ accounts. Expressed as a percentage of bank: 
deposits, debits rose from 9-1 to 11.1.
(iv) Banking Trends
The redemption of Treasury bills and the fall of £17 
million in international reserves were primarily responsible for 
the fall in bank liquidity. Bank deposits rose by only £22 
million, the increase in bank advances of £65 million being 
offset in effect by the redemption of Treasury bills. The 
expansion of advances was financed in large part through a 
reduction of security holdings, which had been at an inordinately 
high level. Special accounts absorbed a further £9 million 
during the year.
(v) External Situation
Despite a fall in international reserves, the
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e x t e r n a l  s i t u a t i o n  was v e ry  h e a l t h y  and c o n t r i b u t e d  to  th e  
g e n e r a l  tone  o f  b u s i n e s s  op tim ism . Some o f  th e  i n c r e a s e d  
consum er sp e n d in g  w ent t o  f i n a n c e  im p o r ts  abou t w hich  t h e r e  was 
g row ing  c o n c e rn ,  b u t  th e  v a lu e  o f  e x p o r t s  e x ce ed e d  im p o r t s  by 
no l e s s  th a n  £100 m i l l i o n .  T r a n s a c t i o n s  m a in ly  o f  a c a p i t a l  
and n o n - r e c u r r i n g  n a tu r e  c o n v e r t e d  th e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  
i n t o  a b a la n c e  o f  paym ents d e f i c i t .  These t r a n s a c t i o n s  in c lu d e d  
th e  £25 m i l l i o n  g r a n t  to  th e  U n i te d  Kingdom and repaym ent o f  
o v e r s e a s  lo a n s  am oun ting  t o  £5*5 m i l l i o n .
( v l )  Summary
The m ost im p o r t a n t  i n f l u e n c e s  on th e  bond m a rk e t  
d u r in g  1946 /47  were th e  e x t e n t  o f  o f f i c i a l  s u p p o r t ,  th e  r e l a t i v e l y  
m ino r  i n c r e a s e  i n  th e  money s u p p ly ,  th e  r i s e  o f  40 p e r  c e n t  i n  
e x p o r t  p r i c e s  and th e  r i s e  i n  consumer sp e n d in g  c o u p le d  w i th  a 
g row ing  o p p o s i t i o n  to  th e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  w artim e  c o n t r o l s .
(b )  1 947-1948
( i )  S t a t e  o f  th e  Bond M arket
Y i e ld s  on lo n g  d a te d  s e c u r i t i e s  i n  1947 /48  a v e ra g e d  
3 .1 6  p e r  c e n t ,  compared w i th  3*21 p e r  c e n t  i n  1946/47* However, 
d u r in g  1947/48  t h e r e  was v i r t u a l l y  no change r e c o r d e d  i n  m ark e t  
y i e l d s  f o r  th e  lo n g e r  d a te d  s e c u r i t i e s  a l th o u g h  y i e l d s  on 
s h o r t e r  d a te d  b onds  f l u c t u a t e d  q u i t e  a d e a l ,  r i s i n g  from  1 .92  
p e r  c e n t  to  2 .4 9  p e r  c e n t  b e tw ee n  Ju n e  and J a n u a r y  and f a l l i n g  
to  2 .3 4  p e r  c e n t  a t  th e  end  o f  th e  y e a r .  T here  was t h e r e f o r e  
a f u r t h e r  n a r ro w in g  o f  th e  gap b e tw e e n  s h o r t  and lo n g  d a te d
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securities during this year.
The main difference from the previous year was the 
rise of £75 million in international reserves. With the 
reduction of Treasury hills and the increase in hank advances 
again roughly offsetting one another, the rise in overseas funds 
was ahle to exert its full impact on the level of hank deposits. 
This was one of the reasons why official support of the hond 
market was on a much smaller scale in 1947/48 than in 1946/47» 
Holdings of Government securities, other than Treasury hills, 
hy the Commonwealth Bank and C.S.B. increased hy £29 million.
The private trading hanks were ahle to finance part of their 
hank lending from the sale of securities hut not to the same 
extent as last year.
Although hanks, other than the Central Bank and C.S.B. 
increased their holdings of securities, a disquieting feature 
was the relatively small net purchases of life assurance 
companies. In 1947/48 Life Offices increased their holdings hy 
£3 million, compared with £18 million in 1946-47• While the 
supply of securities increased less than in the preceding year, 
it was significant that little more than half the increase in 
the available funds of the Life Offices in 1947/48 went into 
Government and Municipal securities, compared with more than 70 
per cent in earlier years. This aspect of the post-war 
Australian hond market will he referred to again. In 1947/48 
it did not appear to have any sway on the general market outlook
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and was not widely discussed until it had reached an acute stage 
in 1950.
Both loans were again heavily over-subscribed. The 
coupon rate was again 3i per1 cent for securities of 10-13 years 
maturity and no short dated securities were offered on either 
occasion.
(ii) Volume of Money
The volume of money rose by 5*7 per cent during the 
year which was certainly not a sensational rise but was consider­
ably greater than in 1946/47* Current account deposits rose by 
£75 million, fixed deposits fell by £5 million and deposits in 
savings banks rose by £21 million. The banks were less liquid 
at the end of the year than at the beginning and the problem of 
financing advances, the demand for which was steadily rising, 
was soon to emerge. The fall in bank liqudity, however, had 
been much less than in 1946/47 and the volume of liquid funds 
was, of course, potentially very large. The amount called to 
special account, on the other hand, was £25 million as against 
£9 million the year before. Thus bank liquidity was increased 
by the favourable external developments and the support policy 
but reduced by budget and credit policies.
In the result it had been possible to reduce security 
holdings and meet special account requirements without causing a 
very appreciable drain on bank liquidity. Of major importance 
in this respect and to the maintenance of low interest rates was 
the favourable movement in the terms of trade.
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(iü) External Situation
In 1947/48 the Export Price Index rose by 43 per cent 
with higher wool and wheat prices predominating* The total value
of commodity exports was £407 million which was almost £100 
million greater than in the preceding year* The value of imports 
despite restrictions, amounted to £338 million which was £130 
million greater than in 1946/47* Thus there was a favourable 
trade balance of nearly £70 million. After taking account of 
so-called invisible net payments and items of a capital nature, 
including a large capital inflow, the level of international 
reserves rose by £75 million, to a total of £274 million,
(jy) Domestic Spending
Despite the Government’s fiscal and monetary policies 
and the continued operation, although in a modified form, of the 
wartime controls including capital issues control, the year saw 
a strong surge of spending, and an associated rise in the demand 
for money. Evidence of this is provided by the expansion of 
bank advances, the increase of 23 per cent in the Gross National 
Product and a further large rise in the velocity of money.
Debits to customers’ accounts were 18 per cent higher in 1947/48 
than in 1946/47 and, expressed as a percentage of bank deposits, 
increased from 11.1 to 12,1. Income velocity also rose.
The level of private investment appeared to exceed 
all expectations. Business confidence was high with 
stocks rising in anticipation of demand and employment increasing 
further during the year. Public investment also increased but
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there were large arrears to be made up and, despite the 
retention of price and other controls for most of the period, 
a competitive struggle for resources was emerging with a 
resultant increase in prices.
(v) Market Support and Controls
In conditions such as these and in a freely operating
market mechanism there would be every reason to expect a fall in
bond prices as had been the tendency in pre-war "boom" periods
when the balance of payments was favourable. But the Government
did support the bond market directly, as I have said, and
indirectly through the administration of capital issues control
which, while eased somewhat at the end of 1946, were not lifted
until January, 1950. These controls were expressly designed
to secure a plentiful supply of funds for essential purposes
(1 )and to maintain low interest rates.v ' The advent of selective 
credit controls in November, 1947 had a similar objective with 
respect to short-term lending. These controls were tightened 
in May, 1949•
(vi) The Fiscal Problem
Secondly the problem was no longer one of finance 
but of real resources. Thus while money was effectively 
channelled into government loans it could not all be spent and 
was therefore available to redeem Treasury bills. A redemption
' 'c.f. Copland and Barback, op. cit. , pp.315-7(1 )
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of Treasury bills is a direct subtraction from bank deposits and 
liquidity; its effect on interest rates may however be fairly 
neutral in a fully employed economy when spending - particularly 
investment spending - is limited by a scarcity of resources.
Thus it may be argued up to a point that if excess subscriptions 
had not been retained and used, in effect to redeem Treasury 
bills, more funds would have been available from the public to 
buy bonds on the market and that this might have reduced the 
need for official support.
This comes, of course, to the very heart of the fiscal 
problem. Will savings be increased (or reduced) more than 
consumption? A funding policy will clearly not always have 
the same effect. It seems probable, however, that in the 
period 1946/50 budget policy reduced consumption expenditure 
more than savings; the redemption of Treasury bills greatly 
exceeded excess subscriptions and amounts likely to have entered 
the capital market. Of greater importance was that it reduced 
the possibility of secondary inflation. Thus it is not clear 
what effect fiscal policy was having on interest rates, but by 
comparison with changes in the balance of payments and the level 
of private investment it would appear to have been small.
There is no evidence that it cut across the cheap money objective 
as might be a tempting conclusion if we were to look only at 
primary effects. In so far as fiscal policy limits the scope 
for spending and inflation in future periods it may well operate 
strongly in the direction of lower interest rates.
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(vii) The Capital Inflow
The capital inflow was also assuming large proportions 
and it was not all ’hot’ money. To the extent that it added 
to the supply of funds for long-term financing it would have 
correspondingly reduced the need to seek funds from the 
Australian public. Imports of capital equipment from non­
dollar areas were increasing each year. Thus while investment 
expenditure was very high, the effective demand on the capital 
market was limited by control over capital issues and the 
availability of physical resources and did not cause undue 
strain, as it may have done if external developments had been 
less favourable.
(viii) Summary
Retail prices rose by about 9 per cent in 1947/48.
Pull employment was a major achievment but there was growing 
evidence that the production of basic commodities was beginning 
to lose out in the scramble for resources. The immigration 
programme was stepped up and this added to productive capacity 
but imposed additional strain in the short run. Economic 
stability was further threatened by a system of "partial" price 
controls.
(c) 1948-49
(i) State of the Bond Market
Bond yields were reduced even further in 1948/49 that 
is from about 3*16 per cent to 3*12 per cent in the case of long-
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dated securities and from 2,33 per cent to 1.99 per cent for 
short dated securities. Two loans were issued during the year, 
one in September and one in March. The March loan was over­
subscribed by nearly £20 million.
The events of the year permitted a significant 
relaxation of the official support policy. By the end of the 
year current market yields on long-term securities were in line 
v/ith the 3i per cent coupon rate. The significant thing is 
that this was achieved without an increase in official holdings 
and with the retention of excess loan subscriptions. Common­
wealth Bank and Commonwealth Savings Bank holdings fell by £7 
million during the year.
(ii) Volume of Money
This easier situation in the bond market was the 
outcome of a number of influences. The most important however, 
was the continuing high level of export prices and the rise of 
£178 million in the level of international reserves. This was 
the main reason for the increase of £110 million in bank deposits 
as the increase in bank advances was more than offset by the 
redemption of Treasury Bills, The volume of money rose by 9*5 
per cent, a much larger increase than in either of the two 
preceding years. Despite a tightening of Special Account policy 
there was a substantial increase in the volume of funds seeking 
investment in 1948/49*
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( i ü )  D om estic Spending
Another fa c to r  o f  im portance was th a t  a lth ou gh  the  
demand fo r  money was a t  a h ig h  l e v e l  i t s  co n tin u ed  advance wias 
impeded somewhat hy grow ing sh o r ta g e s  o f  lab ou r  and m a te r ia ls .  
Thus the G ross N a tio n a l Product r o se  hy 13*4 per c e n t ,  which was 
a much slow er  r a te  o f  in c r e a se  than in  1 9 4 7 /4 8 , In vestm en t  
e x p e n d itu r e , though w e ll  m a in ta in e d , was n o t a b le  to  improve 
on th e  p r e v io u s  y e a r 's  grow th. At th e  same tim e n e t  ex p en d itu re  
by p u b lic  a u t h o r i t i e s  was now back to  the 1945 /46  l e v e l  and 
la r g e  in vestm en t programmes in  c o n ju n c tio n  w ith  the e x te n s iv e  
im m igration  in ta k e  were un dertak en , The l e v e l  o f  employment 
r o s e ,  bu t l e s s  than in  1 9 4 7 /4 8 ,
D e b its  to  cu stom ers' accou n ts were 21 per cen t  
h ig h er  than in  1947 /48  and, ex p r essed  as a p r o p o r tio n  o f  bank 
d e p o s i t s ,  in c r e a se d  from 12.1 to  13*4 per c e n t . T his i s  
ev id en ce  o f  a c o n tin u in g  h ig h  demand fo r  money to  s a t i s f y  the  
t r a n s a c t io n s  m o tiv e . At th e  same tim e sa v in g  bank d e p o s it s  
in c r e a se d  by £33 m i l l i o n ,  or a t about the same r a te  as in  1947 /48  
and f ix e d  d e p o s i t s  ro se  by £15  m i l l i o n ,  r e v e r s in g  the tren d  o f  
e a r l i e r  y e a r s . T h is movement, cou p led  w ith  th e  sm a ller  r i s e  in  
b u s in e s s  s to c k s  and th e  e f f e c t  o f  the U .S, r e c e s s io n  on b u s in e s s  
e x p e c ta t io n s  to g e th e r  w ith  the w iden in g  o f  the gap betw een sh o rt  
and lo n g -d a te d  government bond y i e l d s  may su g g e s t  th a t  th e r e  was 
a ls o  a r i s e  in  s p e c u la t iv e  cash  h o ld in g s  in  1948/49*
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( i v )  P r e s s u r e  on R e so u rc e s
Income t a x  c o n c e s s io n s  to  i n d i v i d u a l s  c o s t  £22 m i l l i o n  
in  1 948 /49  and. a v e ra g e  w eek ly  wage e a r n i n g s  were 14  p e r  c e n t  
h i g h e r  t h a n  i n  1 9 4 7 /4 8 .  P e r s o n a l  con su m p tio n  e x p e n d i tu r e  
h o w e v er ,  d id  n o t  i n c r e a s e  f a s t e r  th a n  i n  1 9 4 7 /4 8 . T here  was a 
l a r g e  c a s h  s u r p l u s .  The r e l a t e d  p ro b lem s o f  i n f l a t i o n  and 
u n b a la n c e d  dev e lo p m en t seemed n e v e r t h e l e s s  to  have b e en  a c c e n ­
t u a t e d  i n  1 9 4 8 /4 9 .  The r e l a x a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l s  had  so m e th in g  to  
do w i th  t h i s  b u t  i n  any c a se  i t  would have b e en  e x c e e d in g ly  
d i f f i c u l t  to  have f o r e c a s t e d  th e  u p tu im  i n  wool p r i c e s  and  the  
l a r g e  c a p i t a l  i n f lo w .  The Government r i g h t l y  c o n c lu d ed  t h a t  
t h e s e  f a v o u r a b le  f a c t o r s  m ust be assum ed to  be tem p o ra ry  and 
t h a t  o v e r s e a s  r e s e r v e s  were n o t  t h e r e f o r e  e x c e s s i v e .  However, 
th e  im m edia te  e f f e c t  o f  th e  l a r g e  r i s e  i n  o v e r s e a s  fu n d s  was 
to  i n c r e a s e  th e  p r e s s u r e  on r e s o u r c e s .
(v ) L i f e  O f f i c e  S e c u r i t y  H o ld in g s
The b e h a v io u r  o f  L i f e  A ssu ran ce  com panies  and c e r t a i n  
o t h e r  i n v e s t o r  g ro u p s  was b e g in n in g  t o  cause  c o n c e rn .  L i f e  
o f f i c e s  were m a in ly  c o n c e rn e d  w i th  ex p an d in g  t h e i r  mortgage 
l o a n s  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  and n o t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  w i th  l i q u i d i t y  a s  such . 
A lth o u g h  L i f e  o f f i c e s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  h o ld in g s  o f  Commonwealth 
s e c u r i t i e s  by £21 m i l l i o n  i n  1 9 4 8 /4 9 ,  l e s s  t h a n  30 p e r  c e n t  o f  
i n v e s t i b l e  fu n d s  were d e v o te d  to  governm ent and m u n ic ip a l  
s e c u r i t i e s ,  com pared w i th  o v e r  50 p e r  c e n t  i n  1947 /48 . Up to  
t h i s  p o i n t ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  i s  p r o b a b le  t h a t  L i f e  o f f i c e s  were m e re ly
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re turning to a more normal portfolio after the "excessive" war­
time rise in security holdings.
(vi) Banking Policy
In 1948/49 amounts totalling £90 million were called
to Special Accounts and with advances increasing by about £70
million the banks were less liquid at the end of the year than at
the beginning. To help some banks who had run down security
holdings more than others and to introduce an added degree of
flexibility into the operation of credit policy, a system of
special loans was introduced. It was considered important to
meet the more essential requirements of industry for finance but
not to do so by resorting to large scale releases from Special
Accounts which might induce a too rapid rate of lending. These
loans were subject to an interest charge of 3i per cent to
dissuade undue reliance on them. These facilities were however,
availed of to an increasing extent and the Bank’s task was made
difficult by the disappearance of controls and the growth of
(1 )domestic inflation.' '
(vii) Summary
The Government had secured cheap money in earlier 
years when it was obliged to give the market some firm support.
In 1948/49 low interest rates were maintained without the need 
for further support and the monetary authorities were in fact net 
sellers of securities. This result had been made possible by
^^c.f. H.W. Arndt : The Australian Trading Banks
(Cheshire, 1957), pp.167-9*
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the favourable overseas developments, some slackening in the 
rate of growth of domestic expenditure and the continuance of 
controls over capital issues. These factors more than offset 
some rise in liquidity preference and switching hy capital 
cautious investors during the year. The economy, however, was 
at full stretch and seemed very vulnerable to a fall in export 
prices or a reversal of the capital inflow.
(d) 1949/1950
(i) State of the Bond Market
This was another buoyant year for the loan market.included
The amount received from public loans was £106 million whiciy 
£40 million of over-subsariptions. Market yields on long-dated 
securities averaged 3*13 per cent or the same as in 1948/49*
In June, 1950, the market yield was 3*15 per cent compared with 
3*11 per cent in June, 1949* Much the same stability was 
evident in short dated yields which did not rise above 2 per cent. 
From March, 1949, the minimum subscription to the short-dated 
loans was £1,000 and continued until June, 1955*
Bond market support was on a very modest scale in 
949/50* Once again the most important influences were the 
rise in wool prices and the capital inflow and the consequential 
rise in London reserves and bank deposits. The volume of money 
rose by16 per cent, a substantially higher rate of increase than 
in either of the two previous years.
In 1949/50 Life offices became net sellers of
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Commonwealth securities while expanding mortgage loans "by £28
million and other loans and investments "by £13 million. This
has already been adverted to. Several other holders were also
(1 )steadily selling securities, some as early as 1948. y Banks, 
other than the Central Bank and Commonwealth Savings Bank, 
increased their security holdings (other than Treasury bills) 
by £32 million, reflecting a stronger liquid position. The 
large increase in "other" holdings is evidence of the strength 
of the bond market, particularly as Savings Bank deposits rose 
by £48 million, or at about the same rate as the previous year.
(ii) External Situation
In 1949/50 the value of exports rose by £74 million 
to a total of £617 million for the year. The value of imports, 
however, reflecting the high level of internal demand, rose 
faster to a total of £537 million. The capital inflow was even 
greater than in 1948/49 and was instrumental in causing inter­
national reserves to rise by £200 million. A large part of the 
capital inflow, however, was of a temporary nature and there was 
now growing concern as to the possible effects of a fall in 
export prices and a reversal of the capital inflow. Such an 
eventuality with investment so high would certainly have meant 
an accelerated market support policy or the abandonment of cheap 
money
v 'H.W. Arndt : The Post-War Australian Bond Market, 
Economic Record, November 1954«
(1 )
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(iii) Other Influences
Despite the continual expansion of hank lending and 
the lodgment of amounts totalling £72 million to Special Accounts 
during the year, hank liquidity rose sharply. The main 
influence was, as I have said, the very favourable overseas pay­
ments position hut there was also one further factor. Unlike 
previous years, the over-suhscrihed portion of public loan 
raisings was not used to redeem Treasury hills hut to increase 
works expenditure beyond the amount approved by the Loan Council 
at the beginning of the year. Thus the Loan Council borrowing 
programme originally approved was £79 million but the actual 
States’ works expenditure was £118 million and the redemption of 
Treasury bills only £15 million, compared with £85 million in 
1948/49.
To all outward appearances the bond market exhibited 
considerable strength; but closer inspection showed up a number 
of inherent weaknesses. The level of investment was undoubtedly 
excessive in relation to available resources. Public works 
expenditure increased by £57 million during the year and many 
plans for private constructional purposes remained unfulfilled.
In these circumstances the cheap money policy could only last as 
long as external conditions remained favourable or controls 
were tightened.
j
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Section 4 : Recapitulation, 1931-50 : Assessment of Results on 
Longer Perspective
Between 1931 and. 1935 interest rates fell principally 
under the pressure of market forces. Although the Premiers’ 
Planfe and the expansion of Treasury hills assisted the fall in 
interest rates, there was no deliberately planned policy of cheap 
money. It was mainly the dearth of new investment that kept 
interest rates falling. In 1933/34 however, the favourable 
balance of payments was also important.
Keynes’ fear that speculation would increase and 
induce more money to be held for use in future rather than 
current periods as interest rates fell does not show out in 
Australian experience. The fall in bond yields came to a halt 
in 1934/35 not because of a rise in liquidity preference but 
because investment was now rising and because the adverse 
balance of payments was not offset by official action. The 
main institutional investors - savings banks and life offices - 
added substantially to the^holdings of Government securities in 
this period.
Up to 1935 open-market purchases or investment of 
Commonwealth Savings Bank funds had not been used with the 
deliberate intention of influencing bond prices and hence 
interest rates. The year was nevertheless a turning point in 
monetary policy as the Bank Board stated openly for the first 
time that it wanted low interest rates to continue and that it
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was prepared to intervene to secure it. This new policy was 
put into effect with varying degrees of success between 1935 and 
1940. Official market support through the use of savings bank 
funds was rather sporadic but was generally intensified whenever 
the cheap money policy was threatened by adverse conditions abroad 
as in 1934-35 and 1937-38, for example. At other times the 
Bank seemed to sell more securities than it bought.
It is possible to exaggerate the importance of policy
measures prior to the War. There were large fluctuations in
bond yields each year from 1931 to 1939 and the foregoing
analysis suggests that these can be explained largely by changes
in income and the money supply as a result of market Influences.
If it is correct to speak of a cheap money policy before the war
it was a policy of preventing interest rates from rising and not
of forcing rates lower. In any case it is difficult to say
when the cheap money policy - if there was such a policy - began.
wasOne possibility is the beginning of 1933 as it/from that time 
that the Commonwealth Bank initiated reductions in fixed deposit 
rates. We might prefer 1935/38 as the starting point as it was 
then that the Board began to evolve a technique for influencing 
credit conditions through the investment of savings bank funds. 
However, for the period as a whole neither had much bearing on 
the course of market rates. More generally the Commonwealth 
Bank became more favourably disposed towards low interest rates 
as soon as it had time to assess the results of the Premiers’
Plan. This may have been of some small assistance to the bond
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market indirectly, that is through expectations about the future 
course of interest rates. This factor, coupled with the grow­
ing realization that a boom was not imminent even if export 
prices should rise, may have been in the minds of institutional 
investors when making purchases. Speculation of this kind tended 
to help and not hinder the cheap money objective.
Interest rates were pegged for most of the war period.
A cheaper money policy was put into effect early in 1947» This 
policy at first necessitated large-scale market buying from 
official sources, despite the retention of many war-time controls, 
favourable export results and an inevitable las. in production.
The Government was now pledged to cheap money so that 
the actual course of interest rates was more directly related to 
policy measures than to the behaviour of market forces. However, 
without the succession of favourable seasons and high export 
prices, the extent of market support would have been much greater. 
Methods of war-time finance had a revolutionary effect on notions 
regarding the legitimacy of central bank credit. In 1945 the 
danger of excess spending after the war was readily admitted but 
it was thought that the cheap money policy, even if it involved 
a concomitant credit expansion, should be continued and that 
excess spending be checked by other measures, notably high 
taxation, banking and other controls. It is interesting that 
this policy achieved a great deal of success in that cash sur­
pluses were generally more than sufficient to offset the 
inflationary effects of the cheap money policy.
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By m id-1948 a c o n s id e r a b le  change had come over the  
jonomy. A g r e a t  exp an sion  programine was under way and b oth  
p r iv a te  in vestm en t and consum ption were in c r e a s in g  r a p id ly ,  
d e s p ite  l im it e d  r e so u r c e s . Such p ressu re  would have had 
r e p e r c u ss io n s  on the bond market in  the normal c o u r se ,  
p a r t ic u la r ly  as w ar-tim e c o n tr o ls  had e i t h e r  been  abandoned or  
handed over to  the S ta te s .  The f a c t  w as, how ever, th a t  market 
support had p r a c t i c a l ly  c e a se d . Had i t  been  n e c e ssa r y  the  
Government would most a ssu r e d ly  have step p ed  in  and supported  
the bond m ark et, but i t  was n ot n e c e ssa r y  in  the p e r io d  we are  
r e v ie w in g . The g r e a t  in c r e a se  in  the demand fo r  money and 
some sw itc h in g  by c a p i t a l - c a u t io u s  in v e s to r s  was more than  o f f s e t  
by the growth in  the money supply consequ en t upon the upturn  in  
ex p o rt p r ic e s  and the phenomenal in f lo w  o f  c a p i t a l .  I n t e r e s t in g ly  
enough, t h i s  was a ls o  a p e r io d  when the r i s e  in  share p r ic e s  was 
checked to  some e x te n t .
The p er io d  194-6/50 -  in  c o n tr a s t  to  the pre-w ar y e a rs  
-  was n o ted  fo r  a s u c c e s s io n  o f  fa v o u ra b le  b a la n ce  o f  paym ents. 
T h is was undoubtedly  the dom inating in f lu e n c e  on the bond m arket. 
The main in f lu e n c e  in  the t h i r t i e s  was the d e c l in e  in  the  
m arg in a l e f f i c i e n c y  o f  c a p i t a l  and i t s  p a in f u l ly  slow  reco v ery .
In  th e  p ost-w ar  y e a r s  1946 /50  the m arginal e f f i c i e n c y  o f  c a p i t a l  
rem ained h ig h  and the gradual d is in t e g r a t io n  o f  c o n tr o ls  l e f t  
th e  bond market v u ln er a b le  to  a sudden r e v e r s a l  o f  the fa v o u ra b le
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external influences.
My procedure in the foregoing Survey has "been to 
set off changes in the demand for money against changes in the 
supply. Income, rather than the price level, has been taken 
as the initiating variable. A rise in investment, for instance,
raises money income, which raises the "demand for money" and so 
the rate of interest. On the other hand an increase in the 
supply of money, "cet. par", lowers the rate of interest. In 
Part VI a similar analysis is carried out for the period
1950/56.
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THEORY OF INTEREST POLICY : 1933 TO 1951 
Part I concluded on a note of optimism regarding the 
ability of the recognised monetary controls to correct most of 
the economic disturbances likely to be encountered. Interest 
in monetary control as an anticyclical weapon was at its height 
around 1930 and it was assumed that businessmen paid close 
attention to the level of interest rates when planning investments. 
In the Report of the Macmillan Committee - which has special 
interest because it was released on the eve of the G-reat 
Depression - the general thesis that changes in interest rates 
exerted a powerful influence on the level of economic activity 
in normal conditions remained unchallenged.
The impact of Depression and a slow painful recovery 
in most countries despite a significant fall in interest rates 
gave rise to renewed thinking as to the efficacy of cheap money 
policies. Scepticism increased in 1938 when the results of 
empirical enquiries among businessmen were published in the 
Oxford Economic Papers. This drew comment from many eminent 
economists. It is the purpose of this chapter to trace the 
main strands of thought up to and including the abandonment of 
cheap money in 1951/52.
Section 1 : The "General Theory"
In an earlier chapter we saw that monetary phenomena 
occupied a place of central importance in the Treatise and that 
the counter-cyclical role assigned to central banks was made
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c le a r  and d e f i n i t e .  We saw a ls o  th a t Keynes was a member o f  the  
M acm illan Committee which d ec id ed  th a t  f l e x i b l e  monetary p o l i c i e s  
o f f e r e d  the most p rom ising  means o f  ev en in g  out f lu c t u a t io n s  in  
econom ic a c t i v i t y .
No sy s te m a tic  trea tm en t o f  the e f f e c t s  o f  in t e r e s t
r a te s  on sa v in g s  and in vestm en t i s  to  be found in  the G eneral
T heory. I t  was in ten d ed  to  d e a l p r im a r ily  w ith  Q u estion s o f
th eo ry  and o n ly  in c id e n t a l ly  w ith  the a p p l ic a t io n  o f  t h i s  th eory
to  p r a c t ic e .  J u s t  the same i t  would have been  rem arkable i f
th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  the y e a rs  1930-35  bad n o t in f lu e n c e d  Keynes
towards some s c e p t ic is m  on the p r e v a il in g  view  th a t  changes in
i n t e r e s t  r a te s  e x e r te d  an a p p r e c ia b le  e f f e c t  on the volume o f
in v estm en t. I n i t i a l l y  Keynes favou red  cheap money b ecau se  he
b e l ie v e d  a f l e x i b l e  m onetary p o l ic y  was the b e s t  means o f
c o u n te r a c t in g  boom and slump. L ater  he became s c e p t ic a l  about
t h i s  and seem in g ly  favoured  a p o l ic y  o f  k eep in g  in t e r e s t  r a te s
low  a t a l l  t im e s , abandoning any id e a  o f  a f l e x i b l e  in t e r e s t
p o l i c y .  In  the G eneral Theory m onetary p o l ic y  tended  to  become
a one-way a f f a i r  to  be em ployed a g g r e s s iv e ly  o n ly  when la g g in g
( a )in vestm en t c a l l e d  fo r  low er r a t e s . v 7 Seymour H arris  
m a in ta in s  th a t  a f t e r  1929 Keynes alw ays su pp orted  low r a te s  and 
n ev er  h ig h  r a t e s a l t h o u g h  he was mucff^cfubious as to  the
^ ^ c . f .  H.C. W allich  : "The Changing S ig n if ic a n c e  o f  the  
I n t e r e s t  R ate" , American Economic R eview , December, 
1946.
'^ J o h n  Maynard Keyaaes- E conom ist and P o l ic y  Maker 
. (T w en tieth  Century L ib r a r y , 1955)» p .9 6 .
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effectiveness of a low interest rate policy in 1936 than he 
had been in 1 9 2 9 * ^ ^
Keynes* scepticism did not have its origins in a 
belief that investment decisions had suddenly become insensitive 
to changes in interest rates. The main trouble was that it may 
be difficult to bring rates down to the desired level if the 
liquidity preferences of the public were increasing faster than 
the quantity of money. The danger of raising interest rates in 
the boom lay in the difficulty of bringing them down fast enough 
in the succeeding depression. Keynes thought that speculative 
pressures had operated to defeat the will of the monetary 
authorities in their efforts to reduce interest rates in the 
Great Depression.
The theory of speculation revolves around the concept 
of a "normal" or "safe" rate of interest. Once investors feel 
that the rate is edging down below what they regard as safe in 
the light of past experience and expectations of future monetary 
policy, there will be a tendency to prefer cash to bonds and 
interest rates will rise. The same effect is produced where 
interest rates have risen but are expected to rise further. If 
representative opinion regards the prevailing rate as unsafe it 
will not last. However, if the monetary authorities are able to 
break through conventional beliefs as to what is a safe rate 
this tendency may be successfully counteracted and the rate
CD Ibid. , p.101
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(1 )prevented from rising.v 7
With a given state of expectation each decline in the
rate of interest renders the next one more difficult. In short,
Keynes thought that while the marginal efficiency of capital
would fall to zero and might even he negative, institutional and
psychological factors were present which set a limit much above
(2)zero to the practicable decline in the rate of interest.
Keynes regarded 2 to 2-g- per cent as probably the lowest prac­
ticable long-term rate under a private enterprise type system. 
"Unless reasons are believed to exist why future experience 
will be very different from past experience, a long-term rate of 
say 2 per cent leaves more to fear than to hope, and offers, at 
the same time, a running yield which is only sufficient to offset
a very small measure of fear. 7
#
Keynes distinguished between the demand for cash to 
hold for the transactions, business and the precautionary motives 
and the demand for cash to hold for the speculative motive.
The former varies very largely with the level of income while the 
latter is said to depend on expectations concerning the future 
course of interest rates. Thus the level of interest at a 
point of time is strongly influenced by psychological phenomena - 
by what majority and representative opinion thinks it should be
(1)
(2)
J.M. Keynes : The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money. (Macmillan, 1951), p.203•
(3)Ibid., p. 218 Ibid., p*202.
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in the light of current and prospective developments and of past
experience,
Keynes also "believed that future fluctuations in the
marginal efficiency of capital were likely to "be too great to "be
( 1 )offset by any practicable changes in the rate of interest*v '
The instability of the marginal efficiency of capital schedule 
seemed to assign a subsidiary role to monetary policy in counter­
cyclical armoury. It was very doubtful if a reduction in the 
rate of interest could itself remedy a situation in which demand 
and business confidence were depressed - "it is not so easy to 
revive the marginal efficiency of capital, determined, as it is,
by the uncontrollable and disobedient psychology of the business 
(2 )world. 1 The boom ends because doubts suddenly arise con­
cerning the reliability of the prospective yield. Keynes 
believed that a high rate of interest waa much more effective in 
a boom than was a low rate in a slump.
Keynes claimed that by showing that savings were 
determined by the scale of investment (not the level of interest) 
via the level of income and that investment was promoted by a 
low interest rate, the main justification for a high rate of 
interest had been removed.
To sum up we may say that Keynes did not think that 
a monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of
^  ^ Ibid. , p.164 ^  ^ Ibid. , p.317
(3)Ibid., p, 375
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interest could hope to have any real measure of success in off­
setting fluctuations in the marginal efficiency of capital. For 
one thing he expected these fluctuations to be very great and 
for another he was not confident in the ability of the monetary 
authorities to keep interest rates sufficiently low. He 
generally opposed raising the rate of interest as an anti-cyclical 
measure for fear that this might reverse the boom engines too 
early. In 1938 he feared another slump and advocated low rates. 
The important thing is that his argument was not that businessmen 
were insensitive to changing interest rates when planning new 
investments but that the range of practical manipulation was too 
small for a flexible interest policy to be relied on as the prime 
regulator of economic activity. His doubts about the ability to 
reduce interest rates and keep them low for any time during 
depression were not borne out by the experiences of most countries 
in the thirties. The extent to which his theory of speculation 
operated in Australia after World War II will be discussed in a 
final section.
Section 2; R.G, Hawtrey
Hawtrey was an outstanding critic of the Keynesian 
theoretical foundation and differed from Keynes in his inter­
pretation of monetary control. While Hawtrey admitted the 
existence of a “credit deadlock“ in 1931, he thought that it had 
been given an exaggerated importance and that the downswing 
would never have occurred had the monetary authorities switched
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to easier credit sooner and not persisted in dear money when the
depression hit. Hawtrey recognised that there were limitations 
(1 )to cheap moneyv 7 hut considered that for most situations 
monetary policy was the hest means of influencing the general 
level of activity.
In his early writings Hawtrey maintained that the 
response of commercial borrowing to easy credit was simultaneous. 
A high rate caused the v/holesaler to restrict orders, while a 
low rate induced him to step up orders to the manufacturer.
Thus a low rate raised the demand for consumption goods and, 
through the "Principle of Acceleration" raised, more than propor­
tionately, the demand for durable capital. It is a change in 
the short-term rate of interest (Bank rate), therefore, that 
starts the whole system moving.
Keynes also thought the rate of interest had important 
economic effects but he was more interested in the bond rate than 
the Bank rate. In this, as in other related matters, he had 
much in common with Knut Wickseil. To Keynes it was the demand 
for durable goods which was of overriding importance, changes in
stocks being mainly incidental to the general changes in business
(2 ) *activity.v 7 Keynes did not say much about the "credit 
deadlock" and Hawtrey claims that he could not have done so in
(1 )v 7The Depression caused Hawtrey to modify his views in one 
or two respects, as was pointed out in Part I.
(2 )x 7c.f. J.R. Hicks : Mr. Hawtrey on Bank Rate and the Long­
term rate of interest. Manchester School. Vol. X. 1939
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view  o f  h i s  r e j e c t io n  o f  th e  o p e r a tio n  o f  Bank r a te  v ia  w orking  
c a p i t a l  as th e  prime mover. He em phasised  in s te a d  the o b s ta c le s  
in te r p o s e d  by l iq u i d i t y  p r e fe r e n c e  to  a f a l l  in  the lo n g -term  
r a te .  In  H aw trey’ s v ie w , K eynes’ advocacy o f  lo a n  ex p en d itu re  
as an a n ti-s lu m p  weapon arose  on ly  when th e re  had been  a f a i lu r e  
on th e  p a r t o f  the monetary a u t h o r i t i e s  to  tak e  the n e c e ssa r y  
s te p s  to  keep down the lo n g -term  r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t .
Hawtrey ad m itted  th a t a low r a te  o f  in t e r e s t  would 
e v e n tu a l ly  s t im u la te  in vestm en t o f  a lo n g -term  c h a ra cter  b u t ,  
as w ith  a p o l ic y  o f  p u b lic  works e x p e n d itu r e , th e  p r o c ess  was to o  
slow  and undependable. ’’When the banks r e la x  c r e d i t ,  th ey  
o f f e r  an inducem ent to  s p e c u la to r s ,  in v e s to r s  and o th e r s  to  h o ld  
more s e c u r i t i e s  w ith  borrov/ed money. That makes the in v estm en t  
m arket more fa v o u ra b le  and so ten d s to  s t im u la te  new i s s u e s .
But th e  s t im u lu s  to  econom ic a c t i v i t y  i s  n o t f e l t  t i l l  the  
c a p i t a l  o u t la y  a r is in g  ou t o f  the new i s s u e s  a c tu a l ly  b e g in s ,
( A  )
and th a t  i s  l i k e l y  to  be a f t e r  a lo n g  p rep ara tory  p e r io d . J
( 1) R.Cf. Hawtrey : Trade D ep ress io n  and th e  Way Out (London. 
1933),  p.132.
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Section 3: The Oxford Enquiry
It was implicitly assumed by the neo-classicists that 
both savings and investment decisions were highly responsive to 
changes in interest rates. It was through such changes that an 
appropriate balance was secured between savings and investment,
A flexibile monetary policy formed the basis of contra-cyclical 
policy.
The first of these assumptions was laid bare by Keynes 
and the second came under heavy fire as a result of the empirical 
investigations conducted by the Oxford Economists’ Research Group 
in 1938.
The main findings of the Group were :
(a) except for the building and construction trades, 
businessmen in framing policy took little notice of 
the prevailing rate of interest;
(b) the rate of interest might affect the policy of the 
speculative merchant;
(c) a change in Bank rate may have important psychological 
effects;
(d) a change in the long-term rate may affect the 
installation of labour-saving machinery;
(e) a rise in bond prices increases business liquidity 
and is thereby conductive to expansion.
The results of the Survey seemed to suggest that the 
direct cost effects on investment assigned to changes in the
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rate of interest had "been greatly overrated in the past.
However, the indirect effects of changes in the long-term interest 
rate were thought to have more importance than had hitherto 
been assumed. Falling interest rates imply rising prices for 
securities which may enhance business liquidity and in turn make 
entrepreneurs more willing to undertake new investments.
With this important reservation the results of the 
Enquiry can be said to have reinforced the growing scepticism 
of the late 1930’s concerning the ability of a cheap money policy 
to stimulate recovery; as a consequence the view gained ground 
that while interest rates had little effect on decisions to 
invest, low rates were to be preferred on budgetary and 
distributional grounds. The Enquiry also served a useful 
purpose by stimulating further thought and enquiry.
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S e c t io n  4 : H.D. H enderson
In O ctob er, 1938 , P r o fe s so r  Henderson in  the f i r s t  
number o f  th e  Oxford Economic P apers commented on the Enquiry  
and p o in te d  ou t th a t the r a te  o f  in t e r e s t  had more chance to  be 
im portant fo r  c e r ta in  c la s s e s  o f  lo n g -term  in v estm en t. P r o fe s so r  
R obertson  em phasised  t h i s  to o . Low in t e r e s t  r a te s  h e ld  much 
ap p ea l but th e re  were few who c o u ld  e x p la in  j u s t  how low r a te s  
s t im u la te  r ec o v e r y . There were d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  su pp osing  th a t  
a very  im portant in f lu e n c e  o f  a d ir e c t  c h a r a cter  o p era ted , 
e i t h e r  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  working or f ix e d  c a p i t a l .  B e s id e s  
d u rab le  g o o d s, an im portant e f f e c t  may be f e l t  v ia  the s to c k  
exchange. The Enquiry shows th a t  th e  r o le  o f  th e  ord in ary  
businessm an in  tr a n sm itt in g  e f f e c t s  i s  a p a s s iv e  one.
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Section 5 : F.A. von Hayek
Hayek also commented on the Oxford Enquiry and agreed
that in the past the rate of interest had not, fact, exerted a
significant influence on investment decisions; however, he thought
this should not he interpreted as meaning that it cannot or ought
(1 )not he made to do so.v ' The fault rests with the monetary 
authorities who, more often than not, fail to adjust interest 
rates with changes in economic activity. As profits rise, the 
rate of interest should he promptly raised, and vice versa.
This is, of course, reminiscent of Wicksell, although 
an important difference was that Hayek did not hold that economic 
stability was necessarily secured through a constant price level.
He considered that monetary phenomena were of vital importance in 
the dynamic process; put very briefly his argument was that a 
cheap money policy led to a lengthening of the structure of pro­
duction without a corresponding increase in the desire to save.
An increase in the quantity of money disrupted normal price 
relations. There is over-investment in the sense that invest­
ment in capital equipment is of such a degree of "round aboutness" 
that it forges far ahead of the output of finished goods. The 
important point here, however, is that the boom can be contained 
if the authorities promptly adjust the market rate to the natural 
rate, that is the rate which equilibrates savings and investment. 
Likewise a depression can be arrested by a suitable downward 
adjustment of the market rate of interest.
v 'Profits, Interest and Investment (London. 1939). pp.66-8
%Section 6 : D.H. Robertson
Robertson generally shared the scepticism of this 
period concerning the efficacy of low interest rates to stimulate 
recovery hut also wished to preserve a measure of flexibility in 
the monetary sphere. He did not believe that cyclical fluc­
tuations were explicable purely in terms of monetary phenomena 
any more than they could be adequately explained by Pigou’s 
business psychology principle. At the same time he paid more 
than ordinary attention to the monetary aspects of cycles.
Unlike Hawtrey, Keynes or the Austrians, Robertson 
never regarded cheap money as a panacea for Depression. He 
emphasised rather the structural problem endemic in a system 
which expands unevenly. He agreed with Harrod that the 
’’Principle of Acceleration” occupied pride of place in trade 
cycle analysis. Although swayed by the empirical enquiries 
and the failure of cheap money to promote an early recovery, 
Robertson did not favour relinquishing control over the 
monetary weapon altogether. He wanted to retain some range of 
flexibility snd was not happy with the impression being left 
by contemporary thought that interest was completely neutral 
as far as investment was concerned. He pointed to the danger 
of interest policy not being considered on its merits from a 
cyclical point of view but instead being dominated by the
desire of governments for cheap money on narrow budgetary
(1 )grounds.x ' As to the responsiveness of capital outlay to
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0) Lloyd-s Bank Review of September, 1937? and reprinted in Essays in Monetary Theory (Staples. 1940). p.131»
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a change in interest rates, he said : "Some of the quantitatively 
more important forms of capital outlay in the modern world - 
the basic instruments of power, transport and business 
accommodation - are not very closely geared to the demand for 
particular types of consumption goods ... and it is precisely 
these forms of capital outlay which, because of their
(2 }durability, are reasonably sensitive to the rate of interest*"' J
(2)Ibid., pp.36-7
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Section 7 : Other Comments on the Oxford Enquiry
Some economists questioned whether the results of the
Enquiry really meant that the rate of interest exerted no
(1 )appreciable effect on the situation. Professor Machlupv 7
argued that in explaining actions of businessmen, steps of
reasoning must be included which are not consciously performed
by the individual and which probably cannot be performed with
scientific exactness. Entrepreneurs are faced with an
’’extreme difficulty of calculating” so that their decisions tend
to be based largely on factors not measured. Similar doubts
troubled D.H. Robertson at the time. He said he wondered if
they really meant that changes in the rate of interest had no
effect on investment decisions or ”if they merely meant that,
sizing up the whole situation, they often decide in a different
direction from that in which the rate of interest, if it were the
(2 )only factor, would p o i n t . 7
Many businessmen had pointed out in answer to the
questionnaires that they thought a rise in bond prices often had
an expansionary effect because it increased the liquidity of
business concerns and financial instituitions and that this was
a factor of some importance in deciding whether or not to invest
This was not a new argument - Keynes had stated it narrowly in
(his Treatisex 7 but it has become increasingly popular with
0 ) American Economic Review. September, 1946
(2)»»what has happened to the Rate of Interest?” Three Banks Review, March, 1949, p.20. “
^ ^ op. cit. , Vol. II, pp.203-4
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(1 )economists since the war. Thus F.A. Lutz' 7 who sought a
theoretical basis for the broadly negative conclusions of the
Survey, pointed out that changes in the rate of interest may
affect the readiness of financial institutions to grant credit or
float bonds or stocks. It was possible for the rate of interest
to influence the volume of investment even without changing the
profit calculations of entrepreneurs.
Whether or not the rate of interest affected profit
calculations, economists were now claiming that what mattered was
not the rate of interest as such but the availability of money.
If a change in the rate of interest affected liquidity - of
financial institutions, businesses or private individuals - it
could be expected to have an influence on the aggregate volume
of spending in the community. This line of thought was well
(2 )developed in Wallich1s article at the end of 1946. 7 Changes
in the market rates of interest produce changes in the capital­
ised value of income-yielding assets. The longer the term of an 
obligation, the greater its response to changing rates. Such 
capital gains, realized or unrealized, have important reper­
cussions upon income because they are apt to affegt the 
expenditures of the gainers or losers*
(1 )’'The Interest Rate and Investment in a Dynamic Economy” 
American Economic Review, December, 1945* See also 
R.S. Sayers: "The Rate of Interest" Oxford Studies in 
the Price Mechanism, (Clarendon, 1952), pp.3-16.
(^)op. cit.
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We have finally a number of economists cautioning 
that the enquiries were directed disproportionately at the more 
risky enterprises where the rate of interest v/ould normally 
have least effect.^^
( J\ )' yc,f. Edward Nevin : The Mechanism of Cheap Money : A 
Study of British Monetary Policy. (Cardiff, 1955), 
p.301.
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Section 3: Australian Pre-War Views
In Part II we discussed the motives for the adoption 
of the cheap money policy in 1931« We found that the early 
Keynesian argument for cheap money was not important in Australia 
at that time. The general view among economists was that interest 
rates could not be reduced until there was a reasonable prospect 
of balancing budgets.
In the Treatise Keynes portrayed the rate of interest 
as the means whereby savings and investment were brought to 
equality with one another, which is precisely the basis Copland 
and Davidson used for their advocacy of a fall in interest rates 
in Australia. In 1931 Copland thought that investment would 
forge ahead once interest rates were reduced; but it was argued 
that interest rates could not be reduced until confidence was 
restored.
At this time it would appear that Keynes was confident 
that central bank action could reduce the bond rate to a level which 
would induce a significant increase in investment expenditures. At 
the same time it seems that he perceived a great deal of merit in 
the argument of Australian economists and it is well known that he 
praised the Premiers* Plan on more than one occasion, presumably on 
the grounds that the direct method used to reduce interest rates 
was the best that could have been done in the circumstances. At 
any rate it was not long before he abandoned the old theory and in 
1933 was able to declare in his essay in the r,FestschriftTT for 
Arthur Spiethoff that the "fatal flaw" of orthodox theory
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was its failure to provide a realistic theory of interest.
The Copland view seems to have been a plausible one to 
take at the time because credit expansion was identified with 
inflation, public confidence was at a low ebb and the political 
situation was highly explosive. What was much less plausible was 
the Commonwealth Bank’s fear of inflation once the crisis period 
had passed.
Early views regarding the efficacy of low interest
rates- in stimulating investment were soon modified in the light
of changing conditions and a changing conception of central
banking and financial policies generally. By the end of 1933
most of the banks were beginning to lose some of their earlier
ardour for cheap money. Even Mr. Davidson was beginning to
(1 )question the effects of low interest rates. In 1935 he said 
that it was not necessarily easier to expand than to contract 
credit and that despite lower interest rates, advances would not 
increase if the community was not in a borrowing mood. He 
illustrated his arguments by reference to Hawtrey’s ’’Credit 
Deadlock’’.
After 1932 the private banks resisted every move for 
lower interest rates but by 1935 the Commonwealth Bank Board was 
firmly convinced as to the importance of keeping interest rates 
low, although its argument was based more on the desirability of
(1 )x 'Royal Commission on the Monetary and Banking System of 
Australia : Minutes of Evidence, p, 4 6 7.
- 189-
facilitating Treasury financing through an orderly hond market
than on a belief that any appreciable stimulus to investment of a
M )direct character was likely to result.' '
The Royal Commission on Banking heard evidence between
January and September, 1936, and issued a Report in 1937« The
Commission thought that low interest rates had assisted recovery
and that after June,1931, the Commonwealth Bank appeared to
realize the desirability of using its powers to lower interest
rates. In the Commission’s view it was the responsibility of
the Commonwealth Bank to determine generally in what direction
and to what extent interest rates should move. Little exception
was taken to the Bank’s action between June,1931, and March,1936,
with respect to interest rates but it was considered that the
Bank should have used its powers to prevent the rise of fixed
(2 ^deposit rates in March,1936. J
There would seem to have been a disposition among 
economists for low interest rates in the late thirties. L.P. 
Giblin doubted the wisdom of using interest rates to control 
booms and depressions, and on budgetary and distributional grounds 
it seemed desirable to keep rates as low as possible. L.G. 
Melville, who was the Bank’s economic advisor at the time, held 
a similar view and said' ' that the difficulty about exercising 
control over credit merely through varying rates of interest was
(1 )' 'See Part IV pp. 116-8 for a more detailed account of 
the Board’s attitude to low interest rates.
(2 )'Report of the Royal Commission on Banking, p.216 
(3)Minutes of Evidence, p.1123
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the uncertainty and slowness of its action ... once the fever 
of boom conditions has gripped the community it takes more than 
a change of one or two per cent in the cost of fixed loans to 
deter speculators and entrepreneurs. Furthermore, changes in 
rates of interest are likely to be less effective in Australia 
than elsewhere and it was therefore necessary for the Common­
wealth Bank to be given some control over the actual size of the 
credit base. v '
It was generally agreed that a rise in interest rates
should be avoided whenever possible mainly because it increased
the cost of government finance and was therefore likely to
(2 )conflict with other aspects of public policy.' 1 It was further 
agreed that interest rates had not been kep^artificially low 
in the thirties but had fallen because of market conditions.
Not all economists favoured the continuance of low interest 
rates, however. T. Hytten for example, contended that a fetish 
for low interest rates might well intensify a future depression 
and emphasised the importance of allowing interest rates to take 
their natural course.
In the search for ways and means of cushioning the 
economy against the impact of changes in the balance of payments 
and other influences which bore directly on bank liquidity and 
lending, economists were coming to see the importance of
'1 , p.1124
^'Vide Economic Record, April, 1939*
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instituting some form of quantitative banking control and 
accordingly to place rather less emphasis on variations in the 
price of credit. The failure to establish an open market in 
Treasury bills and the growing realization that it could be 
misleading to use overseas experience as a guide to policy in 
Australia where conditions were rather different also had
some influence in that direction
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Section 9 : The Direction of Thought Since World War II : Early 
Post-War Views in United Kingdom and United- 
States of America
Before considering the views of Australian economists 
and the rationale of government policies in Australia, we may 
Briefly trace some developments in the theory of monetary 
policy in the United Kingdom and the United States, prior to 
the final abandonment of cheap money#
In the preceding section we noted how one of the 
foremost British economists - D.H. Robertson - was beginning to 
think that the pendulum may have swung too far against monetary 
policy. As a general rule, however, economists before the war 
had become exceedingly sceptical regarding the ability of the 
traditional monetary techniques to resume their former role as 
principal economic regulator. The experience with war finance 
and economic controls seemed, if anything, to increase this 
scepticism.
The U.K. White Paper on Pull Employment issued in 
1944 decided to maintain "cheap money" throughout the period of 
post-war reconstruction. Immediately after the war Hugh 
Dalton* attempted to force interest rates down to record levels, 
a policy which met with some initial success but which was 
finally abandoned in the face of market pressure for higher 
rates. He was successful in bringing the consol rate down 
from 3 per cent (the rate at which the war had been financed) in 
July 1945> to 2-g- per cent in Dece ben, 1 946, but failed to 
convince the market of the survival value of 2-g- per cent.
* Chancellor of the Exchequer from July 1945 to November, 1947-
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Dalton’s ’'cheaper” money policy was motivated prin­
cipally by National Debt and distributional considerations, but 
there were some further reasons. He wished to minimize the 
cost of the building programme and to prepare the way for the 
Nationalisation Bills. In the new edition of his Public 
Finance Dalton has denied that his policy was inflationary in 
1945/47 and both Harrod and Henderson supported that view.v ;
Low interest rates did not stimulate investment in this period 
because investment was held in check "by the need to obtain per­
mission from the Central Government, or from the Capital Issues
(2 )Committee or from the local authorities". ' Between January.
\ S
1946 and January^ 1947, however, deposits of the Clearing Banks 
rose by £900 million, the inflationary effects of which it would 
seem were only partially offset by direct controls over bank 
lending. The failure to prevent the rate from rising above 2-J- 
per cent and the growth in the volume of liquid assets held by 
the banks did not immediately give rise to much concern regarding 
the compatibility of the Government’s avowed aim to preserve 
financial and economic stability in an expanding economy and 
the equally firm intention to retain the cheap money policy.
But the issue was no longer an open and shut affair.
By 1948 increasing doubts were coming to be entertained about
^’^ Hugh Dalton : Principles of Public Finance (London, 1957)
pp. 237-9.(2)v 'ibid., p.235
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the advisability of assuming that interest rates had no positive 
function to perform. Where there had been fairly general 
agreement before the war that it was best to retain low rates 
on budgetary and distributional grounds, there was now a wide 
diversity of opinion developing between writers. Thus in 1948
(A )two outstanding books were published - one by Harrod' ' in which 
it was assumed that interest rate variations do not play an
(2 )important part in contra-cyclical armoury and another by Meadex ' 
in which a revival of control by the rate of interest was 
advocated. Meade argued that a higher rate would influence 
both sides of the demand-supply equation.
("51In March, 1949, D.H. Robertsonx ' questioned the 
wisdom of "putting the rate of interest in chains", and pleaded 
for "some sustained re-thinking in academic circles." He also 
advanced a new argument : under earlier monetary arrangements 
demands for exhorbitant wage rates might meet with insufficient 
money to foot the bill, but if the authorities were determined 
to keep the rate lower there was no such check. The current 
policy was therefore favourable to cost inflation, and in what 
has now become a famous phrase he said : "the monetary 
authorities have in effect abdicated from exercising that 
sovereignty over the standard of value which we thought we had
^ '^Roy Harrod : Towards a Dynamic Economics (Macmillan, 1948)(2)J.E. Meade : Planning and the Price Mechanism.
(Allen and Unwin, 1948).
(3)d .H. Robertson : What has happened to the rate of 
Interest? Three Banks Review', March, 1949.
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commit t e d  to  t h e i r  c h a r g e ” . At t h e  same t ime Robertson,  d i d  n o t  
p r o p o s e  t h a t  th e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  s h o u ld  he  a l lo w e d  t o  go ’’f r e e ” 
t h u s  r e n d e r i n g  r e c o u r s e  t o  p h y s i c a l  c o n t r o l s  o v e r  c a p i t a l  o u t l a y  
u n n e c e s s a r y ,
(1 )
I n  1947 H a r r o d '  '  e x p l a i n e d  why he d i d  n o t  f a v o u r  a 
r e v i v a l  o f  th e  p r i c e  mechanism i n  th e  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t .  The 
c a p i t a l  m ark e t  was n o t  l i k e  o t h e r  m a r k e t s ;  th e  f r e e  p l a y  o f  
m a r k e t  f o r c e s  c o u ld  n o t  s e c u r e  a r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  low enough to  
b o o s t  t h e  economy when i t  n eed e d  i t  o r  h i g h  enough t o  r e s t r a i n  
i n f l a t i o n  when a d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c y  was demanded. F o r  t h i s  
r e a s o n  he c l a im e d  t h a t  Keynes would have  f a v o u r e d  more d i r e c t  
means o f  c h e c k in g  c a p i t a l  o u t l a y  i n  t h e  e a r l y  p o s t - w a r  y e a r s .
A p a r t  f rom  t h i s ,  H ar rod  s a i d  i t  was ’’i m p e r a t i v e l y
n e c e s s a r y ” t o  have a low r a t e  ov/ing t o  t h e  l a r g e  s i z e  o f  t h e
n a t i o n a l  d e b t .  A n o th e r  a rgum ent  advanced  was t h a t  i f  we a c c e p t
K e y n e s ’ d i a g n o s i s  t h a t  i n  t h e  l o n g  ru n  o u r  economy n e ed s  a low
r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  t h e r e  may be  a d a n g e r  i n  a l l o w i n g  i t  t o  r i s e
now. F o r  once i t  had  r i s e n  i t  would n o t  be  e a s y  t o  re d u c e  i t
a g a i n .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  was q u i t e  l i k e l y  t h a t  a h ig h  r a t e  o f
i n t e r e s t  i n  p r e s e n t  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  would e x e r t  b u t  a sm a l l  c u r b i n g
( 2 )i n f l u e n c e  on th e  volume o f  c a p i t a l  o u t l a y , v '
Meade on th e  o t h e r  hand  a rg u e d  t h a t  i f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
h a d  r i s e n  ’’th e  v a l u e s  o f  f i x e d  income p r o p e r t y  would have f a l l e n
(1 ) Roy H ar ro d  : Are These H a r d s h i p s  N e c e s s a r y ?
(London, 1947), p.124.
^ ) I b i d . , p .1 2 5
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and th e  upward movement in  the va lu e  o f  O rdinary Shares would have
b een  m it ig a te d ,  and the in c e n t iv e  to  spend on th e  p a r t o f
(1 )p ro p erty  owners would have been  cu rb ed " .' ' Meade r e je c te d  the  
id e a  th a t  th e  r a te  o f i n t e r e s t  v/as a n e g l ig i b le  fa c to r  in  
d eterm in in g  w hether or n o t money would be sp en t on new p r o je c t s  
fo r  c a p i t a l  develop m en t, and d e sc r ib e d  a d ir e c t  l ic e n s in g  system  
as "clum sy and i n e f f i c i e n t " .  He ad vocated  a c o n s id e r a b le  r i s e  
in  th e  sh o r t-te rm  r a te  o f  i n t e r e s t  and a m oderate r i s e  in  lo n g ­
term  r a te s  somewhat above the probab le average o f  fu tu r e  lo n g ­
term  r a t e s .  To have th e  d e s ir e d  e f f e c t ,  the r i s e  in  the lo n g ­
term r a te  must be c o n f id e n t ly  ex p e cted  to  be f a i r l y  temporary 
-  an e x p e c ta t io n  th a t  would be much encouraged by a c le a r  
e x p la n a tio n  on the p a rt o f  the m onetary a u t h o r i t i e s  th a t r a te s  
o f  i n t e r e s t  would be induced  a ga in  as soon as th e  p e r io d  o f  
s t r a in  on c a p i t a l  r e so u r c e s  had p assed .
In  the U n ited  S ta te s  th e  cheap money p o l ic y  was 
co n tin u ed  a f t e r  the war and was n o t f i n a l l y  abandoned u n t i l  
March, 1951« A r i s e  in  sh o rt-te rm  r a te s  and some f l e x i b i l i t y  
was p e r m itted  a f t e r  m id -1947 but the r e a l  showdown betw een  the  
T reasury and F ed era l R eserve d id  n ot occur u n t i l  a f t e r  th e  o u t­
break  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  in  Korea in  Ju n e, 1950. From the tim e  
o f  th e  "accord" u n t i l  1953 the F ed era l R eserve used  i t s  g r e a te r  
independence to  perm it some t ig h te n in g  o f  c r e d i t  and some r i s e  
in  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .
(1 )op. c i t . , p . 27
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It was becoming clear as time went on that Treasury- 
insistence on low interest rates was greatly impeding efforts to 
halt the inflationary spiral and more economists were stressing 
the need for some modification of existing policy. The large 
holdings of government securities by the banks and the absence 
of any counterpart to the Australian Special Account or the 
English Treasury Deposit Receipt procedure for controlling the 
growth of excess liquid reserves put an edge on the problem.
In 1947 Governor Eccles proposed that all Federal Debt
should be made non-marketable. This was a very drastic measure
and was supported by those who wanted a positive monetary policy.
Governor Sproule submitted another proposal which was more
acceptable to the Treasury. It was that the Central Bank should
manipulate the market sufficiently to create some uncertainty
and thereby slow down new capital issues and discourage
switching. This policy was followed by the Federal Reserve but
was not successful. In December the market stampeded and the
Federal Reserve was obliged to buy bonds on a large scale to 
(^  )preserve par.v ' On that occasion the market had shown that it 
was not yet accustomed to uncertainty. The failure demonstrates 
the dangers inherent in a policy which seems to be experimental 
in character. In March, 1951 the breaking of par was not 
accompanied by a wholesale collapse of the market. This was 
partly because the market was getting more accustomed to
(1 ) C.f. Federal Reserve Bulletins, 1947 and 1948
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f lu c t u a t in g  bond p r ic e s  end p a r t ly  because the a u t h o r i t ie s  made
t h e ir  in t e n t io n s  c r y s t a l  c le a r .
The T r ea su r y 's  rea so n s fo r  w anting to  r e ta in  cheap
money were v a r io u s  but perhaps the two p r in c ip a l  ones were :
(a)- the d e s ir e  to  promote f u l l  employment and f u l l  p ro d u ctio n
and a fe a r  th a t  a more r e s t r i c t i v e  m onetary p o l ic y  m ight
(1 )je o p a r d iz e  the a tta in m en t o f  th a t o b j e c t iv e .  ' A l l ie d  w ith  t h i s  
was the b e l i e f  th a t  i n f l a t i o n  cou ld  b e s t  be c o n tr o l le d  by f i s c a l  
p o l ic y  and (b ) the dual o b je c t iv e  o f f a c i l i t a t i n g  T reasury  
f in a n c in g  and h o ld in g  down i n t e r e s t  ch arges on the N a tio n a l D ebt, 
I t  was argued th a t  to  abandon 2J per cen t would d iso r g a n iz e  the  
s e c u r i t y  m ark et, make r e c o n v e r s io n  o p e r a tio n s  d i f f i c u l t ,  
in c r e a s e  the deb t burden and p o s s ib ly  im pair th e  c r e d it  o f  the  
U n ited  S ta te s  Government.
In the U n ited  S ta te s  the F ed era l R eserve System  had 
been  m oving tow ards a r e la x a t io n  o f  the cheap money p o l ic y  ever  
s in c e  1946. Short term r a te s  ro se  s u b s t a n t ia l ly  betw een  1946 
and 1948 and even the r i s e  in  lo n g  term r a te s  was accom p lish ed  
much l e s s  a b ru p tly  than in  A u s tr a lia  f o r  exam ple, where th e  
r e v iv a l  o f  m onetary p o l ic y  through changes in  in t e r e s t  r a t e s  
was p r e t ty  much a dead is s u e  b e fo r e  1951* In 1951 , U .S . 
Government s e c u r ity  y i e l d s  averaged  2 .5 7  p er  cen t as compared 
w ith  2 .3 2  per cen t in  1950. In  1952 th ey  rose  fu r th e r  to  2 .6 8 ^
^ ^ C .f .  W illiam  J . Baumöl and L e s te r  V. Chandler :
Economic P r o c e s se s  and P o l i c i e s  (H arper, 1 9 5 4 ) ,  
p p .3 0 4 -5 .
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Thus between 1950 and 1952 yields on long-dated securities 
rose by about 15 per cent. The increase for the comparable 
period in Australia was nearly 40 per cent.
The greater independence of the Federal Reserve System 
which had been actively canvassing the prospects of a more 
flexible policy for a number of years, would partly explain 
the difference. In Australia and the United Kingdom it was 
virtually impossible for the respective central banks - 
particularly under Labour Administrations - openly to criticize 
Treasury policy even had they wanted to, although in Australia 
there is no evidence to suggest that there was any difference 
of opinion between the Commonwealth Bank and Treasury on that 
score before 1951* The reasons for the much greater faith in 
a continuing cheap money policy by the monetary authorities 
in Australia and the sudden abandonment of cheap money are 
discussed in subsequent sections.
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Section 10 : Theory of Interest Policy in Australia, 1945/51»
In Australia the cheap money policy was not seriously 
questioned until 1951* Towards the end of the war there was 
very little discussion about the pros and cons of retaining cheap 
money. There was very little discussion because there was 
general agreement that interest rates should be kept low and 
economists seemed to assume that low rates could be retained 
without difficulty especially if controls were continued over 
capital issues and consumer spending. It was thought by some 
that there would be some unemployment after the war and with it 
some pressure for higher interest rates. It was appropriate 
policy in view of this expectation to reduce interest rates now. 
This would help alleviate the housing problem and assist basic 
development. Some economists feared a post-war inflation more 
than a post-war slump but it was argued that a policy of low 
interest rates was still appropriate as inflation could be 
checked by more direct quantitative controls, capital issues and 
higher taxation.
The Government’s policy of maintaining low interest 
rates was set down in May, 1945, in the White Paper on Pull 
Employment. Policy was to continue to be directed towards low 
interest rates which it was hoped, in conjunction with the 
banicing powers, would help stabilise the level of investment 
after the war. Low interest rates and the dependence more on 
taxation than on public loan raisings as a source of finance,
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would also minimize the burden of debt on which interest is paid.
Throughout the period of Labour Administration and for
at least a year after Labour's defeat, it continued to be accepted
government policy to keep interest rates low and stable. There
appear to have been four principal arguments used in support of 
(1 )this policy,^ yviz.:
(a) low interest rates allow public works to be carried
out with great value to the community. This argument
(2 )has had strong public appeal;v J
(b) low rates help encourage private investment and may 
act as a buffer against possible adverse conditions 
in the future;^  ^
(c) in the past high interest rates have burdened the 
farmer and home-builder in particular. Low rates are 
desirable because they prevent certain groups from 
being exploited;
 ^ ^C•f. Things Worth Fighting For : Speeches by J.B. Chifley 
Edited by A.W. Stargardt, pp.?6, 106, 108, 220 and Ex­
tract from Reply by Commonwealth Government to U.N* Q.ues- 
tionnnaire on Pull Employment, 8th October, 1948, and 
reprinted in the Conflict of Expansion and Stability, 
edited by D.B. Copland and R. Barback, p.39*(2)v yC.f. H.C. Coombs:Development of Monetary Policy in Aus- 
tralia (the E.S.&A. Bank Research Lecture, 1954), del- ivered at the University of Queensland on 15th September, 
1934* Coombs says that Australians are expansion-minded 
.and look to the rapid development of their country. "They realize that expansion will be expedited if enterprise 
is not burdened with heavy capital charges."
(-^A Recession by at least 1949 was regarded as more than likely.
(^)c.F. H.W. Arndt Financial Review Article of 23rd August, 1951 on "The Surrender of Cheap Money". Also reprinted in Copland and Barback, op. cit. pp.304-8.
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(d) low rates are desirable on budgetary grounds.
CommonwealthThe/Bank favoured the continuance of the cheap money
policy after the war and made the additional point that a rise in
interest rates would redound to the disadvantage of patriotic
(1 )citizens who had subscribed to war loans.v ' It would also 
aggravate the difficulties of the housing problem and increase 
the problem of the public debt. The Bank’s view was that the 
cheap money policy could be of considerable value in securing a 
high level of employment after the war. In successive reports 
up to and including June, 1950, the Bank did not offer any 
comment on the appropriateness of the cheap money policy in the 
light of changing conditions and we must therefore conclude that 
it was thought that conditions did not warrant any review of the 
cheap money policy. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether even 
the events of 1950/51 shattered this view. Reference was made 
in that report to the increases in interest rates in the United 
Kingdom and U.S.A. as part of measures designed to check 
inflation associated with increased defence expenditures; the 
Bank was obviously alarmed at the inflationary trend but it was 
apparently unconvinced that the measures adopted overseas could 
work in Australia. Although reference is made to the weakening 
of the bond prices there is no suggestion that it might have been 
appropriate to reverse the cheap money policy.
Apart from a fairly steady stream of criticism
( J\ )v 'Commonwealth Bank Annual Report for year ended 30th June,
1945.
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e m a n a t in g  from  b a n k s  and f i n a n c i a l  j o u r n a l i s t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when 
th e  bond  r a t e  was lo w e re d  t o  3 i  p e r  c e n t  i n  November, 1946 , th e  
i d e a s  p ro p o u n d ed  i n  th e  W hite  P a p e r  seem to  have  commanded f a i r l y  
g e n e r a l  a s s e n t .  No l e a d i n g  e c o n o m is t  came o u t  w i th  a f o r t h r i g h t  
d e n u n c i a t i o n  o f  th e  G overnm ent’ s p o l i c y .  The i s s u e  had  i n  f a c t  
c e a s e d  to  be  an im p o r ta n t  one i n  1949- As r e c e n t l y  a s  May, 1950 
Copland was a b le  to  w r i t e  an e s s a y  on th e  ’’Developm ent o f  
Economic Thought i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  1 9 2 4 /5 0 ” w i th o u t  any e x p l i c i t  
m e n t io n  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ;  y e t  l e s s  th a n  a y e a r  l a t e r  he was 
a d v o c a t in g  a r i s e  in  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a s  p a r t  o f  an e i g h t  p o i n t  
p l a n  to  h a l t  i n f l a t i o n .  T h a t  g i v e s  some i d e a  o f  th e  d ra m a t ic  
change t h a t  o v e r to o k  th e  economy -  an a s p e c t  w hich  i s  d e v e lo p e d  
l a t e r  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  r e l e v a n c e  to  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  s i t u a t i o n  
o f  comments by o v e r s e a s  e c o n o m is ts .  Even t h e n ,  how ever, 
e c o n o m is ts  i n  A u s t r a l i a  were slow  to  adm it  t h a t  th e  new weapons 
o f  econom ic p o l i c y  were in a d e q u a te  t o  d e a l  w i th  th e  m agn itude  
o f  econom ic f l u c t u a t i o n s  e n c o u n te r e d  s in c e  1950* On t h i s  p o i n t  
C op land  s a i d  : 11 The p r e s e n t  s t a t e  o f  th e  economy does n o t  i n s p i r e  
c o n f id e n c e  i n  th e  e f f i c a c y  o f  th e  new weapons we have c h o sen  to  
t a k e  th e  p l a c e  o f  th e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  T here  i s  s t i l l  some
( A  )
good wine i n  o ld  b o t t l e s . ” ' '
The id e a  t h a t  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n  th e  new weapons gave 
r i s e  to  a r e s u r r e c t i o n  o f  th e  o ld  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  e m p h a s ise d  by 
a number o f  E n g l i s h  and A m erican  e c o n o m is ts .  I n  A u s t r a l i a ,  
h o w e v e r ,  an a g g r e s s iv e  m o n e ta ry  p o l i c y  th ro u g h  v a r i a t i o n s  i n
( ^ D . B .  C opland  : I n f l a t i o n  and E x p an s io n  : E s sa y s  on th e  
A u s t r a l i a n  economy ( C h e s h i r e ,  1 9 5 1 ) ,  p p . 124-5*
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interest rates and open-market operations has "been ruled out on
at least three counts. One view, which would seem in this
period to have heen held fairly generally by Australian economists
and which can be applied to the more direct forms of credit
restraints such as special accounts, is that a credit policy
sufficiently restrictive to curb the inflation would deliver
too great a shock to business confidence. "If we tried to
check a boom by raising the rate of interest, the increase
would need to be so sharp that it would cause great dislocation
( a )and injustice.v ' This view was shared also by T.W. Swan
and P.H. Karmel. Another is that these techniques cannot be
expected to work very well in Australia which has no highly
developed money market and where a high proportion of capital
expenditure is less likely to be influenced by changes in the
(2 )cost of borrowing.' ' The third reason is that the economy is 
subjected to wide balance of payments fluctuations on which it 
is heavily dependent for its prosperity and which, it is argued, 
can best be met by the more direct forms of control# over bank 
liquidity.
As for the stock argument that changes in the rate of 
interest have no appreciable influence on investment decisions, 
we find little evidence of this having been important in 
Australia. Indeed, as was mentioned above, one of the basic 
reasons for this policy in the first place was that it favoured
^'C.f. L.G-. Melville : Economic Record. June 1946. p.16.
R.R. Hirst : Post-War Monetary Policy in Australia Economic Record, May 1953. pp.2-4.
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economic expansion and a high level of investment. At the time 
this was thought to he particularly important because of the 
strong body of opinion which asserted that the world would be in 
the throes of a major depression within a few years after the 
war. It is apparent that some senior government advisors held 
this view and it is therefore possible that the cheap money 
policy was retained mainly on such grounds. The sort of 
argument used in this context was that it was risky to allow 
interest rates to rise - or to raise them deliberately - to meet 
a merely ephemeral upturn in activity because it would in all 
probability be difficult to get them down again when the 
recession came. Furthermore, in the long run investment 
opportunities may diminish.
Thus the stagnation thesis, coupled with the theory 
of speculation and special features of the Australian economic 
and political framework seemed to present a strong case for 
keeping interest rates as low as possible. In fact by the end
of the war belief in low interest rates had almost become a
(1 )dogmax ' and the position did not change appreciably in the 
ensuing five years. Variable interest rates became a highly 
unfashionable subject icy economists in Australia. ' The "New 
Economics” with attention focused on the possibilities of fiscal 
policy obviously exerted an influence as did the period of war 
with the vast increase in debt on which interest had to be paid.
(1 )H.C. Coombs op. cit. , p.6
' 'C.f. R.F. Holder : ’’Monetary Policy in Australia”, 
Economic Papers. No* 11. P.5'1»
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Contrary to what one would have thought, Coombs says that the
prejudice in favour of low interest rates was intensified by
the events of the thirties. ’'Many were convinced that the high
rates of the late twenties were a factor in precipitating the
depression and that the low rates of the late thirties were a
(1 )significant element in stimulating recovery.,,v '
We can, I think, sum it up by saying that Australians
were essentially forward-looking in 1945* Any possible obstacle
in the path of a speedy development must be removed, especially
as economic conditions were vulnerable to sudden changes in trends
overseas. One of these obstacles was a high rate of interest
which was also oppressive to the groups which were likely to
contribute most to this era of progress. (e.g. , Home-builders,
farmers and small businessmen). Both these points of view have
(2 )been brought out very forcibly by H.W. Arndtv J He says there 
are two quite general but weighty reasons for keeping interest 
rates as low as possible at all times. One is that, in the long 
run low interest rates favour investment which is a particularly 
important argument for Australia bent on developing its economic 
resources. The other is that interest payments represent 
transfers of income by and large, from active and enterprising to 
inactive members of the community, and by and large from the less 
to the more well-to-do.
Melville’s views are of particular interest because he 
was amongst those who discounted the likelihood of any general
(1) (2 )Ibid., p.5 Copland and Barback, op. cit. , p.307
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unemployment in the early post-war years, hut thought it was "best 
to keep rates "as low and as stable as possible through all 
phases of business fluctuations,"v ' He argued that a change in 
interest rates affected both saving and investment. As interest 
rates fall investment expands without limit and savings fall 
because income is redistributed to those who do most of the 
spending in the community; but interest rates have significant 
effects for savings and investments only if they are allowed to 
operate over a considerable period of time. There is therefore, 
no denial of the Keynesian proposition that interest rates cannot 
be relied upon to adjust themselves to economic circumstances in 
a way which equates investment and savings at the full employment 
level. A moderate increase in the rate of interest will not 
have much immediate effect in checking the boom while a large 
increase may have too much effect. However, Melville insisted 
that the matter could not be regarded as finally settled and that 
the retention of cheap money after the war would be inflationary 
because it would reduce the level of savings.
(2 )In September, 1950, Donald Cochranev ' drew attention 
to some of the problems which had been accentuated by the rigid 
adherence to a policy of cheap money. While desirable from the 
point of view of taxation and fiscal policy, the cheap money 
policy was encouraging people to invest savings in the more risky
fields and this was aggravating the problem of unbalanced economic
— —  —
v 'op. cit., p. 16
(2 )v Australian Quarterly, September, 1950*
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growth. Cochrane’s assessment of the economic situation was
that inflation was likely to persist and that as we could not
afford to reduce taxation, every possible encouragement should be
given to individual savings. Without investment controls, a
cheap money policy may well prove to be an unwise policy.
Cochrane concluded that it might be necessary to relax the cheap
money policy temporarily and allow interest rates to rise.
The trading banks had consistently argued that the
cheap money policy discouraged individual savings and must soon
break under the strain of heavy investment demands. In 1947 the 
( a )National Bankv * pointed out that with the gradual relaxation of
wartime controls and the easing of capital issues controls a
policy which attempted "to maintain interest rates at abnormally
low levels” may meet with serious difficulties. This was mainly
because the attractions of investment in industry and commerce
were likely to increase relative to Commonwealth loans. The
cheap money policy may also have deleterious effects on individual
thrift especially in association with high levels of taxation.
The view was also advanced that in the long run the maintenance of
cheap money would require "rigorous official control over all
(2 )forms of investment".v ' The cheap money policy was, of course,
(3)prone to have an inflationary influence.
While the banks have no doubt a vested interest in high
(1 )' 'Cf. Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, Jan. 1947*
(n\' 'See Address delivered by the Chairman at the Ordinary 
General Meeting of the Commercial Bank of Australia held 
in August, 1946. Reprinted in Copland and Barback, op. cit., p.302.
(3)ßank of N.S.W. Review, August 1951 and Ibid., p.304.
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interest rates, they were not alone in claiming that the con­
tinuance of low interest was damaging the incentive to save and 
that it was therefore inflationary, particularly in an expanding 
economy. The real point of course, is that the banks do not 
like having their activities controlled by the central hank or 
anyone else in the interests of economic stability; but the 
idea that the level of interest makes no difference to the 
proportion of income saved was now being questioned. By 1940 
the traditional belief in a direct connection between the level
of interest and personal savings was almost entirely 
(1 )discredited;x ' but the experience with a fully-employed economic 
system since the war leaves considerable doubt in my mind whether 
governments can be entrusted to do the "necessary" saving. 
Conditions have been quite different in the forties but in 1951 
there was still a strong body of thought which * considered that a 
change in interest rates would have no appreciable effect on 
savings.
In 1952 H.W. Arndt considered that in the short run
the effect of higher rates on the level capital expenditure was
negligible compared with what could be done through credit
(rationing and capital issues c o n t r o l , b u t  that in the long run 
low rates favoured investment and high rates created a serious 
problem because of the additional tax burden.
v^Cf. T.W. Swan, Economic Record, June, 1940.
(^'See for example, H.W. Arndt op. cit. , p.306.
(3)Ibid., p.305
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Arndt now agrees broadly with the neo-Keynesian view
that cheap money is a desirable goal as long as it does not run
counter to the overall economic objectives. Thus he supported
a rise in interest rates in 1951 -52 and 1955-56 when it became
clear that the retention of low rates would have involved
continuing market support at a level inconsistent with other
policies designed to maintain reasonable stability in the
(1)e c onomy.v '
(3)H.W. Arndt : The Australian Trading Banks, 
p. 1 70.
op« cit. 9
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Section 11 : Abandonment of Cheap Money : Symposia in United 
Kingdom and U.S.A.
An excellent discussion of the pros and cons of the 
return to more flexible monetary policies appears in the August 
1951 issue of the Review of Economics and Statistics for 
America and the March/April and August, 1952, issues of the 
Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics for the United 
Kingdom.
In the United States, the Chicago School is well 
known for its outspoken criticism of cheap money policies. It 
follows the Knight tradition of "laissez faire1'. Both Milton 
Friedman and H.C. Simons argue in an ”a priori” fashion.
Economic controls and in certain circumstances fiscal policies, 
threaten the basis of a free society. Monetary policy should 
be relied on solely to maintain full employment and a stable 
price level. They are prepared to let the rate go free and find 
its own level and argue therefore for it to be used as part of 
the price mechanism. It is claimed that variations in the 
rate of interest are more impersonal in character and do not 
discriminate against particular industries or borrowers.
The possibility that investment decisions may not be 
particularly sensitive to changes in the rate of interest is 
admitted but a rise in the rate of interest will make saving 
more attactive and reduce the liquidity of business. It is 
true that certain imperfections exist in the capital market as 
there will, for example, be a bias in favour of persons or units 
with large liquid resources, good connections, etc. However,
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these imperfections are not regarded as being particularly sig­
nificant when viewed against the alternative methods of control­
ling inflation, which would lead in their view to even wider 
deviations from the optimum distribution of resources.
This school of thought believes that open market 
operations should be employed to whatever extent is necessary 
to control inflation without regard for the resultant level of 
interest rates. The rate of interest must be judged on its 
consequences. Lerner is another economist who sees no virtue 
in a cheap money policy as such and has expended a considerable 
amount of energy in showing that a government, in order to 
control inflation, will simply borrow heavily from the public 
thereby raising the rate of interest. It needs to borrow only 
to the extent necessary to secure a rate of interest which is 
considered appropriate to the circumstances. Having done this 
and achieved a high level of income and a stable price level 
there is no National Debt problem. All actions, including the 
raising of the rate of interest, must be judged on their 
consequences and the higher interest payments are not a burden 
when income is rising. Conversely in time of deflation debt 
is redeemed so as to secure a lower rate of interest. It is 
apparent therefore that Lerner also argues in an "a priori" 
fashion although his argument is somewhat different from that of 
the Chicago School in that he favours using changes in taxation
to vary consumption spending as a marginal weapon should the
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rate of interest chosen fail to produce the "right” amount of 
spending. Friedman, on the other hand, regards a good 
combination as roughly a balanced budget together with whatever 
associated monetary policy would prevent inflation.
Both the "Classical” arguments of Friedman and the 
"Functional Finance" principles of Lerner tend to brush aside 
political, institutional and psychological factors although 
there might be something to be said for the argument that these 
would be less acute once the public was made to expect periodic 
fluctuations in bond prices. There might then be more 
"informed” speculation end hence less likelihood of a complete 
market breakdown. The experience of cheap money since the war
lends some weight to this argument.
(1 )The "Economist"v ' has also argued the classical 
line. It favours using the rate of interest as part of the 
price mechanism, and at the time said that a variable rate of 
interest "provides an objective calculus of the relative worth 
of short-term end long-term projects. The very objective of 
any disinflation policy is to make marginal buyers less able 
to exert their demand.” Professor Meade was another who argued 
strongly for using the price mechanism and once mentioned a rate 
of 13 per cent.
At the’other end of the scale are economists who 
oppose any use of flexibile monetary policy involving changes in
(oVide May 3th, 12th and 19th issues of 1951
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the rate of interest. They also argue in an "a priori" 
fashion and are generally found to favour the extensive use of 
direct controls. This viewpoint has a strong and fiery apostle 
in Thomas Balogh.
Balogh’s main criticism is that monetary policy does 
not work by selecting investment optimally but by creating 
uncertainty and holding up the flow of finance in a way which 
invites cumulative movements. His argument then is not that 
monetary policy does not work, but that it works too well - that 
it tends always to overshoot the mark. Embodied in this is the 
notion - popular even now among Australian economists - that a 
small dose of monetary medicine makes little difference while a 
large dose kills the patient.
Harry Johnson is also an ardent supporter of fiscal 
policies and direct controls. His approach is somewhat more 
empirical than Balogh’s but his conclusions are muchthe same. 
Johnson says that a rise in the rate of interest should be 
avoided if possible, because it only adds to costs and creates 
difficulties in the capital market. If a tighter monetary 
policy is thought desirable, however, it should be implemented 
by means of direct control over excess banking liquidity.
Johnson was an active critic of the New Monetary Policy intro­
duced in the United Kingdom in 195*1 > to which a brief reference 
may now be made.
Soon after the election Butler began to use monetary 
policy with two main ends in view - to apply extra disinflation
-21 5-
and to protect the balance of payments. Apart from the possible 
psychological effects of implied threats of sterner measures to 
come, the policy proceeded in two stages; one was the funding 
operation which meant a once-for-all reduction in the liquidity 
of the banking system, and the other was the raising of Bank Rate 
to 4 per cent in March, 1952 , together with a tightening of 
capital issues and selective credit controls.
Johnson was in favour of capital issues and selective 
credit controls but strongly opposed the funding operation and 
the subsequent raising of Bank Rate. His contention was that the 
reduction in liquidity could have been secured without the 
necessity of paying higher interest charges if the Treasury 
Deposit Receipt had been revived. There is nothing sacred about 
the 30 per cent liquidity ratio. This challenge did not pass 
unanswered. Dennis Robertson and Paish, for example, pointed 
out that the Government had rejected this alternative because 
it would not have had the desired effect on public opinion, 
particularly abroad. An important part of the policy was to 
restore foreign confidence in sterling.
In an earlier article Johnson argued that in future 
there would be a bias towards low interest rates and that the 
use of Bank Rate and open market operations had gone for good. 
Significant trends during and since the war had been the increase 
in the amount of public debt held by the banks, the increasing
* It had been raised from 2 to 2-J- per cent in November, 195'!«
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role of government in economic life and the widely accepted view 
that the interest elasticity of investment is low*
Both Balogh and Johnson regard monetary policy as 
workable but inappropriate because it is inequitable and 
inefficient. It works through business expectations. J.R. Hicks 
who certainly does not represent an extreme view on this subject, 
agrees that monetary policy works in this manner rather than 
through any so-called "cost" effect but does not regard it as a 
bad thing. Indeed, he says, that it is precisely because other 
regulators have been proved deficient in the post-war years that 
it was necessary to resurrect the "old" monetary policy. Once 
it was admitted that there was some rate of interest that would 
bring investment plans to a standstill, there is no need for Bank 
Rate ever to reach such levels (say 20%), All the Bank has to do 
is to show its willingness and ability to go "just as far as is 
necessary".
In an earlier article Hicks had stressed the
asymmetrical nature of monetary control - an aspect to which
Keynes had devoted some thought. Thus Keynes’ 2 per cent
minimum means not only that there is a limit to the possibility
of stimulating industry by lowering Bank Rate, but also that
because a reduction cannot get the same assistance from
anticipations about the future as a rise can, it is doubtful
whether a reduction can ever have a stimulating effect in the
(1 )same sort of way as a rise has a depressing effect.v '
^'Cf. Manchester School, op. cit., p.153 and Joan Robinson The Rate of Interest and Other Essays (Macmillan. 1962)
p.77. .......
9
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Johnson’s nearest counterpart in the United States is 
Seymour Harris who was a staunch supporter of the cheap money 
policy. He "believes that in the fight against inflation most 
emphasis should be placed on fiscal policy and controls in that 
order. The high degree of liquidity in the American economy in 
195*1 was a serious threat to stability hut could only be solved 
by increasing taxes and levying compulsory loans. These, 
together with income control, where necessary, adequate price 
and supply controls may keep the supply of money in check and 
induce additional demands for money for holding.
Harris says that the conflict between the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Treasury was over a rise in interest rates 
of from i per cent to per cent and that a rise of such small 
magnitude could not depress investment much while there is the 
risk of it demoralizing the security market. Failure to use 
monetary policy to fight inflation is not primarily the result 
of Treasury pressure. Much more important is the fact that 
there is no disposition to fight inflation among the powerful 
interests that control the country.
Hansen at the time favoured the retention of cheap 
money but for rather different reasons than Harris. He thought 
that for most situations market imperfections would be too great 
for monetary policy to correct. In America in 1949/50 the 
great immediate need was to re-employ resources quickly for 
re-armament, a task which was quite beyond monetary policy.
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Hansen is not a supporter of cheap money in all situations but 
thinks that conditions in the post war have not lent themselves 
to remedies involving increased interest rates. However, a 
point of major importance is that Hansen would be prepared to 
jettison the cheap money policy if it meant expanding the liquid 
assets in the hands of the public in a manner prejudicial to an 
effective fiscal policy. This viewpoint has the support of many 
Australian economists.
Thus Hansen1s attitude to cheap money could logically 
vary from time to time, depending on his interpretation of the 
market situation. The same could be said of Lester V. Chandler, 
Richard Musgrave and possibly Dennis Robertson. Chandler 
interpreted the 1950 situation somewhat differently from Hansen 
and thought that there was room, within the confines of a 
comprehensive programme, for a rise in interest rates, if this is 
necessary to limit the availability of credit for spending 
purposes. He is rather critical of those like Harris who have 
proceeded as if the direct "cost," effects of an increase of -§■ 
per cent in interest rates was the only matter at issue. They 
have failed to conceive of monetary policy in sufficiently broad 
terms.
Chandler favoured the use of monetary policy in 
conjunction with, and not as a substitute for, fiscal policy.
His conclusion was that the rate of interest should be allov/ed to 
rise slightly and selective credit controls used as an adjunct to 
that policy. It is not just a matter of comparing the extra
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costs involved in a rate change; monetary policy also embraces
central bank propaganda to influence expectations of the market.
Musgrave also favours the use of selective credit
controls. He says that if the rate of interest fails to narrow
the deflationary or inflationary gap, the desirable level of rates
would seem to hinge largely on distributional and debt management
considerations. However, in view of the psychological aspect and
the effect on the institutional investor, it may be desirable to
retain some freedom in using interest rate adjustments as an
element of cycle policy. The psychological aspects were in fact
mentioned in the Oxford Enquiry and Musgrave considers that they
are still important. He says that short-run effect of changes
in the level of interest and especially anticipation of rate
changes, may be more significant than the longer run effects of
actual changes. Central bank action directed at a rate
increase tends to be interpreted as a general signal of changing
economic outlook, an indication that "tieboom has run its 
(1 )course’. 1 Quite apart from cost effects, this psychological 
factor alone may result in restrictive business action. In 
the upward phase of the cycle the cheap money policy may have to 
be relaxed to help close the inflationary gap, and prevent a 
diversion of fluids to debentures and equities. Monetary policy 
works by creating uncertainty which first slows down the
^'"Credit Controls, Interest Rates, and Management of 
Public Debt”; Essays in Honour of Alvin H. Hansen 
(Norton. 1948), pp.227-8.
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financial boom and later the real investment boom.
Dennis Robertson was a participant in this debate and 
became very irritated with those who advocated direct controls. 
He rejected the idea that a higher Bank Rate worked by causing 
a collapse of confidence and believed that dear money had 
assisted the balance of payments. It had been an important 
step in the restoration of confidence in sterling.
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Section 12 : Reasons for the Abandonment of Cheap Money in 
Australia, 1951/52«
An account of the main economic trends in 1951/52 is 
given in Part VI as part of a detailed analysis to ascertain the 
extent to which interest rates reflected market conditions and 
the extent to which they were influenced "by policy decisions. 
However, for the purpose of this study it is also desirable to 
set down the main events leading up to the abandonment of cheap 
money in July, 1952.
The first hint of trouble came in December, 1950, 
when a 3a per cent conversion offer to holders of £129 million 
of 4% stock was accepted only to the extent of £100 million. 
Official support of the bond market was required on an increasing 
scale early in 1951 to prevent yields from rising, particularly 
after the collapse of the v/ool boom. In April, 1951 , the £40 
million Twelfth Security Loan was issued at an effective yield 
of 3i Per cent, the authorities thus acquiescing in the rise
(A )in rates.v ' This loan was over-subscribed but at that time 
insurance companies began selling heavily and bond prices 
started to tumble about June, 1951* While cheap money crumbled 
under pressure, share prices rose and the new issue market 
enjoyed a major boom. This was assisted by the removal in 
January, 1950, of capital issues control which was not
Of. D. Rowan : The Monetary Problems of a Dependent 
Economy : The Australian Experience, 1948/52. Banca
Nationale Del Ls.voro - Quarterly Review, December, 1954.
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reinstated until February, 195"! • After prolonged discussion 
which seems to have unsettled the market, the bond rate was 
raised to 3f per cent in August, 1951* From that time loans 
began to be heavily under-subscribed but the end of the cheap 
money era v/as not officially recognised until June, 1952, with 
the prevailing market rate for long-term securities at about 
per cent. The coupon rate was raised to 4i per cent in the 
November loan.
One could list a great many reasons why cheap money 
v/as pursued with such vigour after the war. For one thing it 
was easy to implement the policy in the early years and for 
another, the trend of thought in Australia moved strongly against 
allowing interest to rise after the iwar. After the war low 
interest rates were inconsistent with the view that investment 
is interest elastic but it was noted earlier that most economists 
immediately after the war did consider flagging investment a 
definite possibility. Nevertheless very little attention was 
paid to the results of the Oxford Enquiry. The main arguments 
- with hardly a dissenting voice - were that low interest rates 
were essential in view of the enormous increase in public debt, 
that they would assist economic expansion and were to be 
preferred on egalitarian grounds.
Likewise with the abandonment of cheap money, there 
is very little evidence that the authorities were motivated by the 
desire to implement a more flexible monetary policy. The main
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fact, recognised but slowly 'by the authorities in 1951/52 and 
again in 1955/56, was that cheap money had to he abandoned and 
the open-market policy reversed if fiscal and other measures were 
to he given any real chance of success. The importance of 
reversing the open-market policy if it clearly endangers the 
preservation of economic stability has been stressed by Hansen 
in the international debate and in Australia by a number of 
economists including Coombs, Arndt, Rowan and Holder.
It is generally agreed that the efforts to prevent 
interest rates from rising in 1950/51 and. 1951/52 contributed 
to the growth of inflationary pressure. In this period the 
Central Bank increased its holding of securities^ other than 
Treasury bills^by about £170 million.
The main causes of increased market support and the 
abandonment of cheap money in Australia were as follows :
(a) collapse of the wool boom and the resultant liquidity 
crisis;
(b) expectation of a rise in the rate of interest, 
prompted«partly by the belief that the authorities 
would soon have to take action involving a rise in 
interest rates to check inflation and partly by the 
rise in interest rates overseas;
(c) effect of inflation on the real rate of interest 
and diversion of funds to shares and debentures in
an effort to cut capital losses;
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(d) c o n v ic t io n  th a t  developm ent must co n tin u e  in  s p i t e  o f  
in f la t io n a r y  p r e ssu r e .
I t  i s  p la u s ib le  to  argue th a t  the con tin u an ce o f
in f la t io n a r y  p re ssu re  would have req u ired  th e  abandonment o f
cheap money soon er or l a t e r ;  but i t  seems v ery  c le a r  th a t  the
( a )
A u str a lia n  m onetary a u t h o r i t i e s  were lo t h  to  l e t  i t  g o v ' and 
may have been  a b le  to  h o ld  th e  l i n e  lo n g e r  had i t  n o t been  fo r  
th e  r a th e r  e x c e p t io n a l n a tu re  o f the c ircu m sta n ces  from 1950 to  
1952. I n f la t io n a r y  p r e ssu r e s  were i n t e n s i f i e d  in  1949 /50  and 
1950/51» To some e x te n t  i t  was an im ported c o s t  i n f l a t io n  w ith  
heavy c a p i t a l  in f lo v /s ,  a lth ou gh  1950/51 d i f f e r e d  in  many r e s p e c ts  
from 1949 /50  and e a r l i e r  p o st-w a r  y e a r s . As th e  Commonwealth . 
Bank put i t ,  1951 /52  was a year  o f  dram atic change. The b a s ic  
dilemma fo r  the m onetary a u t h o r i t i e s  was how to  cu sh ion  the  
im pact o f  th e  l i q u i d i t y  c r i s i s  and a t the same tim e r e s t r a in  the  
growth o f  in f la t io n a r y  p r e s s u r e s . In the ’’n i c e ” judgment 
r eq u ire d  fo r  such a s o lu t io n  the s la v i s h  concern  fo r  low in t e r e s t  
r a te s  had to  go.
Thus Rowan sa y s  th a t  " i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  th e  l iq u i d i t y  
c r i s i s  n o t on ly  e lim in a te d  cheap money but a ls o  brought about a 
c o l la p s e  o f  the e q u ity  m arket. The s t e a d in e s s  o f  the ad m in is­
t r a t i v e  group o f  r a te s  r e f l e c t s  th e  f a c t  th a t  the a u t h o r i t i e s
‘ ( 2 )p a r te d  w ith  cheap money u n w i l l in g ly ” . ' The sharp d e c l in e  in  
w ool p r ic e s  in  1951 and the huge flo w  o f  im p o rts , le d  to  a rap id  
d e p le t io n  o f  London fu n d s w ith  a con sequ en t l o s s  o f  bank
^  ^Cf. P art V I, e t .  seq . ^'^0 0 . c i t . , p .2 0 9
- 225-
liquidity and a general tightness of money. The reversal of the 
capital inflow also contributed to the final abandonment of cheap 
money.
The liquidity crisis may explain why cheap money was 
abandoned, when it was, but it is very doubtful if the pre-1951 
pattern of interest rates could have been continued for much 
longer even in the absence of such a crisis. It is easily over­
looked that the level of investment demand was expanding rapidly 
in this period (i» 1948/51) and that inflation was particularly 
acute in Australia. The effectiveness of monetary policy was 
reduced by the failure to put a break on public investment 
programmes or alternatively to revive the use of some direct 
controls and increase taxation. As there appeared to be no 
limit at all to the requirements of government works programmes 
and certainly no way of avoiding defence commitments, it is 
likely that a very restrictive credit policy would sooner or 
later have been required to meet the situation and that this 
would have sounded the death-knell of cheap money. Indeed the 
chief cause of pressure on the bond market in 1955/56 was the 
restrictive credit policy which induced holders to sell bonds 
as a means of obtaining cash. Tight budgetary policies provided 
little assistance to the retention of low interest rates in 
Australia because on both occasions they came too late, and then 
to cut back imports and enable the investment programme to be 
carried through with a minimum of recourse to central bank credit.
-2 26-
The persistently high level of internal demand was 
therefore a factor of some importance in the surrender of cheap 
money; but it would, of course, be entirely unreal to imagine 
that it was unrelated to balance of payments trends and prospects 
It was precisely because the tempo of the Australian economy had 
become so geared to trends in international commodity prices and 
the flow of capital that cheap money ended when it did. The 
same can be said of the further rise in interest rates in 1955/56 
More generally, the diversion of funds from bonds to 
shares and debentures in 1950/51 and from most classes of 
financial assets to cash in 1951/52 was undoubtedly a major 
contributory cause of the breakdown of the cheap money policy in 
Australia. In 1949/50 the boom in equities would appear to have 
been caused more by a general feeling of confidence arising from 
persistently favourable balance of payments than by "switching” 
from bonds. While "switching", particularly by life assurance 
companies, was carried out on a large scale in 1950/51 it was, 
for the most part, offset by demands from other sections of the 
public.^^ ^
The tendency for funds to flow into debentures and 
notes rather than bonds has become even more marked in recent 
years and the Government’s failure either to implement an 
effective fiscal policy or revive the use of direct controls was
For a discussion of the importance of the wool boom in sustaining the demand for Commonwealth securities see 
H.W. Arndt : "The Post-War Australian Bond Market, 
Economic Record. November. 1954. also Part VI, et. seq.
(1 )
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an important cause of the further fall in "bond prices in 1955/56 
and the eventual acceptance of a coupon rate of 5 per cent for 
long-term government securities*
The argument that rates rose "because people expected 
them to rise has, I think, 'been greatly overrated* Nevertheless 
there is something in the belief that the Government’s handling 
of the situation - its refusal to admit bond market support and 
lack of a clear policy - added to speculative pressures and 
market support* A more drastic increase in bond rate and a 
clear announcement of intentions may have cleared the air and 
reduced the extent of market support. A more decisive policy 
would have been preferable. The most important influence here, 
however, was undoubtedly the rise in interest rates overseas.
J.O.N. Perkins has argued that Australia should be 
willing to pay a fairly high rate of interest in order to develop 
her resources. The basis of the argument is that capital flows 
fairly freely in response to interest rate differentials, high 
interest rates help stimulate saving and that the Australian 
market is strongly influenced by the prevailing rate in London 
in its views of what the rate of interest should be in
(A )Australia. v 1 The first twro points are very debatable out the 
last was important in so far as it reinforced the growing belief 
that the pace of development could not be sustained indefinitely 
without a rise in interest rates and that more drastic measures
(J\ )v ;J.O.N. Perkins ’’Interest Rate Links Among Sterling Area 
Countries” Australian Financial Review/, 8th August, 1954.
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would have to he taken in Australia to restore internal balance.
The imperfections of the Australian capital market 
limit the scope both for changes in interest rates overseas to 
have a direct influence on rates in Australia and for the 
implementation of a positive monetary policy*
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Section 13 : The Case for a More Flexible Monetary Policy
In Australia the abandonment of cheap money was not
therefore a deliberate act of policy but was forced on the
authorities by events. In the United Kingdom and the United
States, monetary policy, through changes in interest rates,
performed a more positive function among the array of
stabilization measures. This course is more feasible in
countries which possess a well developed money market. Thus
Dr. Coombs has recently stated that :
’’Delay in changing the direction of central bank market
policy whenever such a change would involve the acceptance
of lower prices for government securities is inevitable
so long as the central bank continues to be so large a
factor in the market...In more developed economies there
are markets which provide channels for large transactions
in which prices and yields are determined essentially by
market conditions...It is desirable'that there should be
a number of firms participating in the market as dealers
- themselves holders of Government securities and financially
strong enough to quote prices for a range of government
securities. In such a market the central bank could
operate in a way which ensured that its participation was
marginal only and which would avoid it necessarily becoming
0)involved for purposes conflicting with its basic policies.
H.C. Coombs : "Conditions of Monetary Policy in 
Australia" H.C. Mills Memorial Lecture. 1958.
(University of Sydney), p.11.
(1 )
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On the other hand, the absence of a Bank rate to act 
as a warning signal may mean that the psychological factor as 
stressed by Musgrave and others in the international debate has 
less chance to be important in Australia. In like fashion it 
can be argued that with a simpler capital market than in either 
the United Kingdom or U.S.A. and with adequate controls over the 
banks there was less need to adopt a positive monetary policy.
The relatively greater importance of the Government sector also 
makes for a narrowing of the range of investments v/hich in 
practice a change in interest rates would be likely to influence. 
It cam be argued also that the rise in the Bank Rate in the 
United Kingdom was directed mainly at restoring a measure of 
confidence in sterling.
While Lerner presents some interesting theoretical 
possibilities in his Principles of Functional Finance it seems 
to me to be extremely unlikely that Governments will ever behave 
in the manner indicated. Economists like Lerner want the price 
mechanism to v/ork more effectively but usually evolve a system 
requiring more and more difficult decisions to be made. What 
for example is the "appropriate1 rate of interest? How is it 
determined? What happens when the Government finds, as it did 
in Australia, that it cannot borrow any more from the public? 
Lerner’s scheme would be wholly unworkable in Australia where 
the supply of loanable funds fluctuates widely from year to year 
in association with changes in the balance of payments.
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The fact that Australia’s prosperity still seems
largely to hinge on the terms of trade is one reason for accepting
the views of overseas economists with some caution. It is
argued that these oscillations in our overseas reserves and
hence in bank deposits and liquidity are best controlled by
more direct means - such as Special Accounts which can be more
easily reversed when conditions change and which do not
necessarily cause repercussions through the entire system.
While the volume of credit is controlled mainly with a view to
offsetting the effects on liquidity of the balance of payments
and government financial operations it may seem difficult to
envisage a flexible interest rate policy being revived in
Australia, especially as these changes v/ould require large
fluctuations in security prices unpalatable to any government.
Until recently Harry Johnson’s arguments have carried the day in
Australia. These are that it is desirable to avoid the extra
costs involved in higher interest rates by acting on bank
liquidity more directly and that a rise in interest rates creates
difficulties in the capital market. Australian economists have
also been inclined to argue, as we noted in Section 10, that the
effects of changes in interest rates are unpredictable and that
a flexible interest rate policy is clumsy, inefficient and often
inequitable; it is likely to reverse expectations and is there-
(a )fore an unreliable weapon of contra-cyclical policy.v 1
(1 )v 'R.R. Hirst, op. cit. , p.3.
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More recent experience however has set economists 
wondering whether there might not be more to be said for a 
flexible monetary policy than they had been prepared to admit 
hitherto. Is there a case for using monetary policy in a more 
positive fashion in Australia? Should the open market policy 
have been reversed in 1950/51 and again in 1955? It is rather 
interesting that both Coombs and Row^ an think that it should.
Dr. Coombs says that we entered the post-war period
with a very restricted conception of the role of monetary policy
and relying heavily on the direct controls characteristic of the
war. In surveying the development of monetary policy since
1945f Dr* Coombs admitted that our capacity to restrain mounting
inflation was weakened by the desire to maintain interest rates
at the low wartime level. Two of his conclusions have
particular relevance to this discussion. They are (a) that no
monetary policy can be effective unless there is reasonable
discipline in public investment programmes, and (b) that if it
is necessary to counter a growing money supply, open market
sales must not be subordinated to low interest rates, however
('[ )desirable these may be. v '
Reviewing the more recent period Dr. Coombs has stated 
that from time to time, we will be faced with active or potential 
inflation which can only be controlled by measures involving 
higher- interest rates. Unwillingness to face this action would
a)op. cit. , p.13
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make periodical "bursts of inflation almost inevitable and 
increase the need to resort to more unpopular measures such as 
increased taxes.
The central bank will moreover continue to be handi­
capped in its open market policies until institutional develop­
ments in the Government security market reduce dependance on the 
central bank and until we become educated to accept changes in
interest rates more readily. The objective must be to take
(1 ^action before cumulative tendencies have been established.v '
(2 )David Rowanv ' contends that both quantitative and 
qualitative controls worked well since the war and particularly 
in the changing conditions from 1950 to 1952. However, if any 
criticism is to be levelled at the Bank it is that it could have 
reduced switching from bonds to equities if it had been prepared 
to openly abandon cheap money. The abandonment of cheap money 
in 1950 would probably have been ■’unacceptable to the Treasurer 
anyway but if it had been possible it v/ould not only have greatly 
reduced switching but diminished both the general optimism of 
business and the availability/- of funds through the capital market. 
It was unwise for the Bank to leave the initiative with the 
market and allow interest rates to climb steadily upwards in the 
face of official resistance. Rowan says that for monetary 
policy to be effective it must aim at influencing conditions in 
the new issue market and the decisions of financial institutions
0 ) (2)op. cit. , p.12 op. cit., p,210-3
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other than hanks. More generally, Rowan concludes that the
traditional central hanking techniques are ill-adapted to the
needs of a dependent economy experiencing major fluctuations
in external reserves. He supports the use of import and
capital issues controls together with quantitative hank control
as the first line of defence.
What is the case for a flexible monetary policy?
The main channels through which monetary policy operates have
(1 )heen re-stated only recently hy J.E. Meadev J and are as 
follows:
(a) the effect on investment directly;
(h) the effect on stocks. This will not he great if 
considerable price movements are expected;
(c) effect on new capital issues;
(d) reduction in trading bank lending;
(e) the effect on capital values of all forms of securities. 
Thus a rise in the rate of interest reduces liquidity 
and therefore slows down both business expansion (in
so far as reserves are invested in securities) and 
consumption expenditure;
(f) it affects the terms at which hire purchase schemes 
can be financed which (in the event of a higher rate) 
may dampen down the demand for durable goods.
The argument.that lower interest rates, by reducing
(1 )v '"Objectives of Monetary Policy" Economic Society of
Australia and New Zealand. Economic Papers. No.11.
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costs, encourage an expansion of investment, is not as widely 
held as formerly. The assumption that investment decisions are 
highly sensitive to changes in interest rates has been the 
subject of considerable criticism particularly since the Oxford 
group of economists published the results of their survey in 1938» 
It is true that since 1951 the techniques of monetary policy have 
regained a measure of their former appeal but the main argument 
used now is not that a change in interest rates directly renders 
new investment either in fixed equipment or stocks more or less 
profitable than before but that a change in interest rates may 
have important effects on the availability of finance, on the 
stock exchange and on the direction of funds between various 
classes of investment.
Except for long-period investments, the interest 
elasticity of investment is now taken to be fairly low sind 
consequently a fractional change in the rate of interest will 
not make much difference to investment plans. Even in the 
case of long-period investments the rate of interest is not 
very important as public works and housing activity, for example, 
are now determined largely by social and political considerations.
A rise in the rate of interest may however be a means 
of limiting the availability of credit for spending purposes and 
of making it more difficult to raise new capital. There are 
reasonsfor thinking that this may not be very important in 
Australia. If bank credit policy is not sufficiently restrictive
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institutional lenders may be able to cover their capital losses
and there may, of course, he an expectation of a further rise in
the rate of interest. More important, however, the demand for
funds may he so great that lenders continue to lend despite
losses. The effect of this is to force up rates on debentures
and notes and other funds competing for fixed term investments.
This is undoubtedly a very important consideration in Australia
where the failure to control the diversion of funds in the
capital market would be likely to require large changes in 
rates
interest/unacceptable on budgetary and egalitarian grounds.
It is arguable of course, that this diversion of funds may have 
been prevented or at least greatly diminished if the Government 
had acted more quickly and increased bond rate earlier.
A period of rising interest rates has also focused 
attention on the effect on capital values and hence consumption 
expenditure. Whether or not a fall in the rate of interest by 
increasing capital values and hence liquidity will cause an 
increase in consumer spending, depend largely on prevailing 
expectations concerning the future course of interest rates as 
well as on the nature of the circumstances before the change.
If the rate is expected to fall even further the rise in 
consumption expenditure may be delayed to some extent by the 
possibility of greater capital gain later.
Likewise a rise in the rate of interest might be 
expected to have some dampening effect on consumption
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expenditure, particularly if it is associated with a fall in share 
prices. But while this may be important at a particular time, 
it is clearly shrouded with uncertainty and would not be a 
reliable channel through v/hich to allow monetary policy to work.
The trouble in Australia was that consumption expend­
iture was not much affected while a further rise in the rate of 
interest v/as in the offing* Furthermore a decline in liquidity 
does not necessarily put a stop to borrowing or the willingness 
to lend as people are often inclined to assume greater risks 
(work on smaller safety margins) if inflation is expected to 
continue. In so far as companies have large funds tied up in 
government securities however, the capacity for immediate 
expansion could well be affected by a rise in the rate of 
interest; however indications are that since the war companies 
have preferred not to tie up funds in this way, the main reason 
being that the pace of expansion has quickened and most firms 
are involved in an almost continuous need for expansion and 
replacement. Companies now also operate on smaller liquidity 
margins.
Obviously much will depend on prevailing credit 
policy but even more on the central bank’s ability to convince 
representative opinion that no further rise in the rate need be 
expected. Success in co-ordinating these two aims could render 
a flexible monetary policy useful in putting a brake on con­
sumption expenditure and holding up the availability of funds
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for investment. Failure to co-ordinate them would mean large 
fluctuations in security prices which are undesirable on other 
grounds. There are reasons to believe that with the development 
of new institutions and the Central Bank’s great av/areness of 
the advantages of a flexible interest rate policy, these aims 
will be better co-ordinated in the future.
Meade’s final argument is that a rise in the rate of 
interest may slow down the rate of growth of hire purchase and 
therefore dampen down the demand for durable goods. This seems 
to have limited application in Australia where a rise in the 
overdraft rate and/or a restriction of credit may do no more 
than force borrowers to go elsewhere for funds. The higher 
rates which they may be required to pay on deposits, notes and 
debentures are of small moment by comparison with the 
opportunities of profit opened up by hire purchase business.
Hire purchase is itself to some extent demand creating. The 
only sure way of cutting back the demand for durables is through 
taxation and more direct measures, but if the higher rate is not 
regarded as temporary, consumption expenditure and hence the 
demand for hire purchase facilities may fall because of the 
decline in capital values referred to above.
Conditions of full employment and the accompanying 
problem of inflation in an expanding economy have brought into 
operation a wide array of monetary techniques for controlling the 
level of aggregate demand. Since 1950 or thereabouts more
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attention has "been given to the effects of changes in interest 
rates especially on the level of saving, as this has "been at the 
heart of our problem. However changes in interest rates are 
not considered an appropriate means of offsetting the fundamental 
changes in liquidity which arise from changes in the balance 
of payments and the outcome of government financial operations. 
High interest rates were forced on the authorities by events. 
Cheap money was abandoned because it was found inconsistent with 
the policy of credit restraint and not because very much credence 
was given to the more positive case for a flexible interest 
policy. There is still an old-fashioned hankering for the 
national debt argument. The general view is that low rates 
have but a minor effect on investment. Certainly an over­
riding problem is the financing of capital works expenditure.
A stable bond market is desirable in that it will enable major 
works expenditures to be financed with the minimum of inflation 
or disturbance to loan raisings. The tragedy of the Australian 
experiment is that efforts to retain stable bond prices have 
in fact added to inflation.
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Section 1 : 1950-1956 
(a) 1950-51
(i) State of Loan Market
The amount raised from the loan market in 1950/51 was 
approximately £127 million or about £22 million more than 1949/50 
which had been a highly successful year. In 1950/51 all three 
loans were heavily oversubscribed, yet the market developed 
unmistakable signs of weakness in the latter half of the year.
A good summary of the position is found in the annual Report of 
the Commonwealth Bank :-
,f...public loan raisings have become increasingly 
difficult in the face of the strong demand for private 
industry for funds. Following a period of falling 
prices of Government securities...the long term 
securities of the twelfth security loan were issued 
at a discount of 1 per cent (May, 1951), though the 
nominal interest rate was unchanged at 34 per cent.
This was the first time since 1946 that long term 
Government securities had been issued with a yield 
of more than 34 per cent..."
(ii) Bond Prices
Short-dated bond prices fluctuated very little during 
the year but a weakness in long-dated bonds became apparent 
after January, 1951« The current market yield in March averaged 
3.27 per cent, compared with 3*17 per cent in December and 3*14
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per cent in June, 1950. In the final quarter of the year 
official support was at a higher rate and yields in April and 
May were sustained at the March level. The real collapse came 
in June when, despite the more vigorous support policy, the 
average yield rose to 3*51 per cent. Bond prices continued to 
fall in the following year with the coupon rate "being' raised to 
per cent in August.
The average market yield on long-term securities was 
only marginally higher in 1950/51 than in 1949/50 - 3*21 per 
cent compared with 3*13 per cent. The fall in wool prices in 
March had an important "bearing on the subsequent rise in bond 
yields. In the first nine months of the year the rise in 
export incomes had been great enough to maßlt the operation of 
factors which were contributing to market weakness. There was 
a further fall in the bond holdings of Life Offices and other 
institutional investors and a growing preference for shares and 
other securities which offered a hedge against inflation. Share 
prices rose throughout the year until May.
In 1950/51 Commonwealth Bank and C.S.B. holdings of
Commonwealth securities rose by £66 million but the holdings of
investors other than financial institutions and governments
(1 )also rose - by £44 million. Professor Arndtv ' considers that 
this movement can be explained largely by the wool boom which 
seems a plausible explanation especially in the light of more
^  ^ H.W. Arndt; "The Post-War Australian Bond Market" 
Economic Record, November, 19549 P•267
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recent experience between 1951? and 1957* Arndt’s survey reveals
that almost the entire increase in bond holdings of private
companies between 1949 and 1951 was accounted for by those
classified as "agriculture and pastoral". The inflow of
capital was also an important source of funds and played some
part in supporting the bond market during these years. As a
corollary, the subsequent fall in wool prices and reversal of
the capital flow "deprived the bond market of the major sources
(1 )of support which it had enjoyed in the two preceding years". 7
(iii) Volume of Money
The volume of money rose by 19 per cent in 1950/51 for 
which the rise of £ 1 9 3 million in international reserves and £ 1 0 4  
million in bank advances were largely responsible. Recourse 
to Treasury bills was avoided only by the pre-payment of tax 
on wool incomes which increased revenue by about £110 million 
in 1950/51. These factors, together with the support policy 
explain why, despite the continued and accelerated deterioration 
in the value of money in 1950/51 and the associated strong rise 
in the transactions demand for money, bond yields for the year 
as a whole rose but little.
(iv) External Situation
The supply of loanable funds bears a close relation to 
export prices and the movement of international reserves. In 
1 9 5 0 /5 1 wool prices averaged 144d. per lb. greasy compared with 
6 3d. per lb. in 1949/50. The export price index rose by 73
^^ f p*268
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per cent and there was a favourable trade balance of approx­
imately £237 million. In 1949/50 the favourable balance had 
only amounted to £77 million but the capital inflow had been 
more than twice as great. This explains why the rise in over­
seas reserves was of approximately the same order in each of 
these years.
(v) Bank Advances
Despite a tightening of central bank policy and the 
reinstatement of capital issues control in February, 1951 > the 
banks expanded their advances by over £100 million during the 
year. The rise of nearly 40 per cent in bank debits is an 
indication of the magnitude of the current demand for money. 
Debits rose from 14*6 to 17 per cent of bank deposits. The rise 
in time deposits was but a fraction of the total increase in 
deposits.
(vi) Domestic Spending
Investment and consumption spending attained high 
levels in 1950/51» Hostilities broke out in Korea in June,
1950, and rearmament dominated the world scene during the year. 
Defence expenditures were stepped up in Australia and net 
expenditure by public authorities was nearly 40 per cent greater 
than in 1949/50* Part of this increase was, of course, 
absorbed in rising prices but it also reflected a high migration 
intake (although lower than 1949/50) and re#l expansion. Gross 
private investment in fixed capital equipment was 34 per cent
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higher than in 1949/50 while consumption spending received an 
added boost from the December Basic Wage Decision and the 
operation of the automatic cost of living adjustment system.
(vii) Summary
The rise in bond yields occurred in the second half 
of the year during which time there was a sensational rise in 
wool prices followed by an equally sensational fall. This 
development, coupled with the greater availability of imported 
goods and growing doubts as to the economy’s capacity to absorb 
this increase, gave rise to increasing uncertainty about the 
future. The Government supported the bond market strongly 
to maintain cheap money but towards the end of the year there 
were signs that a market breakdown could not be long delayed.
Once the wool boom had collapsed and the capital inflow 
diminished without any prospect of early relief to rising 
prices and costs, bond prices could not be prevented from falling 
without further endangering economic stability.
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(b) 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 5 2
(i) Loan Raisings
The amount subscribed to public loans in 1951-52 was 
£64 million or about half as much as in 1950/5"! • The failure 
of the loan market followed upon a balance of payments deficit 
of great magnitude but the situation was also aggravated by 
the government’s refusal to accept the inevitability of the 
dearer money conditions.
(ii) Volume of Money
In 1 9 5 1 / 5 2 the money supply fell by 2 per cent which 
was the direct outcome of the fall of £480 million in inter­
national reserves. The fall in the money supply would have been 
much greater however, had it not been for the expansion of £45 
million in Treasury bills and £185 million in bank advances. 
Open-market operations also added to the money supply.
(iii) Banking Policy
As a counter to the fall in overseas funds, the 
Central Bank reversed its banking policy and supported the liquid 
reserves of the trading banks. Special Account releases 
amounted to approximately £ 3 1 0 million and this enabled the 
banks to expand their lending, particularly for the purpose of 
financing rapidly accumulating stocks of imported goods. This 
action was instrumental in keeping the recession within bounds. 
The degree of unemployment which subsequently emerged in 1952/53 
was comparatively mild and expansion was resumed without undue
delay
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(iv) Abandonment of Cheap Money
Between August and November the Government made a 
desperate bid to hold the line, after having reluctantly raised 
the coupon rate from per cent to 3% per cent in the August 
loan. This policy involved net purchases of securities from 
official sources on an increasing scale and by the end of 
November it was clear that the scale of selling was too great 
for a successful holding operation. Yields rose steeply after 
December, although it was not until near the end of the financial 
year that the authorities were prepared to concede defeat.
Both the November and March loans for the longer maturities were 
issued at 3i per cent despite the fact that great difficulty 
was being experienced in keeping market yields down to that 
level. The March loan in particular proved a sorry failure
which is not surprising when market yields had exceeded 3*8 
per cent for three months prior to issue. Yields rose rapidly 
after March but the end of the cheap money era was not officially 
recognised until July, 1932, when the order made by the Bank 
under the National Security Regulations fixing maximum rates of 
interest for certain transactions was revoked. Bank deposit 
and overdraft rates v/ere then permitted to rise. In the 1932/53 
Budget Speech delivered on August 6th the Treasurer said that 
governments v/ere naturally reluctant to pay increased rates of 
interest but should nevertheless recognise the Mrealities of the
f tmarket situation
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For the year as a whole net purchases of Commonwealth 
securities "by the Commonwealth Bank and C.S.B. amounted to £106 
million. In June, 1952, the average yield was 4.62 per cent 
compared with 3*75 per cent in December and 3»51 per cent in 
June, 1951*
The fundamental causes of market weakness were as
follows:
(a) the fall in the supply of loanable funds consequent 
upon the balance of payments deficit;
(b) the progressive deterioration in the value of money 
with no end to the (inflationary spiral in sight.
This was not a new factor but in earlier years it 
had been masked by high and rising export prices;
(c) the Government’s failure to see the writing on the 
wall and move quickly towards a solution. Policy 
was indecisive and added to the general state of 
uncertainty and the associated rise in liquidity 
preference;
(d) the continuing high rate of economic growth.
There seems quite a strong case for arguing that an 
early reversal of open-market operations and the fixing of a 
coupon rate more appropriate to the circumstances may not only 
have secured a better response to public loans but also resulted 
in approximately the same increase in market yields without 
adding further to inflation. If the November and March loans
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had been  f lo a t e d  a t 4 in s te a d  o f  3i per c e n t ,  the s e l l i n g  wave 
in  the l a s t  q u a rter  o f  the year may have been  a vo id ed . I f  we 
p o s tu la te  a s i t u a t io n  in  w hich th ere  was no market support we 
m ight have secu red  r e s u l t s  which compare w ith  the a c tu a l  
s i t u a t io n  as fa r  as the v a r io u s  f a c t o r s  ca u sin g  the r i s e  are 
concerned  as fo l lo w s  :
F a c to r s  C ausing Change 
in  Y ie ld
With
Market
Support
W ithout
Market
Support
(a )  F a l l  in  Money Supply + 0.70% + 0
(b ) R ise  in  Demand fo r  Money 
(M g + 0.30% +0.30%
(c )  R ise  in  L iq u id ity  
P re fer en ce  (Mg) + 0.3455 + 0 . 14$>
+ 1.34% + 1 .5U%
I f  t h i s  g u e ss  i s  anywhere n ear the mark i t  su g g e s ts  
th a t  w ith o u t the support p o l i c y ,  or l e s s  support combined w ith  
g r e a te r  r e a lism  in  f i x in g  the term s and c o n d it io n s  o f  lo a n s  in  
1951 / 5 2 , the r i s e  in  m arket y i e ld s  may n o t have been  a p p re c ia b ly  
g r e a te r  than  a c tu a l ly  occu rred  w ith  a f u l l -b lo o d e d  support 
p o l i c y .  I f  th a t i s  the ca se  th e re  would have been  a stro n g  
p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a more h e a l tiny resp on se  to  p u b lic  lo a n s  n ot on ly  
in  1951 / 5 2 , b u t in  the en su in g  year and o f  cou rse  the in f la t io n a r y  
e f f e c t s  o f  th e  cheap money p o l ic y  would have been  a l l  but 
e lim in a te d . Up to  a p o in t  th e r e fo r e ,  the support p o l ic y  was a 
s e l f - d e f e a t in g  p o l ic y  in  th e  r a th er  e x c e p t io n a l  c o n d it io n s  o f  
1 9 5 1 /5 2 .
Thanks m ain ly  to  s w if t  a c t io n  by the Commonwealth
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Bank, the collapse of the export "boom did not develop with a 
serious recession, hut it left its mark on the investing public 
and was followed by a sharp rise in liquidity preference. 
Uncertainty both as to the future course of business and of bond 
prices together with the hardship already inflicted on 
recipients of fixed incomes was so great that cash seemed 
preferable to almost all forms of assets. In 1950/51 the 
share market had enjoyed a major boom and there was almost 
certainly some switching between government securities and shares 
and debentures. In 1951/52 however, people not only deserted 
bonds on an increasing scale but got out of shares also. Share 
prices fell rapidly as a consequence.
In 1951/52 Life Offices reduced their holdings of 
Commonwealth securities by a further £11 million while holders 
other than governments and financial institutions unloaded bonds 
to the extent of £35 million. This is the crucial difference 
between the situation in 1951/52 and 1950/51 when this group 
acquired additional holdings of £44 million. In 1950/51» 
particularly in the second half of the year, there was some 
evidence that increasing uncertainty about the future course of 
bond prices and the growing attractiveness of other forms of 
investment had manifested itself in some market weakness.
The capital inflow had been greatly reduced also but the 
implications for the bond market were not immediately apparent in 
view of the phenomenal rise in wool incomes which, apart from 
its direct effect on the supply of loanable funds, had
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traditionally been regarded as a pointer to business optimism. 
This supporting peg virtually guaranteed the strength of the 
bond market. When it was removed the bottom dropped out of 
the market.
The other major factor was that the underlying growth 
of the economy was not greatly impaired by the changing fortunes 
in export markets. The effect of re-armament was only now 
fully reflected in expenditures. Private investment was much 
higher in money terms and well maintained in real terms. The 
impression sometimes created is that consumption spending eased 
off and in real terms this is probably true. However, average 
weekly wage earnings rose by 23 per cent and the "horror" budget 
appeared to have a remarkably moderate impact on the level of 
spending. What it really did was to ensure that the Loan 
Council borrowing programme of £225 million would be carried 
through with a minimum of recourse to central bank credit.
(c) 1952-1953
(i) Loan Raising's
The most noteworthy thing about the year was that 
while the bond market regained something of its former stability 
without the need for market support, the amount received from 
public loans was slightly less than in 1951/52. On the face 
of it this may seem surprising in a year which recorded a 
sizeable surplus on overseas current account.
In the November loan the coupon rate was raised from 
3-f to 4i pep cent. The Government not only demanded less from
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the market, there being only two loans during the year, but, 
what is probably more significant, reduced the currencies of 
the long-term securities from 13 to 9 years and issued a loan 
in March with a currency of years and carrying interest at 
3 per cent with a discount of 10/-. In the previous year 
short-term loans were issued for 3 years and with interest at 
2 per cent. This was indisputable evidence that the Government 
had at last acquiesced in dear money although there was no 
particular merit in trying to conceal this fact. After the 
November loan the market regained some semblance of stability. 
Yields fell between October and January and again between March 
and June. After June the downward movement persisted.
(ii) Level of Spending
To what influences was the bond market principally 
subject in 1952/53? Business was in rather a hesitant mood, 
and for the first time in many years an earnest endeavour was 
made to prevent Government expenditure from rising. These 
endeavours were not entirely successful of course, but total 
expenditure was restrained. The velocity of money, as 
evidenced by bank debits, declined while the fall in business 
stocks enabled advances to be repaid. Consumption spending 
increased by only 6 per cent.
(iii) Volume of Money
The money supply rose by 9 per cent during the year. 
International reserves rose by £186 million and despite restraint 
in total spending, the Government gave away about £50 million in
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tax concessions and was forced to borrow a further £72 million 
from the Commonwealth Bank to cover the cash deficit for the 
year.
(iv) Other Influences
On the other hand, the tendency during the year for 
the raising of large sums through debentures and similarly sec­
ured obligations did something to unsettle the bond market.
The share market was depressed and in 1952/53 more money was 
raised from debentures than from shares. Rates on debentures 
were edging up to 5 per cent which seemed an attractive yield at 
the time•
Furthermore, with the emergence of some unemployment 
and a fairly stable price level, some decline in liquidity 
preference could reasonably have been expected. Life Offices 
increased their holdings of Commonwealth securities by £6 
million but otherwise the benefit from the revision of 
expectations would seem to have been secured by private industry 
seeking funds through the issue of debentures and the like, with 
very little renewed interest being shown towards Commonwealth 
securities. It is quite likely that savings bank deposits were 
drawn upon to finance a large part of fixed interest borrowing. 
It must also be remembered that hire purchase was now growing 
rapidly and that years of inflation had not put a premium on 
saving.
Another unfavourable factor as far as the bond 
market was concerned was the outflow of private capital. While 
the terms of trade were more favourable, export prices rose by
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only 2 per cent, and the improvement in the "balance of payments 
situation was largely attributable to the increased volume of 
exports and decreased volume of imports,
(v) Summary
The year had therefore been a dull one for the bond 
market. For this the policy pursued in the preceding 18 months 
must take some blame. The favourable balance of payments and 
large cash deficit in 1952/53 had been offset by the uncertain 
tone of business, the emergence of stronger competition for 
Government loans and the apparent outflow of private capital.
As a result bond yields were not very different at the end than 
at the beginning of the year. However, the average yield in 
1952 53 was appreciably higher than in 1951/52.
(d) 1953-1954
(i) State of the Bond Market
The bond market developed a firm tone in 1953/54*
At the commencement of the year the market yield on long-term 
government securities was 4*48 per cent and at the end of the 
year 4*40 per cent. The extent of stability is evidenced by 
the fact that the average yield for the year was 4*44 per cent, 
compared with 4*54 per cent in 1952/53* A rise, however, 
occurred in yields on short-term securities, particularly in the 
June quarter. The 3 per cent 1957 loan was issued at a 
discount of £1.10.
From two loans issued during the year the amount
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raised was £118 million, or more than twice as much as in 
1952/53. The currencies for long-dated securities were also 
lengthened. This greatly improved response to public loans 
materially assisted the government’s cash position. With 
continuing restraint on expenditure and revenue higher than 
anticipated, it permitted a reduction of £35 million in the 
short-term debt during the year.
The Central Bank did not need to support the bond 
market this year and its security holdings, other than Treasury 
bills fell by £30 million. There was a rise of £66 million in 
holdings of businesses and other non-institutional investors 
whereas in the preceding year these holdings had fallen by £25 
million.
(ii) Reasons for Improvement in the Bond Market
How can we account for the market’s underlying 
strength and the reduction in market support? The money supply \ 
rose by 6.5 per cent, but this was less than last year’s 
increase. International reserves had risen by only £9 million 
as against £189 million in 1952/53* On the other hand bank 
lending enjoyed a rapid expansion.
The transactions demand for money v/as somewhat higher 
than in the previous year with a notable recovery in private 
investment. Bank debits rose by 15 per cent and proportionately 
more than the money supply.
These factors, had they been the only ones operating, 
would surely have combined to induce a rise and not a fall in
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bond yields in 1953/54* An explanation for the market’s 
strength must therefore be sought elsewhere.
While the evidence is scant it seems plausible to 
argue in the circumstances that there was a fall in the demand 
for money to hold for speculative purposes during the year.
The economic outlook improved, "unemployment was falling and the 
rise in costs and prices had virtually been halted. The 
narrowing of the gap between yields on short and long-dated 
securities had gathered pace during the year and may suggest 
that the fear of capital loss through further rises in the rate 
of interest was now being heavily discounted. On the one hand, 
the growing evidence of price stability reduced liquidity 
preference while on the other the large taxation reductions 
would appear to have stimulated saving as much as consumption 
despite a fall of 8 per cent in farm incomes.
Share prices were generally little higher in 1953/54 
than in 1 9 5 2 /5 3 but the amount raised from the public through the 
issue of shares, debentures and unsecured notes was greater.
There was certainly no lull in the growth of hire purchase.
This is a rather difficult year to analyse but every­
thing suggests that the strength of the market was based mainly
on the mitigation of fears regarding the future course of/interest rates. The 4i per cent coupon rate appealed to the 
market as reasonable in the circumstances. Important factors 
in this respect may have been the easier money trend abroad, 
the expansion of bank advances, the stability of internal prices,
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the rather dull share market and the return of business 
confidence. Budget handouts may also have been important 
psychologically*
(e) 1 9 37 -1955
This was also a year of fairly stable bond prices 
though there is little doubt that had the market been left to 
itself prices would have fallen substantially*
(i) State of Loan Market
The loan market v/as subjected to strain from a number 
of directions. The rise in the money supply was appreciably 
less than in either of the two preceding years mainly because 
of the large fall in international reserves. Export prices 
fell by 9 per cent (wool prices by 1 4 per cent) and there was a 
steep rise in imports. The terms of trade fell from 127 to
113* The net inflow of private capital, however, was about £70 
million more than in 1953/5 4 , a substantial part of which it 
would seem was for investment of a long-term character.
In the second place there was a rise in business 
confidence with boom conditions towards the end of the year and 
interest rates rising in the United States and a number of other 
countries. While the rise in the money supply was comparatively 
modest, the velocity of money circulation rose at a faster pace, 
following a pattern similar to 1953/54- Bank debits rose by 10
per cent, and climbed to 19*3 per cent of bank deposits, the 
highest ratio on record in the post-war years.
The growth in the use of debentures and unsecured
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notes to tap private savings did not falter and considerably 
more v/as raised from these sources and from new share issues in 
1954/55 than in any other year with the exception of 1950/51* 
During the year interest rates on debentures edged up from 5i 
to 6 per cent, and even higher for some hire purchase concerns 
under the strong pressure of demand for funds. It was the 
coincidence of these developments with the fall in wool prices 
and in the supply of loanable funds that was largely responsible 
for the spate of central bank buying to prevent bond prices from 
rising much above the coupon rate of 4i per cent.
(ii) Support of the Bond Market
During the year Commonwealth Bank and C.S.B. holdings 
of securities, other than Treasury bills, rose by £46 million 
while investors, other than financial institutions and govern­
ment!*, increased holdings by only £22 million, compared with £66 
million in the preceding year.
The Commonwealth Bank commented upon the increased 
need for market support in its Annual Report for the year : 
"During 1954/55 the demand for funds in the capital 
market by private industry and commerce, especially 
by hire purchase concerns paying high rates of 
interest, tended to impose pressure on the bond 
market and increased the difficulty of raising 
Government and semi-government loans. These 
factors led to an increase in the Bank’s holdings
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of Government securities".* v '
More recently the Governor of the Commonwealth Bank,
Dr. H.C. Coombs, has said that :
"while the character of the dilemma was recognised
from an early stage, the claims of low interest
rates and stability of prices of government
securities were difficult to resist...it was not
until early in 1956 that Central Bank support for
(2 )the market was reduced to normal amounts.,,v '
While some difficulty was experienced in holding the 
bond rate to 4*50 per cent for most of the year public loan 
raisings amounted to £122 million, which was slightly better 
than the 1953/54 result. The August loan was well received but 
obviously £50 million was too much to ask for in November and 
there was a shortfall of approximately £13 million. Only £40 
million was sought in the March loan and this met with success.
Yields on short-term securities rose sharply in the 
second half of the year which no doubt in part reflected the rise 
to prominence of finance companies offering handsome returns on 
deposits for periods up to 3 years. At the end of the year 
the market yield on long-term government securities was 4*53 per 
cent compared with 4*40 per cent at the beginning. The average 
yield for the year was 4*50 per cent compared with 4*44 per cent
(A )v ' Commonwealth Bank Annual Report, 1954/55, pp.22-3.
(‘*) "Conditions of Monetary Policy in Australia" R.C. Mills 
Memorial Lecture 1958 (Delivered at the University of 
Sydney, on 29th April).
(1)
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in 1953/54 and 4*54 per cent in 1952/53*
(f) 1955-1956
(i) Bond Yields
The average yield on long-term securities in 1955/56 
was 4.76 per cent, compared with 4*50 per cent in 1954/55*
./hen market support was reduced in February, 1956, yields rose 
sharply. The yield in June, 1955, was 4*53 per cent and in 
March, 1956, 5*12 per cent. There was a further rise in the 
final quarter with yields averaging 5*34 per cent in June, 1956* 
Yields on short-dated securities rose even more steeply, the 
average for the year being 4*39 per cent, compared with 3*49 
per cent in 1954/55*
(ii) Support of the Bond Market
For the year as a whole the Central Bank increased its 
holdings of Commonwealth securities, other than Treasury bills, 
by £36 million. For about 8 months of the year the Bank 
continued to give the market strong support, despite the fact 
that this policy was clearly in conflict with the expressed aims 
of monetary regulation at the time. This was referred to in 
the Bank’s Annual Report for the year where it was pointed out 
that :
"...in inflationary conditions the measures 
necessary to counter a market tendency for 
interest rates to rise can produce effects seriously 
inconsistent with the general economic policy being 
pursued."^  ^
0 ) Commonwealth Bank Annual Report, 1955-56, p.18.
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The Prime Minister came straight to the point in March when in 
the course of a special statement on economic measures he said •
’’Under the circumstances of the market, the 
Central Bank, has until quite recently, felt 
called upon to support Bond prices by abnormal 
(and, in total, huge) purchases, this again 
involving the creation and outlay of many
(1 )millions of new money* This is inflationary*”' '
There can be no doubt therefore why market support
was reduced to more normal proportions in March and bond yields
(2 )permitted to rise in excess of 5 per cent* v ' It is, however, 
not so easily understood why this action was not taken sooner 
as it must have been clear that the forces making for higher 
yields were very strong and were not of an ephemeral character.
The reduction in market support was followed by rises 
in bank interest rates as it was becoming clear that funds would 
continue to be diverted from the banking system while there was 
such a disparity between official and market rates* In the 
May loan the coupon rate for long-term securities was raised 
from per cent to 5 per cent and the loan met with a fairly 
good response despite the higher rates ruling in the market.
(iii) Reasons for Market Weakness
The chief explanation for the rise in the bond yields 
was the complete reversal of the expansionary credit policy of
^'Statement of Economic Measures, March 1956 (Government 
Printer), p.10*
(2)See also comments by Coombs, op. cit.
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earl ier years. There was also a further fall in international
reserves and deterioration in the terms of trade. On the other 
hand the government staved off a certain cash deficit by its 
March taxation measures and finished the year with an approximate 
balance between cash receipts and payments. Thus the money 
supply rose by only one per cent during the year while the 
velocity of money circulation continued to expand.
The other major factor was that government loans again 
experienced difficulty in competing with private industry for 
funds. While the three public loans brought in £93 million, 
or £30 million less than last year, the amount obtained from 
debentures and notes was substantially higher than the year before*
The rapid growth in hire purchase in 1953/34 and 
1 9 5 4 /5 5 and the relatively high rates currently offered on short 
and medium term deposits was causing the government no small 
concern. The Prime Minister referred to this problem in his 
September Statement on the Economy and announced that represent­
atives of the Hire Purchase companies had agreed to exercise 
restraint in hire purchase business in the ensuing nine months.
The increase in outstanding balances during the year was of the 
order of £30 million, compared with £50 million in each of the 
tv/o preceding years.
(iv) Summary
Private investment was significantly higher in 
1955/56. This factor coupled with disequilibrium in the balance
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of payments and the growing disparity between official and 
market yields referred to above go a long way towards explaining 
the market’s underlying weakness. An offsetting factor was the 
strong inflow of capital. The grov/th of inflationary pressures 
during 1955 and the early part of 1956 almost certainly 
reinforced expectations that higher interest rates could not 
be long delayed and precipitated the diversion of funds 
referred to above and which had been apparent also in mid-1951•
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S e c t i o n  2 : R e c a p i t u l a t i o n  191)0-1956 : Assessm ent  o f  R e s u l t s  
on L onger  P e r s p e c t i v e
Cheap money was n o t  s u r r e n d e r e d  l i g h t l y  i n  A u s t r a l i a .  
When m a rk e t  f o r c e s  s u b j e c t e d  th e  bond  m ark e t  t o  p r e s s u r e  i n  1951 
and a g a i n  i n  1955,  th e  Commonwealth Bank s u p p o r t e d  th e  m ark e t  
s t r o n g l y  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  p r e v e n t  y i e l d s  f rom r i s i n g .  On b o t h  
o c c a s i o n s  t h i s  p o l i c y  added t o  i n f l a t i o n a r y  p r e s s u r e  and f a i l e d  
t o  a c h i e v e  th e  d e s i r e d  o b j e c t i v e .  Market  s u p p o r t  was o f  th e  
o r d e r  o f  £180 m i l l i o n  betv /een  1950 and 1952 and £80 m i l l i o n  
b e tw e e n  1954 and 1956.
F o r  t h e  p e r i o d  a s  a whole m ark e t  y i e l d s  on l o n g - t e r m  
governm en t  s e c u r i t i e s  r o s e  f rom  3»15 t o  5*34 p e r  c e n t .  The bond 
coupon r a t e  was r a i s e d  on t h r e e  o c c a s i o n s  -  f rom  3 j  t o  3q p e r  c e n t  
i n  A u g u s t ,  1951 ,  f rom  3 i  t o  4 i  p e r  c e n t  i n  November, 1952,  and 
f rom  46 t o  5 p e r  c e n t  i n  May, 1956. Bank and o t h e r  i n t e r e s t  
c h a r g e s  h o w ev er ,  were n o t  p e r m i t t e d  t o  r i s e  u n t i l  J u l y ,  1952, and 
a g a i n  i n  1956 and t h e r e  have  b e e n  no r e d u c t i o n s  s i n c e .
A u s t r a l i a n  e x p e r i e n c e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a r i s e  i n  l i q u i d i t y  
p r e f e r e n c e ,  e i t h e r  a s  an i n f l a t i o n  hedge o r  b e c a u s e  o f  s p e c ­
u l a t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  th e  f u t u r e  c o u r s e  o f  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  can be 
a s tu m b l i n g  b l o c k  t o  a p o l i c y  o f  low i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  On th e  
o t h e r  hand  o u r  a n a l y s i s  shows t h a t  l i q u i d i t y  p r e f e r e n c e  was n o t  a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  s i t u a t i o n  d u r i n g  
t h e s e  y e a r s ;  i t  o p e r a t e d  s t r o n g l y  i n  two y e a r s  o n ly  -  i n  
1 9 5 1 /5 2  when i t  r o s e  and h e l p e d  d e f e a t  t h e  s u p p o r t  p o l i c y  and 
a g a i n  i n  1 9 5 3 /5 4  when i t  f e l l  and a s s i s t e d  the  l o a n  m a rk e t .
L o o k in g  a t  t h e  p e r i o d  a s  a whole  th e  m ost  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r s
1which induced the rise in interest rates were as follows :
(a) the deterioration in the terms of trade;
(b) the strong undertone of growth in the economy;
(c) the diversion of funds to debentures and other like
* securities.
It must be emphasised however, that the initial 
weakness in the bond market had its origins in the progressive 
deterioration in the value of the currency and the particularly 
steep rise in prices in 1950/51* Ironically enough this trend 
was closely allied with the boom in wool incomes which itself 
was instrumental in securing a steady demand for securities.
As soon as wool prices found more normal levels, however, the 
market was fully exposed to the fears of further rises in the 
price level. There is little doubt that this set of circum­
stances touched off a strong rise in liquidity preference which, 
despite intensified market support, resulted in substantially 
higher interest rates.
It is also true that this rise in liquidity preference
and the consequential rise in interest rates was accentuated by
the absence of a determined government policy directed at
quickly establishing a rate regarded as reasonable in the new
circumstances. Nevertheless it seems that some delay is
inevitable as long as the Central Bank is such a large factor in 
(<\ )the market. v '
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(1)See pages Part V.
- 266-
By the end of 1952 it was clear that the grow/ing com­
petition for funds from the private sector through the issue of 
debentures and notes and the acceptance of deposits was emerging 
as the greatest single threat to Commonwealth loan raisings and 
indeed to the stability of the market generally. This was not 
a new development but it did not reach major proportions much 
before that time.
Such a development was of course related to the strong 
undertone of growth in the private sector of the economy which, 
unfortunately for the bond market, happened to coincide with 
pressures for very large public investment programmes and higher 
defence expenditures.
The period after 1950 can be contrasted in a number 
of respects with the earlier post-war years which were marked by 
a succession of favourable trade balances and a phenomenal 
inflow/ of capital. Between 1946 and 1950 cash surpluses were 
generally more than adequate to nullify the inflationary effects 
of cheap money. In 1951/52 and 1952/53 large cash deficits 
were incurred while the cash surpluses in subsequent years fell 
significantly short of the amounts by which the money supply 
was increased as a result of Central Bank support of the bond 
market. Another difference was that capital issues control, 
which had been a useful bulwark to the cheap money policy in 
the earlier post-war years, v/as suspended in January, 1950, 
reimposed in February, 1951 > but finally abandoned in December, 
1953. More important, however, from the standpoint of the bond
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market was the fact that the main growth of hire purchase and 
the development of an unofficial short-term money market seems 
to have occurred since 1949*
Bond yields rose each year with the exception of 
1953/54 when the bond rate of 4i per cent appealed to the market 
as reasonable. In other respects also this year will rank as 
one of the most stable on record. However, for the period as 
a whole our analysis shows that interest rates in Australia were 
not easily reduced once they had been permitted to rise. The 
rigidity of the monetary system stems from the absence of a Bank 
rate to signal changes in monetary conditions and lack of a 
developed money market to transmit changes in the monetary 
situation readily to all parts of the system. Of greater 
importance however, was the presence throughout these years of 
8 widespread conviction that development must proceed in spite 
of inflationary pressure, and this imposed a continuing pressure 
on interest rates. As we saw in Part III, most countries v/ere 
subjected to similar influences in this period with rises in 
Bank rates far outnumbering falls.
In Section I, I have traced the transition from cheap 
to dear money conditions. It is clear now that if effective 
measures were to be launched against inflation - and an effective 
fiscal policy and direct controls could not be applied for 
political reasons-interest rates had to be permitted to rise 
in accordance with the realities of the market. The 
Australian Government and the Central Bank were slow to
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understand this, slower generally than monetary authorities in 
other countries. Just recently, however, there have been 
indications that the Australian financial system is being 
rapidly transformed with definite signs of the development of an 
active market in short-term money. If this trend persists 
- and there is every indication that it will - a more flexible 
monetary policy with less likelihood of the repetition of past 
mistakes may confidently be expected in future.
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PART VII
CONCLUSION : LESSONS OF AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE
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In the t h i r t i e s  m onetary p o l ic y  was to  a la r g e  e x te n t  
su b o rd in a ted  to  th e  n eed s o f  government f in a n c e  and the m onetary  
a u t h o r i t i e s  were f e e l in g  t h e ir  way tow ards a tech n iq u e  o f  c e n tr a l  
"banking th a t  d id  n o t have to  depend upon v a r ia b le  i n t e r e s t  ra tes*  
D uring and a f t e r  th e  war the Labour A d m in istra tio n  pursued the  
cheap money p o l ic y  w ith  c o n s id e r a b le  v ig o u r  and very  few  
e co n o m is ts  q u es tio n ed  th e  wisdom o f t h i s  p o l ic y  u n t i l  1951 ♦
Cheap money was abandoned in  A u s t r a l ia ,  n o t b ecau se  o f  
a g r e a te r  aw areness o f  the advan tages o f  a f l e x i b l e  m onetary 
p o l i c y  in  a r a p id ly  expanding economy, but b ecau se  the degree o f  
m arket support n e c e ss a r y  to  r e ta in  i t  would have s e r io u s ly  
a g g ra v a ted  in f la t io n a r y  p r e ssu r e . As i t  w as, the r i s e  in  
i n t e r e s t  r a te s  in  1951 /52  and a g a in  in  1955/56  was a s s o c ia te d  
w ith  heavy m arket su p p o rt, which ran cou n ter  to  government 
p o l i c y  g e n e r a l ly .
Our stu dy le a d s  fu r th e r  to  the c o n c lu s io n  th a t  the  
r i s e  in  bond y i e ld s  was the outcome o f  th ree  p r in c ip a l  in f lu e n c e s
-  nam ely the rap id  r a te  o f  econom ic grow th , the f a l l  in  farm  
incom e, and th e  f a i lu r e  to  p reven t funds b e in g  d iv e r te d  from  
bonds to  d e b e n tu r e s , u n secu red  n o te s  and the l i k e .
The fundam ental cause o f  bond market weakness i s  
n o t found to  r e s t  in  the commonly a ccep ted  K eynesian  e x p la n a tio n
-  th a t  bond y i e l d s  rose  m ain ly  b ecause p eo p le  exp ected  them to  
r i s e ,  th a t  i s  to  sa y , th a t  r a te s  ro se  b ecau se  p eop le  added to  
t h e ir  s p e c u la t iv e  h o ld in g s  o f  ca sh . Thus a popular argument
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is that a succession of favourable balance of payments had 
instilled in businessmen a note of extreme confidence in the 
future« When this was upset in 1951 expectations were reversed 
because representative opinion expected rates to rise and rates 
had begun to rise overseas.
It is not suggested that this had no influence whatever 
on the situation in Australia, but it is contended that it 
cannot provide the major explanation. Bond prices fell mainly 
because of the sheer pressure of the demand for funds (for real 
investment) in relation to the supply and not primarily because 
of expectations about future interest rates. The preference 
for liquidity was related more to the needs of business expansion 
than either as a hedge against inflation or on account of fears 
for the future. Without an expansion of bank lending in 1951/52 
the rise in bond yields would have been much greater.
The restrictive credit policy was an important cause 
of the further rise in interest rates in 1955/56, as was also 
the growing competition for investible funds; but on both 
occasions it was the fall in the supply of loanable funds 
consequent upon the deficit in the balance of payments that was 
at the root of the trouble.
At the same time it should not be overlooked that 
the attainment of external balance was greatly impeded by the 
failure to contain domestic inflation and that expectations about 
the future level of prices were important in diverting funds from 
bonds and the banicing system. There was an important link
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between the general level of prices, and particularly expect­
ations of price changes, and the state of the bond market.
This effect appears to have been particularly important in 
1953/34 when fears of further price rises were allayed and the 
long-term bond rate of interest was stabilized in the market at 
per cent without the need for official support.
One of the big questions is whether a deliberate rise 
in interest rates, say in the latter part of 1950 would have 
moderated the subsequent diversion of funds and reduced the 
extent of market support. If this policy had been able to 
dispel fears of further rises in the price level, it may have 
met with success but it is very doubtful if it would have done 
so in view of the wool boom and the high level of domestic 
spending. People did not necessarily sell bonds because of 
expectations of higher interest rates to come - this is one of 
the common fallacies - but because better existing opportunities 
for investment were presenting themselves and because cash was 
needed to repay debts to provide a hedge against inflation.
Thus while saving as a whole may not be very 
responsive to a higher bond rate, the latter is an important 
consideration in times of full employment and inflation 
regarding the choice of investments to secure the highest possible 
yields consistent with maximum security. Expectations about 
the price level therefore exerted a very powerful influence on 
the bond market in Australia and those expectations were
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undoubtedly reinforced by the rise in interest rates in other 
countries.
We may, I think, conclude that there is no impelling 
evidence that Keynes* theory of speculation was confirmed by 
post-war events in Australia. Speculation was not so important 
as is popularly asserted. One of the most important lessons 
of Australian experience is that the vicissitudes of external 
trade not only make policy making an exceedingly difficult 
business but also render a flexible interest rate policy sus­
pect both on economic and political grounds. As was pointed 
out earlier, there are already indications that imperfections 
in the Australian capital market are being overcome but even 
so there are grave obstacles to the use of fLexible interest 
rates as a means of securing economic stability. Apart from 
the vicissitudes of external trade just adverted to, there is 
likely to be a continuing bias in the direction of economic 
expansion. A reasonably stable bond market is required to 
facilitate conversion operations connected with such expansion.
Nevertheless there is no particular merit in trying 
to hide from the public view the existence of pressures that 
will from time to time require a rise in interest rates. As 
a corollary it is desirable to grasp every opportunity to 
reduce interest rates so that ample scope exists for increases 
when conditions change. The second lesson then is that if we 
wish to be reasonably free of direct controls, we must come
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to accept the inevitability of changes in interest rates.
While large fluctuations in security prices are to be avoided, 
some fluctuations are inherent in the private enterprise 
system.
While there are many aspects of the problems I 
have traversed which call for further research, one of the 
most pressing needs is a study into the causes of diverging 
trends between short and long-dated security yields. I was 
only able to touch on this problem in this thesis, but I do 
believe that further research on these lines would be re­
warding.
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